Read This: March 31, 2010 03/31/2010
Mingechevir, Azerbaijan
Nabucco: The Forgotten Pipeline (RFE/RL)
Nabucco, which aims to bring some 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas to Southern and Central Europe, has long been seen as an opportunity for the EU to break a dangerous dependence on Russian gas and pipelines.
The project has stumbled so frequently on funding and supply issues that some have dismissed it as unfeasible. But it now appears on track to meet its target date for first deliveries in 2014.
The Road Behind and the Road Ahead for the Umma (Wilson Quarterly)
Since Sadat’s demise, the Arab world has struggled to find its ideological bearings. The old secular leftist ideologies of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and pan-Arabism are rarely mentioned anymore. Their last two standard-bearers, Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, proved unequal to the task of leading the Arab world and were discredited, along with the “isms” they represented. Assad, who ruled for 29 years, was able to extend his influence no farther than neighboring Lebanon. Hussein came to power in 1979 and was an international pariah after 1990, when he invaded Kuwait, a brother Arab country.
Read more after the jump ---->
Nabucco, which aims to bring some 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas to Southern and Central Europe, has long been seen as an opportunity for the EU to break a dangerous dependence on Russian gas and pipelines.
The project has stumbled so frequently on funding and supply issues that some have dismissed it as unfeasible. But it now appears on track to meet its target date for first deliveries in 2014.
The Road Behind and the Road Ahead for the Umma (Wilson Quarterly)
Since Sadat’s demise, the Arab world has struggled to find its ideological bearings. The old secular leftist ideologies of Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and pan-Arabism are rarely mentioned anymore. Their last two standard-bearers, Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, proved unequal to the task of leading the Arab world and were discredited, along with the “isms” they represented. Assad, who ruled for 29 years, was able to extend his influence no farther than neighboring Lebanon. Hussein came to power in 1979 and was an international pariah after 1990, when he invaded Kuwait, a brother Arab country.
Read more after the jump ---->
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Response to "A new START?" 03/31/2010
Guest blogger Joe Pinilla recently published an interesting piece on the new START agreement between Russia and the US and the ongoing crisis in Iran. In my view Joe got some things very right and others very wrong. In the spirit of healthy debate I offer this response:
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
Read This: March 29, 2010 03/29/2010
Qaddafi of Arabia (Al Jazeera)
Gaddafi has always seen himself as Nasser's natural successor as a unifying factor and the leader of the ummah. The longest serving Arab leader has tried to forge several unity projects with a number of Arab nations such as Egypt, Syria and Sudan. These attempts were no doubt a failure due to the lack of political will, and perhaps because leaders of these nations refused to allow such a maverick politician to lead them even if that was on rotational basis.
So Allawi Won... What Next? (TNR)
What does this confusion and uncertainty mean for the United States? There’s good news and bad. The good news is that U.S. officials generally feel they can work with either Maliki or Allawi, both known quantities with good relations in Washington. (This is more true of Allawi, a former Iraqi opposition leader in exile who worked closely with the CIA before the war; America has been growing impatient with some of Maliki’s recent strongman tendencies, which is not to say that Allawi is a pure Jeffersonian either.)
The bad news is that the longer it takes Iraq to form a government, and the more rancorous that process becomes, the more likely some factions are to win political leverage through violence, which is what happened after the country’s 2006 national election, fueling Iraq’s horrific civil war. Though informed opinion is divided on whether this is a realistic scenario, it’s impossible to rule out the possibility of a return to bloody anarchy.
Damrosch Humanizes Tocqueville (Review in The American Prospect)
Damrosch's recounting of Tocqueville's and Beaumont's journey, told in straightforward chronological order, is often entertaining as well as instructive, quite apart from the depictions of the two travelers leering at their hosts' daughters and the daughters' friends. Coming out of the forest in Michigan Territory, Tocqueville and Beaumont are startled to run across a man who looks like an Indian but speaks French, one of the local métis of mixed French and Indian blood. A strange symbolic scene unfolds, of Tocqueville being paddled down a river in a dugout canoe by the stranger, a bright summer half moon hanging above the wilderness horizon, the canoe coursing slowly through the thickest New World thickets while the métis sings an ancient French song: "Entre Paris et Saint-Denis/Il était une fille..."
