Happy Hour: The Afghan Edition 05/21/2010
Cold cuts + beer + this vid = happy hour.
Evan
Evan
Add Comment
Remember the Arrest of Mullah Baradar? 05/10/2010
Baradar might hate infidels, but he loves the iPhone
Mullah Baradar is the Taliban number 2, and was arrested by the Pakistani ISI in January. It was a bizarre episode, because Mullah Baradar was the reported lynchpin in Karzai's efforts to secure a peace deal with Taliban. Well, check out the indispensable Ahmed Rashid for this tidbit on Baradar's arrest:
When Karzai visited Islamabad on March 10 to find out why his interlocutor Mullah Baradar was arrested, he was, according to Afghan officials, bluntly told by Pakistan's generals that the Americans are bound to leave and that if he wanted Pakistani help resolving issues with the Taliban, he would first have to close Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistani officials deny threatening Karzai and insist that they want a peaceful and stable Afghanistan once the Americans leave. But other sources have confirmed that such ultimatums were delivered.
The ISI playing hardball? Couldn't be...
When Karzai visited Islamabad on March 10 to find out why his interlocutor Mullah Baradar was arrested, he was, according to Afghan officials, bluntly told by Pakistan's generals that the Americans are bound to leave and that if he wanted Pakistani help resolving issues with the Taliban, he would first have to close Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistani officials deny threatening Karzai and insist that they want a peaceful and stable Afghanistan once the Americans leave. But other sources have confirmed that such ultimatums were delivered.
The ISI playing hardball? Couldn't be...
Sunday Afternoon Read 05/09/2010
Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002-2009 by Alec Barker
This study both acknowledges and scrutinizes the so-called “Iraq effect,” which posits a central role for veterans of the Iraq insurgency in the evolution of Taliban IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in Afghanistan. Without debunking the Iraq effect, we find additional causes and contributing factors – such as the influence of Kashmiri fighters – as well as instances in Afghanistan and Pakistan that predated or conflicted with those in Iraq. While acknowledging local reasons for bombings and bomb innovation, we also suggest a phenomenon of generalized and global TTP acceleration in which generations of terrorists and insurgents take progressively shorter periods of time to accomplish advances in IED TTPs, supported by information-sharing and training among fighters and improvements in available components.
This study both acknowledges and scrutinizes the so-called “Iraq effect,” which posits a central role for veterans of the Iraq insurgency in the evolution of Taliban IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in Afghanistan. Without debunking the Iraq effect, we find additional causes and contributing factors – such as the influence of Kashmiri fighters – as well as instances in Afghanistan and Pakistan that predated or conflicted with those in Iraq. While acknowledging local reasons for bombings and bomb innovation, we also suggest a phenomenon of generalized and global TTP acceleration in which generations of terrorists and insurgents take progressively shorter periods of time to accomplish advances in IED TTPs, supported by information-sharing and training among fighters and improvements in available components.
Memoirs of the Taliban 02/23/2010
Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former minister in Afghanistan's Taliban government and the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, published his memoirs this winter. He was released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005.
His writings contain lots of juicy tidbits about the relationship between Pakistan's notorious ISI intelligence services and the Taliban. Money quote from Steve Coll's commentary:
While in office, Zaeef found that he “couldn’t entirely avoid” the influence of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Its officers volunteered money and political support. Late in 2001, as the United States prepared to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the I.S.I.’s then commanding general, Mahmud Ahmad, visited Zaeef’s home in Islamabad, wept in solidarity, and promised, “We want to assure you that you will not be alone in this jihad against America. We will be with you.” And yet Zaeef never trusted his I.S.I. patrons. He sought to protect the Taliban’s independence: “I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out.”
Read the Telegraph's review here.
His writings contain lots of juicy tidbits about the relationship between Pakistan's notorious ISI intelligence services and the Taliban. Money quote from Steve Coll's commentary:
While in office, Zaeef found that he “couldn’t entirely avoid” the influence of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Its officers volunteered money and political support. Late in 2001, as the United States prepared to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the I.S.I.’s then commanding general, Mahmud Ahmad, visited Zaeef’s home in Islamabad, wept in solidarity, and promised, “We want to assure you that you will not be alone in this jihad against America. We will be with you.” And yet Zaeef never trusted his I.S.I. patrons. He sought to protect the Taliban’s independence: “I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out.”
Read the Telegraph's review here.
A serious question: When did the New York Times editorial board decide it doesn't give a @#%$ about quality?
Andrew Rosenthal et al. began February with Adam B. Lowther's bizarre argument that Iran getting the bomb wouldn't be such a bad thing. For those of you that missed it, Lowther lists five potential benefits that include Israel and Palestine getting serious about a peace deal, helping the US break OPEC, and forcing Arab states to pay for the "War on Terror." (Stephen Walt has the unnecessary full take-down here.) It's almost as if the editorial board felt bad for making the Iran hawks look stupid by publishing Alan Kuperman's ludicrous Iran invasion plan back in December and decided to right the wrong by publishing something equally stupid from the other side.
