The NYTimes has an inspiring story about a man who quit Russia's police force on YouTube by giving a speech denouncing institutionalized corruption and bribe-taking. He was, of course, arrested, farcically charged under a statute designed to protect "state secrets", but was released after the case became an embarrassment. Now he tours Russia giving speeches against corruption, and encouraging ordinary people to bypass the Kremlin-controlled media and share their stories via YouTube. Watch him speak here (with subtitles).
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The Man Behind WikiLeaks 07/27/2010
Julian Assange has been making the interview circuit as of late. Check out the Economist's interview with him here. Love him or hate him, he's certainly a fascinating character.
Turkey and the EU 07/27/2010
David Cameron's enthusiastic backing for Turkey's EU bid makes it a good time to discuss a tricky issue.
First, let me be clear on one thing: Cameron's support for Turkey's EU bid doesn't really mean anything. The UK has strongly supported Turkey's EU bid from day one. Majority opinion in the UK sees the EU as, at most, a free trade zone. The Tories in particular love making the EU seem dysfunctional and making France squirm, and this is what the calls for Turkey's accession accomplish.
But should Turkey be allowed into the EU? It depends what the EU means to you. If the purpose of the EU is to develop a meta-state of increasingly "pooled" sovereignty, then the answer is no. The reason is not because Turkey is Muslim, relatively poor, and full of aspiring migrants. It's because Turkey is way too independent.
Click "Read More" to Continue----------->
First, let me be clear on one thing: Cameron's support for Turkey's EU bid doesn't really mean anything. The UK has strongly supported Turkey's EU bid from day one. Majority opinion in the UK sees the EU as, at most, a free trade zone. The Tories in particular love making the EU seem dysfunctional and making France squirm, and this is what the calls for Turkey's accession accomplish.
But should Turkey be allowed into the EU? It depends what the EU means to you. If the purpose of the EU is to develop a meta-state of increasingly "pooled" sovereignty, then the answer is no. The reason is not because Turkey is Muslim, relatively poor, and full of aspiring migrants. It's because Turkey is way too independent.
Click "Read More" to Continue----------->
More fuel for the COIN debate from Condra et al.:
This paper analyzes the impact of civilian casualties on insurgent violence in the conflict in Afghanistan using micro-level, geocoded data on civilian casualties and violence between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units and insurgents. We employ a series of analytic comparisons to distinguish between four prominent theories on the how civilian casualties may affect violence: revenge, recruitment, population-provided information, and insurgent group capacity. Separating out levels of future violence from long-run trends (a 3-period moving average) allows us to distinguish the short-run ‘information’ and ‘capacity’ effects from the longer run ‘recruiting’ and ‘revenge’ effects. Examining differences in the impact of events that kill women and children from those that kill men allows us to separate the ‘information’ and ‘capacity’ effects. Studying how local responses to local civilian casualties differ from local response to civilians casualties in other parts of the country helps disentangle the ‘recruiting’ and ‘revenge’ effects. [...]
In Afghanistan we find strong evidence for a revenge effect in that local exposure to ISAF generated civilian casualties drives increased insurgent
violence over the long-run. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 6 additional violent incidents in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks. There is no evidence of short run effects in Afghanistan, thus ruling out the information and the capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting insurgents‘ mobilizing tools may be quite conflict-specific. Our results show that if counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan wish to minimize insurgent recruitment, they must minimize harm to civilians despite the greater risk this entails.
This paper analyzes the impact of civilian casualties on insurgent violence in the conflict in Afghanistan using micro-level, geocoded data on civilian casualties and violence between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units and insurgents. We employ a series of analytic comparisons to distinguish between four prominent theories on the how civilian casualties may affect violence: revenge, recruitment, population-provided information, and insurgent group capacity. Separating out levels of future violence from long-run trends (a 3-period moving average) allows us to distinguish the short-run ‘information’ and ‘capacity’ effects from the longer run ‘recruiting’ and ‘revenge’ effects. Examining differences in the impact of events that kill women and children from those that kill men allows us to separate the ‘information’ and ‘capacity’ effects. Studying how local responses to local civilian casualties differ from local response to civilians casualties in other parts of the country helps disentangle the ‘recruiting’ and ‘revenge’ effects. [...]