Gaddafi has always seen himself as Nasser's natural successor as a unifying factor and the leader of the ummah. The longest serving Arab leader has tried to forge several unity projects with a number of Arab nations such as Egypt, Syria and Sudan. These attempts were no doubt a failure due to the lack of political will, and perhaps because leaders of these nations refused to allow such a maverick politician to lead them even if that was on rotational basis.
So Allawi Won... What Next? (TNR)
What does this confusion and uncertainty mean for the United States? There’s good news and bad. The good news is that U.S. officials generally feel they can work with either Maliki or Allawi, both known quantities with good relations in Washington. (This is more true of Allawi, a former Iraqi opposition leader in exile who worked closely with the CIA before the war; America has been growing impatient with some of Maliki’s recent strongman tendencies, which is not to say that Allawi is a pure Jeffersonian either.)
The bad news is that the longer it takes Iraq to form a government, and the more rancorous that process becomes, the more likely some factions are to win political leverage through violence, which is what happened after the country’s 2006 national election, fueling Iraq’s horrific civil war. Though informed opinion is divided on whether this is a realistic scenario, it’s impossible to rule out the possibility of a return to bloody anarchy.
Damrosch Humanizes Tocqueville (Review in The American Prospect)
Damrosch's recounting of Tocqueville's and Beaumont's journey, told in straightforward chronological order, is often entertaining as well as instructive, quite apart from the depictions of the two travelers leering at their hosts' daughters and the daughters' friends. Coming out of the forest in Michigan Territory, Tocqueville and Beaumont are startled to run across a man who looks like an Indian but speaks French, one of the local métis of mixed French and Indian blood. A strange symbolic scene unfolds, of Tocqueville being paddled down a river in a dugout canoe by the stranger, a bright summer half moon hanging above the wilderness horizon, the canoe coursing slowly through the thickest New World thickets while the métis sings an ancient French song: "Entre Paris et Saint-Denis/Il était une fille..."
Passover at the White House 03/29/2010
The right wing in Israel is increasingly unhinged from reality
As Jews around the world prepare to celebrate Pessah [Passover] – the festival of freedom – President Obama’s condescending and insulting behavior reminds us of how we were treated by Pharaoh in Egypt.
- Danny Danon, Member of Knesset, Likud
A couple of weeks have passed since the Israeli government insulted Vice President Biden during his visit to Israel, and the current crisis in US-Israeli shows no signs of abating. Right wing members of Israeli PM Netanyahu's coalition are digging in their heels and firing off invectives against Obama, insulted themselves by reports that Obama asked Netanyahu to drop the Shas Party [Ultra-Orthodox Eastern Jews) and Yisrael Beitenu [Ultra-nationalist Russian Immigrants] from his governing coalition in favor of the centrist Kadima Party. After less than a year in office, Netanyahu's boorish FM, Avigdor Lieberman, has brought relations between Israel and its most important allies, including the US, Turkey, the UK, and Australia, to new lows.
Jews around the world begin the Passover Holiday today at sundown. In Israel especially, they will do so with a measure of melancholy. According to a recent poll, only 14% of Israelis think that Israel has a favorable standing in the world. Passover has a special significance for Israel. Many Zionists, in an effort to understand the "Jewish problem" in the 19th and 20th centuries, drew parallels between the diaspora condition of Jews in Europe to the biblical period of Jewish slavery in Egypt. Jewish life in Europe, according to this thinking, was the same as the period of ancient bondage in Egypt, and the solution also remained the same: a return to Israel.
During their march to freedom, the American Black Civil Rights movement also strongly identified with the story of the Jews' Exodus from Egypt. And in an unlikely, but perhaps fitting twist of events, President Obama became the first US President to hold what is now an annual White House Seder.