This week the bizarro NYT Op-Ed page got even worse with the publication of Lara M. Dadkhah's views on why we need more civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The piece is an annoying combination of callous bravado and complete naivete:
"So in a modern refashioning of the obvious — that war is harmful to civilian populations — the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim."
You know those tough dudes at college who love 24, sleep with a copy of The Prince under their pillow and won't stop taking your ear off about how although Hitler was a sicko but he certainly knew how to motivate people? Something tells Dadkhah was/is one of those people.
To the point that civilian casualties historical haven't been an issue, um... remember the last time a superpower tried to invade Afghanistan? Thankfully Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova over at Newsweek do:
More after the jump --->
Andrew Rosenthal et al. began February with Adam B. Lowther's bizarre argument that Iran getting the bomb wouldn't be such a bad thing. For those of you that missed it, Lowther lists five potential benefits that include Israel and Palestine getting serious about a peace deal, helping the US break OPEC, and forcing Arab states to pay for the "War on Terror." (Stephen Walt has the unnecessary full take-down here.) It's almost as if the editorial board felt bad for making the Iran hawks look stupid by publishing Alan Kuperman's ludicrous Iran invasion plan back in December and decided to right the wrong by publishing something equally stupid from the other side.
This week the bizarro NYT Op-Ed page got even worse with the publication of Lara M. Dadkhah's views on why we need more civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The piece is an annoying combination of callous bravado and complete naivete:
"So in a modern refashioning of the obvious — that war is harmful to civilian populations — the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim."
You know those tough dudes at college who love 24, sleep with a copy of The Prince under their pillow and won't stop taking your ear off about how although Hitler was a sicko but he certainly knew how to motivate people? Something tells Dadkhah was/is one of those people.
To the point that civilian casualties historical haven't been an issue, um... remember the last time a superpower tried to invade Afghanistan? Thankfully Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova over at Newsweek do:
More after the jump --->
Taliban #2 Captured in Pakistan 02/16/2010
This is big news, and causes a pause to reconsider how half-assed the original invasion of Afghanistan was. I personally was surprised that Mullah Baradar was found in Karachi, not in the tribal regions. Karachi is Pakistan's biggest city and financial center. Juan Cole's analysis:
Obama's drone attacks on the Taliban leadership forced Mullah Baradar and some other commanders to relocate to the southern port city of Karachi, hundreds of miles from the action in the tribal areas of the northwest. He is said to attempted to restructure the military command of the Taliban in fall of 2009, but met a good deal of resistance. The episode is said to have resulted in poor morale in the Old Taliban.
My own suspicion is that Mullah Baradar was behind the violence against Shiites in Karachi this winter. Provoking Sunni-Shiite violence so as to destabilize Pakistan's financial and industrial hub would be a typical al-Qaeda tactic. The bombings succeeded in provoking major riots and property damage. But when you hurt stock prices and harm government revenues, you rather draw the attention to yourself of the country's elite and their security forces, since you have mightily inconvenienced them. As long as the Old Taliban were mainly bothering the government of Hamid Karzai over the border in Pakistan, the ISI might have been able to turn a blind eye to them. But if they were going to cause billions of dollars of damage to Karachi, which they did this winter, that is intolerable.
I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that Mullah Baradar's capture will destroy the Old Taliban. And even if that organization is weakened, there are at least three other major insurgent groups only loosely connected to them, which have the operational autonomy and resources to go on fighting.
Certainly, we shouldn't jump to any conclusions that this will precipitate the collapse of the Taliban. However, the same was said about killing Zarqawi and the durability of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Combined with the surge and proposals for buying off middle and lower ranking insurgents, this does start resembling the Iraq case. If the recent events also signal a change in Pakistan's posture-- then, perhaps, this could be the beginning of the end.
Update: Members of the Taliban moved to Karachi to get out of the range of drone attacks. Karachi has 3 million Pashtuns, mostly living in ghettos where the Taliban can blend in.
Obama's drone attacks on the Taliban leadership forced Mullah Baradar and some other commanders to relocate to the southern port city of Karachi, hundreds of miles from the action in the tribal areas of the northwest. He is said to attempted to restructure the military command of the Taliban in fall of 2009, but met a good deal of resistance. The episode is said to have resulted in poor morale in the Old Taliban.
My own suspicion is that Mullah Baradar was behind the violence against Shiites in Karachi this winter. Provoking Sunni-Shiite violence so as to destabilize Pakistan's financial and industrial hub would be a typical al-Qaeda tactic. The bombings succeeded in provoking major riots and property damage. But when you hurt stock prices and harm government revenues, you rather draw the attention to yourself of the country's elite and their security forces, since you have mightily inconvenienced them. As long as the Old Taliban were mainly bothering the government of Hamid Karzai over the border in Pakistan, the ISI might have been able to turn a blind eye to them. But if they were going to cause billions of dollars of damage to Karachi, which they did this winter, that is intolerable.
