Memoirs of the Taliban 02/23/2010
 Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former minister in Afghanistan's Taliban government and the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, published his memoirs this winter. He was released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005. His writings contain lots of juicy tidbits about the relationship between Pakistan's notorious ISI intelligence services and the Taliban. Money quote from Steve Coll's commentary: While in office, Zaeef found that he “couldn’t entirely avoid” the influence of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Its officers volunteered money and political support. Late in 2001, as the United States prepared to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the I.S.I.’s then commanding general, Mahmud Ahmad, visited Zaeef’s home in Islamabad, wept in solidarity, and promised, “We want to assure you that you will not be alone in this jihad against America. We will be with you.” And yet Zaeef never trusted his I.S.I. patrons. He sought to protect the Taliban’s independence: “I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out.” Read the Telegraph's review here.  A serious question: When did the New York Times editorial board decide it doesn't give a @#%$ about quality? Andrew Rosenthal et al. began February with Adam B. Lowther's bizarre argument that Iran getting the bomb wouldn't be such a bad thing. For those of you that missed it, Lowther lists five potential benefits that include Israel and Palestine getting serious about a peace deal, helping the US break OPEC, and forcing Arab states to pay for the "War on Terror." (Stephen Walt has the unnecessary full take-down here.) It's almost as if the editorial board felt bad for making the Iran hawks look stupid by publishing Alan Kuperman's ludicrous Iran invasion plan back in December and decided to right the wrong by publishing something equally stupid from the other side. This week the bizarro NYT Op-Ed page got even worse with the publication of Lara M. Dadkhah's views on why we need more civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The piece is an annoying combination of callous bravado and complete naivete: "So in a modern refashioning of the obvious — that war is harmful to civilian populations — the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim." You know those tough dudes at college who love 24, sleep with a copy of The Prince under their pillow and won't stop taking your ear off about how although Hitler was a sicko he certainly knew how to motivate people? Something tells Dadkhah was/is one of those people. To the point that civilian casualties historical haven't been an issue, um... remember the last time a superpower tried to invade Afghanistan? Thankfully Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova over at Newsweek do: More after the jump ---> Taliban #2 Captured in Pakistan 02/16/2010
This is big news, and causes a pause to reconsider how half-assed the original invasion of Afghanistan was. I personally was surprised that Mullah Baradar was found in Karachi, not in the tribal regions. Karachi is Pakistan's biggest city and financial center. Juan Cole's analysis: Obama's drone attacks on the Taliban leadership forced Mullah Baradar and some other commanders to relocate to the southern port city of Karachi, hundreds of miles from the action in the tribal areas of the northwest. He is said to attempted to restructure the military command of the Taliban in fall of 2009, but met a good deal of resistance. The episode is said to have resulted in poor morale in the Old Taliban. My own suspicion is that Mullah Baradar was behind the violence against Shiites in Karachi this winter. Provoking Sunni-Shiite violence so as to destabilize Pakistan's financial and industrial hub would be a typical al-Qaeda tactic. The bombings succeeded in provoking major riots and property damage. But when you hurt stock prices and harm government revenues, you rather draw the attention to yourself of the country's elite and their security forces, since you have mightily inconvenienced them. As long as the Old Taliban were mainly bothering the government of Hamid Karzai over the border in Pakistan, the ISI might have been able to turn a blind eye to them. But if they were going to cause billions of dollars of damage to Karachi, which they did this winter, that is intolerable. I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that Mullah Baradar's capture will destroy the Old Taliban. And even if that organization is weakened, there are at least three other major insurgent groups only loosely connected to them, which have the operational autonomy and resources to go on fighting. Certainly, we shouldn't jump to any conclusions that this will precipitate the collapse of the Taliban. However, the same was said about killing Zarqawi and the durability of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Combined with the surge and proposals for buying off middle and lower ranking insurgents, this does start resembling the Iraq case. If the recent events also signal a change in Pakistan's posture-- then, perhaps, this could be the beginning of the end. Update: Members of the Taliban moved to Karachi to get out of the range of drone attacks. Karachi has 3 million Pashtuns, mostly living in ghettos where the Taliban can blend in. Charlie Wilson Dead at 76 02/10/2010