In the heat of the 2008 presidential campaign, Jewish members of Obama's team improvised a makeshift Seder in the basement of a Pennsylvania hotel. Obama himself ended up joining in, along with non-Jewish staffers, in what was a welcome respite from a grueling campaign. Customarily, diaspora Jews end the Seder with the toast "Next Year in Jerusalem". Obama half-jokingly instead toasted, "Next Year in the White House". He followed through on that:
- Danny Danon, Member of Knesset, Likud
A couple of weeks have passed since the Israeli government insulted Vice President Biden during his visit to Israel, and the current crisis in US-Israeli shows no signs of abating. Right wing members of Israeli PM Netanyahu's coalition are digging in their heels and firing off invectives against Obama, insulted themselves by reports that Obama asked Netanyahu to drop the Shas Party [Ultra-Orthodox Eastern Jews) and Yisrael Beitenu [Ultra-nationalist Russian Immigrants] from his governing coalition in favor of the centrist Kadima Party. After less than a year in office, Netanyahu's boorish FM, Avigdor Lieberman, has brought relations between Israel and its most important allies, including the US, Turkey, the UK, and Australia, to new lows.
Jews around the world begin the Passover Holiday today at sundown. In Israel especially, they will do so with a measure of melancholy. According to a recent poll, only 14% of Israelis think that Israel has a favorable standing in the world. Passover has a special significance for Israel. Many Zionists, in an effort to understand the "Jewish problem" in the 19th and 20th centuries, drew parallels between the diaspora condition of Jews in Europe to the biblical period of Jewish slavery in Egypt. Jewish life in Europe, according to this thinking, was the same as the period of ancient bondage in Egypt, and the solution also remained the same: a return to Israel.
During their march to freedom, the American Black Civil Rights movement also strongly identified with the story of the Jews' Exodus from Egypt. And in an unlikely, but perhaps fitting twist of events, President Obama became the first US President to hold what is now an annual White House Seder.
In the heat of the 2008 presidential campaign, Jewish members of Obama's team improvised a makeshift Seder in the basement of a Pennsylvania hotel. Obama himself ended up joining in, along with non-Jewish staffers, in what was a welcome respite from a grueling campaign. Customarily, diaspora Jews end the Seder with the toast "Next Year in Jerusalem". Obama half-jokingly instead toasted, "Next Year in the White House". He followed through on that:
Pete Souza/White House
For the uninitiated, Jews and Samaritans celebrate Passover yearly according to the Jewish (lunar) calendar on the 15 of Nisan, which varies with the solar Gregorian calendar. "Seder" means "order" in Hebrew, referring to the special way that Jews eat the holiday meal. Jews abstain from leavened bread for a week, to remember the ancient Jews' hurried flight from Egypt across the Sinai Desert, during which they baked bread but did not have time to wait for it to rise.
Passover typically occurs around the same time as Easter, and there is much debate over whether Jesus's Last Supper was a Passover Seder. It is not difficult to see the similarities between Jews eating wafer-thin bread with wine and the Eucharist sacrament. Less disputed is that Passover actually originated as a Newroz-style holiday of harvest, during which Jews celebrated the arrival of Spring and traveled to the Temple in Jerusalem to sacrifice sheep (Korban).
Happy holidays!
- Jon
Passover typically occurs around the same time as Easter, and there is much debate over whether Jesus's Last Supper was a Passover Seder. It is not difficult to see the similarities between Jews eating wafer-thin bread with wine and the Eucharist sacrament. Less disputed is that Passover actually originated as a Newroz-style holiday of harvest, during which Jews celebrated the arrival of Spring and traveled to the Temple in Jerusalem to sacrifice sheep (Korban).
Happy holidays!