In Afghanistan we find strong evidence for a revenge effect in that local exposure to ISAF generated civilian casualties drives increased insurgent
violence over the long-run. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 6 additional violent incidents in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks. There is no evidence of short run effects in Afghanistan, thus ruling out the information and the capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting insurgents‘ mobilizing tools may be quite conflict-specific. Our results show that if counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan wish to minimize insurgent recruitment, they must minimize harm to civilians despite the greater risk this entails.
How to Sell a Tank 07/25/2010
Strategies range from the mild (above) to the manic (below)
From Popular Science via the Danger Room
Absurdity On The Streets 07/22/2010
Soviet Lessons 07/21/2010
Don't go that way
Drawing parallels between the Soviet and American occupations of Afghanistan has become a cottage industry in recent years. Yet most policy makers and observers miss the actual convergence between these operations in all the superficial talk of ‘the graveyard of empires.’ If the US expects to avoid a disastrous withdrawal and another civil war, it urgently needs to re-examine the lessons of the USSR’s experience in Afghanistan.
The overlap between the two cases begins with tactics. For one thing, the Soviets repeatedly bombed the borderlands of Pakistan, believing that these attacks would deny their enemies a sanctuary and so weaken the insurgency. For another, they tried to win hearts and minds by installing a ‘progressive’ regime based on Western (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) principles. That both of these attempts failed miserably suggests that neither the coalition’s efforts to construct another alien political system nor its moves to destroy Taliban resistance are likely to succeed. Rather, the US should convince Kabul to declare a general amnesty and form a coalition government.
Click here to read more-->
The overlap between the two cases begins with tactics. For one thing, the Soviets repeatedly bombed the borderlands of Pakistan, believing that these attacks would deny their enemies a sanctuary and so weaken the insurgency. For another, they tried to win hearts and minds by installing a ‘progressive’ regime based on Western (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) principles. That both of these attempts failed miserably suggests that neither the coalition’s efforts to construct another alien political system nor its moves to destroy Taliban resistance are likely to succeed. Rather, the US should convince Kabul to declare a general amnesty and form a coalition government.
Click here to read more-->
Hezbollah opens a theme park devoted to its struggle against Israel.
Democratic Earthquake Theory 07/19/2010
Alastair Smith and Alejandro Quiroz Flores explain why democracies respond better to natural disasters:
Political survival lies at the heart of disaster politics. Unless politicians are beholden to the people, they have little motivation to spend resources to protect their citizens from Mother Nature, especially when these resources could otherwise be earmarked for themselves and their small cadre of supporters. What is worse, the casualty count after a disaster is a major determinant of the amount of international assistance a country receives. Relief funds can even enhance a nondemocrat’s hold on power if they are used to buy off supporting elites. Given such incentives, autocrats’ indifference to disaster-related deaths will continue. The fix can only be political -- leaders will not use the policies already available to mitigate the effects of natural disasters until they have the incentives to do so.
Read the rest of the article here.
Political survival lies at the heart of disaster politics. Unless politicians are beholden to the people, they have little motivation to spend resources to protect their citizens from Mother Nature, especially when these resources could otherwise be earmarked for themselves and their small cadre of supporters. What is worse, the casualty count after a disaster is a major determinant of the amount of international assistance a country receives. Relief funds can even enhance a nondemocrat’s hold on power if they are used to buy off supporting elites. Given such incentives, autocrats’ indifference to disaster-related deaths will continue. The fix can only be political -- leaders will not use the policies already available to mitigate the effects of natural disasters until they have the incentives to do so.
Read the rest of the article here.
From an NY Times piece on tax collection (or lack thereof) in Pakistan:
Out of more than 170 million Pakistanis, fewer than 2 percent pay income tax, making Pakistan’s revenue from taxes among the lowest in the world, a notch below Sierra Leone’s as a ratio of tax to gross domestic product.
This might sound like paradise to some, but as a Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, taxes are the price that we pay for civilization. A government's ability to collect revenue is a good proxy for judging the writ, legitimacy, and competence of a state. Pakistan looks to be failing in all three.
Out of more than 170 million Pakistanis, fewer than 2 percent pay income tax, making Pakistan’s revenue from taxes among the lowest in the world, a notch below Sierra Leone’s as a ratio of tax to gross domestic product.
This might sound like paradise to some, but as a Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, taxes are the price that we pay for civilization. A government's ability to collect revenue is a good proxy for judging the writ, legitimacy, and competence of a state. Pakistan looks to be failing in all three.
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