 Charlie Wilson finds his inner mujahedeen during the 1980s. Charlie Wilson, the former congressmen who lead US efforts support to the Afghan mujahedeen against Soviets, died today at 76. Tom Hanks immortalized Wilson's legacy in the movie Charlie Wilson's War. It is a legacy troubled by the moral paradox of America's relationship with the Afghan mujahedeen over the past 30 years. In an earlier era, the mujahedeen were valiant freedom fighters. Today, they are insurgent terrorists. To Charlie Wilson's credit, he was a lonely voice calling for the U.S. to help rebuild Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Perhaps this might have staved off the Afghan civil war and prevented the rise of the mujaheeden's rise to power as the Taliban. I don't think so, but we'll never know. Busy managing the collapse of communism and fighting Saddam Hussein, America turned its attention away from Afghanistan. Everybody knows the rest of the story. The war that we never wanted to be ours, Charlie Wilson's war, has now become America's war. This time, it is our legacy, and how we want to be remembered as a nation, that is at stake. We musn't turn our backs on the Afghan people again. Tribal Time 01/31/2010
 Photo Credit: AP What do the Populzai, Alikozai, and Barakzai all have in common? Don't know? Well then you need the NYT's quick and dirty 5-step guide to understanding the Afghan tribal system. American Exceptionalism 01/26/2010
 After Karzai reads that Eikenberry referred to him as 'not adequate' there will probably be less handshakes to go around Now you too can read the confidential cables that the US Ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, sent to the U.S. Secretary of State (and ultimately, President Obama) on his doubts about the U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan. Basically, Ambassador Eikenberry is arguing that Afghanistan lacks the civilian capacity to build on or institutionalize any security gains made by an increase in America forces. He doesn't think that Karzai has what it takes. Secondly, he points out that without any comprehensive way of addressing the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan, there cannot be a long-term solution to Afghanistan's problems. His alternative suggestion--basically more deliberations--leaves something to be desired. Only in the United States do secret documents get leaked in part immediately and released in full 3 months later. Afghani Optimism By The Numbers 01/11/2010
 According to a recent survey by the BBC, Afghans are decidedly optimistic about prospects for their country in the coming years. Even more importantly, support for the Taliban continues to wane. Only 6% of Afghans surveyed said they wanted to live under a Taliban-led regime, while 90% said they preferred the current government. Check out the full results here and the BBC story here. Afghan Photojournal 01/05/2010
 Gorgeous photos from Afghanistan over at Foreign Policy. The picture above, shot last year, is probably not that much different than scenes from 1000 years ago. Intelligence Failure 01/05/2010
All the talk about Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the al-Qaeda "triple agent", is obscuring real problems with America's intelligence gathering efforts in Afghanistan. Everyone loves a good spy story, but the issue in Afghanistan isn't that CIA was fooled by an al-Qaeda operative (all espionage comes with significant risk) but that America's intelligence community has basically failed to provide even the simplest of information about the way Afghanistan works to policy makers and military leaders. Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, U.S. intelligence chief in Afghanistan and a PBOM favorite, recently published a scathing review of the American intelligence community's work in Afghanistan. From the introduction: Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency. His recommendations for improvement are also well worth a read. Check out the full report here. Will the Muslim Moderates Please Stand Up? 01/03/2010
 The Pakistani Taliban carry out 'sharia law' 25km outside of Peshawar, Pakistan Many people view the current struggle against Islamic extremism as a battle for hearts and minds. Within this framework, only a reform from within Islam can defeat fundamentalism. If this is true, then the Muslim moderates have to stand up. But when will that happen? This is a common refrain of Thomas Friedman, and it was the question posed recently by Paul Drescher, in response to my post What the Taliban Stand For. The argument goes something like this: On a global scale, Muslims bomb mosques every year. They strap detonators to their belt for suicide missions that they know will kill innocent women and children. Although they carry out these actions in the name of Islam, the Quran forbids both suicide and the slaughter of women and children. Most victims of this nihilistic barbarism are other Muslims. Such savagery will only end when the umma (Muslim community) condemns this blasphemy with the same zeal that it protested the Danish cartoons… It’s a seductive argument, but it’s misplaced. Extremism doesn’t flourish because moderates are too quiet. It flourishes because it is more relevant to a given context. Click "Read More" to Continue-------> | By Evan Tachovsky and Jon Friedman
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