- Jon
War Games: An Israeli Strike on Iran 03/29/2010
Alicia Cheng and Sarah Gephart, Mgmt. Design
The U.S. Department of Defense regularly runs war simulations on all sorts of interesting scenarios, which are unfortunately (for us) classified. The Brookings Institution, however, which is chock-full of former U.S. officials, did run a recent simulation. Check out the indispensable David Sanger's report here. Below is a summary of his observations:
1. By attacking without Washington's advance knowledge, Israel had the benefits of surprise and momentum - not only over the Iranians, but over its American allies - and for the first day or two, ran circles around White House crisis managers.
2. The battle quickly sucked in the whole region - and Washington. Arab leaders who might have quietly applauded an attack against Iran had to worry about the reaction in their streets. The war shifted to defending Saudi oil facilities, and Iran's use of proxies meant that other regional players quickly became involved.’
3. You can bomb facilities, but you can't bomb knowledge. Iran had not only scattered its facilities, but had also scattered its scientific and engineering leadership, in hopes of rebuilding after an attack.
4. No one won, and the United States and Israel measured success differently. In Washington, officials believed setting the Iranian program back only a few years was not worth the huge cost. In Israel, even a few years delay seemed worth the cost, and the Israelis argued that it could further undercut a fragile regime and perhaps speed its demise. Most of the Americans thought that was a pipe dream.
1. By attacking without Washington's advance knowledge, Israel had the benefits of surprise and momentum - not only over the Iranians, but over its American allies - and for the first day or two, ran circles around White House crisis managers.
2. The battle quickly sucked in the whole region - and Washington. Arab leaders who might have quietly applauded an attack against Iran had to worry about the reaction in their streets. The war shifted to defending Saudi oil facilities, and Iran's use of proxies meant that other regional players quickly became involved.’
3. You can bomb facilities, but you can't bomb knowledge. Iran had not only scattered its facilities, but had also scattered its scientific and engineering leadership, in hopes of rebuilding after an attack.
4. No one won, and the United States and Israel measured success differently. In Washington, officials believed setting the Iranian program back only a few years was not worth the huge cost. In Israel, even a few years delay seemed worth the cost, and the Israelis argued that it could further undercut a fragile regime and perhaps speed its demise. Most of the Americans thought that was a pipe dream.
A new START? 03/29/2010
Goodbye, sanctions!
Russia and the US agreed to a strategic arms reduction treaty on Friday. According to the Obama administration, this deal represents “the most comprehensive arms control agreement in two decades.” The White House also suggested that its policy of ‘pushing the reset button’ would lead to further cooperation between the two nations on other important issues.
The new agreement is actually a mixed bag. On the one hand, the decision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons should help to defuse tensions between Russia and the US. On the other hand, it does not solve the more pressing issue of disarming Iran’s nuclear program. Unless the two sides find some consensus on the proliferation of weapons technology, this accord will quickly become an after-thought.
Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council presents the biggest impediment to applying sanctions against Tehran. Not only can Moscow scuttle a unified resolution, but it can also continue to supply Iran with equipment and know-how even if other countries proceed. A defection by Russia would also provide nations that have reservations about penalizing Iran with political cover to maintain relations with the Islamic republic. Each of these outcomes would render any sanctions toothless and allow the Ahmadinejad regime to carry on developing its weapons program.
Why does Russia want another nuclear power in its backyard? Most of the Kremlin’s reluctance to act is motivated by domestic considerations. Russians value their country’s independence in international relations and resent its diminished status. Nearly sixty percent of people, for example, "deeply regret" the collapse of the USSR.
To legitimize its rule in this context, the regime engages in great-power politics and tries to set Russia up as a counterweight to American hegemony. This means that an alliance with pariah states such as Venezuela or Iran has value beyond the basic economic subtext. It also means that Russian elites see geopolitics as a zero-sum game based on self-interest and prestige. Their determination to protect Iran, in other words, has more to do with mobilizing domestic support and establishing a prominent role for Russia ‘between the West and the world’ than any worries about the Iranian people’s welfare.
Unfortunately, there is little the US can do to counteract this attitude. Trying to force Russia to take action will feed anti-American sentiments and make the Putin regime more recalcitrant. Yet conceding to Moscow’s demands will only embolden it.