I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that Mullah Baradar's capture will destroy the Old Taliban. And even if that organization is weakened, there are at least three other major insurgent groups only loosely connected to them, which have the operational autonomy and resources to go on fighting.
Certainly, we shouldn't jump to any conclusions that this will precipitate the collapse of the Taliban. However, the same was said about killing Zarqawi and the durability of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Combined with the surge and proposals for buying off middle and lower ranking insurgents, this does start resembling the Iraq case. If the recent events also signal a change in Pakistan's posture-- then, perhaps, this could be the beginning of the end.
Update: Members of the Taliban moved to Karachi to get out of the range of drone attacks. Karachi has 3 million Pashtuns, mostly living in ghettos where the Taliban can blend in.
Charlie Wilson Dead at 76 02/10/2010
Charlie Wilson finds his inner mujahedeen during the 1980s.
Charlie Wilson, the former congressmen who lead US efforts support to the Afghan mujahedeen against Soviets, died today at 76.
Tom Hanks immortalized Wilson's legacy in the movie Charlie Wilson's War. It is a legacy troubled by the moral paradox of America's relationship with the Afghan mujahedeen over the past 30 years. In an earlier era, the mujahedeen were valiant freedom fighters. Today, they are insurgent terrorists.
To Charlie Wilson's credit, he was a lonely voice calling for the U.S. to help rebuild Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Perhaps this might have staved off the Afghan civil war and prevented the rise of the mujaheeden's rise to power as the Taliban. I don't think so, but we'll never know. Busy managing the collapse of communism and fighting Saddam Hussein, America turned its attention away from Afghanistan.
Everybody knows the rest of the story. The war that we never wanted to be ours, Charlie Wilson's war, has now become America's war. This time, it is our legacy, and how we want to be remembered as a nation, that is at stake. We musn't turn our backs on the Afghan people again.
Tom Hanks immortalized Wilson's legacy in the movie Charlie Wilson's War. It is a legacy troubled by the moral paradox of America's relationship with the Afghan mujahedeen over the past 30 years. In an earlier era, the mujahedeen were valiant freedom fighters. Today, they are insurgent terrorists.
To Charlie Wilson's credit, he was a lonely voice calling for the U.S. to help rebuild Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Perhaps this might have staved off the Afghan civil war and prevented the rise of the mujaheeden's rise to power as the Taliban. I don't think so, but we'll never know. Busy managing the collapse of communism and fighting Saddam Hussein, America turned its attention away from Afghanistan.
Everybody knows the rest of the story. The war that we never wanted to be ours, Charlie Wilson's war, has now become America's war. This time, it is our legacy, and how we want to be remembered as a nation, that is at stake. We musn't turn our backs on the Afghan people again.
Tribal Time 01/31/2010
Photo Credit: AP
What do the Populzai, Alikozai, and Barakzai all have in common?
Don't know? Well then you need the NYT's quick and dirty 5-step guide to understanding the Afghan tribal system.
Don't know? Well then you need the NYT's quick and dirty 5-step guide to understanding the Afghan tribal system.
American Exceptionalism 01/26/2010
After Karzai reads that Eikenberry referred to him as 'not adequate' there will probably be less handshakes to go around
Now you too can read the confidential cables that the US Ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, sent to the U.S. Secretary of State (and ultimately, President Obama) on his doubts about the U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan.
Basically, Ambassador Eikenberry is arguing that Afghanistan lacks the civilian capacity to build on or institutionalize any security gains made by an increase in America forces. He doesn't think that Karzai has what it takes. Secondly, he points out that without any comprehensive way of addressing the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan, there cannot be a long-term solution to Afghanistan's problems. His alternative suggestion--basically more deliberations--leaves something to be desired.
Only in the United States do secret documents get leaked in part immediately and released in full 3 months later.
Basically, Ambassador Eikenberry is arguing that Afghanistan lacks the civilian capacity to build on or institutionalize any security gains made by an increase in America forces. He doesn't think that Karzai has what it takes. Secondly, he points out that without any comprehensive way of addressing the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan, there cannot be a long-term solution to Afghanistan's problems. His alternative suggestion--basically more deliberations--leaves something to be desired.
Only in the United States do secret documents get leaked in part immediately and released in full 3 months later.
Afghani Optimism By The Numbers 01/11/2010
According to a recent survey by the BBC, Afghans are decidedly optimistic about prospects for their country in the coming years. Even more importantly, support for the Taliban continues to wane. Only 6% of Afghans surveyed said they wanted to live under a Taliban-led regime, while 90% said they preferred the current government.
Check out the full results here and the BBC story here.
Check out the full results here and the BBC story here.
Loading