A famous Russian proverb says that if you ‘give a finger, your arm will get bitten off.’ That is probably not what Mr. Obama expected when he talked about extending a hand.
-Joe
The new agreement is actually a mixed bag. On the one hand, the decision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons should help to defuse tensions between Russia and the US. On the other hand, it does not solve the more pressing issue of disarming Iran’s nuclear program. Unless the two sides find some consensus on the proliferation of weapons technology, this accord will quickly become an after-thought.
Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council presents the biggest impediment to applying sanctions against Tehran. Not only can Moscow scuttle a unified resolution, but it can also continue to supply Iran with equipment and know-how even if other countries proceed. A defection by Russia would also provide nations that have reservations about penalizing Iran with political cover to maintain relations with the Islamic republic. Each of these outcomes would render any sanctions toothless and allow the Ahmadinejad regime to carry on developing its weapons program.
Why does Russia want another nuclear power in its backyard? Most of the Kremlin’s reluctance to act is motivated by domestic considerations. Russians value their country’s independence in international relations and resent its diminished status. Nearly sixty percent of people, for example, "deeply regret" the collapse of the USSR.
To legitimize its rule in this context, the regime engages in great-power politics and tries to set Russia up as a counterweight to American hegemony. This means that an alliance with pariah states such as Venezuela or Iran has value beyond the basic economic subtext. It also means that Russian elites see geopolitics as a zero-sum game based on self-interest and prestige. Their determination to protect Iran, in other words, has more to do with mobilizing domestic support and establishing a prominent role for Russia ‘between the West and the world’ than any worries about the Iranian people’s welfare.
Unfortunately, there is little the US can do to counteract this attitude. Trying to force Russia to take action will feed anti-American sentiments and make the Putin regime more recalcitrant. Yet conceding to Moscow’s demands will only embolden it.
A famous Russian proverb says that if you ‘give a finger, your arm will get bitten off.’ That is probably not what Mr. Obama expected when he talked about extending a hand.
-Joe
Not surprisingly, the global economic downturn has significantly affected most organisations, with 62% of respondents having reported a decline in financial performance over the last 12 months and 40% of all respondents having reported a decline in financial performance over the last 12 months 40% of all respondents saying the risk of economic crime had risen due to the recession. Indeed, almost half of our respondents believed that the incidences ad cost of fraud (43% and 42%, respectively) experienced in the past year were greater compared to 12 months ago.
Given the 40%-60% split in views as to whether the recession had increased the risk or the incidence of economic crime, we expected that the 38% of organisations reporting no impact of a downturn would have better, that is lower economic crime experience. We found, however, that organisations that had not suffered from an economic downturn reported similar levels of economic crime as compared to those whose businesses had declined. We also expected that respondents reporting a stable level of financial performance would have reported fewer frauds, but they report the same frequency of incidents as the 62% or respondents reporting a decline.
Read the rest of the report here.
Given the 40%-60% split in views as to whether the recession had increased the risk or the incidence of economic crime, we expected that the 38% of organisations reporting no impact of a downturn would have better, that is lower economic crime experience. We found, however, that organisations that had not suffered from an economic downturn reported similar levels of economic crime as compared to those whose businesses had declined. We also expected that respondents reporting a stable level of financial performance would have reported fewer frauds, but they report the same frequency of incidents as the 62% or respondents reporting a decline.
Read the rest of the report here.
And Behind Door Number 2, It's Hair! 03/27/2010
Last week blood, this week hair. So what is all the actually ruckus about? Eurasia Group's Roberto Herrera-Lim explains:
Bangkok's streets are again filled with protesters this week in what will likely prove a boisterous but futile attempt to force the government's resignation. But behind all the noise, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who has been directing these demonstrations from outside the country, may well have a more subtle, longer-term agenda.
[...]
The real motive behind Thaksin's use of these protests is probably to weaken Prem [Prem Tinsulanonda, key anti Thaksin adviser to the King], which would then allow him to position himself to eventually take advantage of a government weakened by the economic crisis, to negotiate his return to the country, and to settle his many outstanding legal and financial problems. The big unknown is whether Thaksin's moves reveal that he has inside information on how and when the succession process (and resulting power struggle) will begin to unfold, and whether his rhetoric is an attempt to position himself in the conflict for power that could follow.
Bangkok's streets are again filled with protesters this week in what will likely prove a boisterous but futile attempt to force the government's resignation. But behind all the noise, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who has been directing these demonstrations from outside the country, may well have a more subtle, longer-term agenda.
[...]
The real motive behind Thaksin's use of these protests is probably to weaken Prem [Prem Tinsulanonda, key anti Thaksin adviser to the King], which would then allow him to position himself to eventually take advantage of a government weakened by the economic crisis, to negotiate his return to the country, and to settle his many outstanding legal and financial problems. The big unknown is whether Thaksin's moves reveal that he has inside information on how and when the succession process (and resulting power struggle) will begin to unfold, and whether his rhetoric is an attempt to position himself in the conflict for power that could follow.
So, Where Are We With Iran? 03/27/2010
Nigel Sheinwald, British Ambassador to the US, paints an excellent picture:
The international community has given Iran a choice between engagement and isolation. It knows from experience that it is hard to stop a determined proliferator. Iran is no exception. But the world is not without leverage.
First, unlike Saddam’s Iraq, Iran desires international respectability and goes to extraordinary lengths to portray its nuclear program as legitimate.
[See Jon's post below for a great example, ]
International censure by bodies such as the United Nations Security Council is a powerful pressure point. Since 2005, Britain, France and Germany have worked with the United States, Russia and China — the “E3 plus 3” process — to maintain a strong international consensus.
Second, the international community has many things that Iran needs — above all, technology and money — if it is to meet the demands of its growing population, nearly 70 percent of which is younger than 30 and which has a strong desire to reintegrate with the world.
Third, unlike North Korea, Iran has a pluralistic system of government and a surprisingly open society.
It is no democracy — as it showed last summer. But there are many power centers. The regime must be mindful of public opinion. This gives the international community an opportunity to influence debate inside Iran.
The international community has given Iran a choice between engagement and isolation. It knows from experience that it is hard to stop a determined proliferator. Iran is no exception. But the world is not without leverage.
First, unlike Saddam’s Iraq, Iran desires international respectability and goes to extraordinary lengths to portray its nuclear program as legitimate.
[See Jon's post below for a great example, ]
International censure by bodies such as the United Nations Security Council is a powerful pressure point. Since 2005, Britain, France and Germany have worked with the United States, Russia and China — the “E3 plus 3” process — to maintain a strong international consensus.
Second, the international community has many things that Iran needs — above all, technology and money — if it is to meet the demands of its growing population, nearly 70 percent of which is younger than 30 and which has a strong desire to reintegrate with the world.
Third, unlike North Korea, Iran has a pluralistic system of government and a surprisingly open society.
It is no democracy — as it showed last summer. But there are many power centers. The regime must be mindful of public opinion. This gives the international community an opportunity to influence debate inside Iran.
From National Nuclear Day 2008 in Iran. Yes, THAT IS an interpretive dance.
From Wired.com:
Next month, the Iranian government is inviting academics, foreign dignitaries and scientists to Tehran for a conference on — you guessed it — nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. According to Fars News Agency, the theme of the conference will be “Nuclear Energy For All, Nuclear Weapon [sic] for None.”
You gotta at least give it to them, Mahmoud and his buddies sure do have a sense of humor...
Next month, the Iranian government is inviting academics, foreign dignitaries and scientists to Tehran for a conference on — you guessed it — nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. According to Fars News Agency, the theme of the conference will be “Nuclear Energy For All, Nuclear Weapon [sic] for None.”
You gotta at least give it to them, Mahmoud and his buddies sure do have a sense of humor...
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