Gambling analogies aside (you have no idea how tempted I was to use a Lady Gaga/Khamenei photo mash-up for this post), it is clear that Khamenei's only hope now is to out-last or out-muscle the protesters and the political elites they represent.

In a characteristically dour speech following Friday prayers, Khamenei said that the election was fair and that the results were not up for debate. He blamed outside influence, specifically British agents, for the recent demonstrations.

It seems to me that Khamenei had two main objectives: first, signal that a crackdown is forthcoming if the protests don't stop and second rally his supporters for what may prove to be a bloody battle, both figuratively and literally.

Strategically, this move makes sense. Khamenei's survival is now invariably linked to Ahmadinejad's presidency and the support of hardliners in the security service, Republican Guard, and militia. Any sign of weakness will in turn weaken his hand with these actors. There is little chance that he will be able to coax the protesters out of the street, so Khamenei must prepare to force them.

Its is going to be an interesting weekend.

Update: Sullivan has the transcript here.

Update 2: Also, just imagine how this speech would have read if Obama had come out in support of Mousavi. Obama did the right thing in not giving Khamenei political material.

-Evan

Excellent coverage from Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra (who sounds strangely like dracula).

Since the Revolution in 1979, Iranian politics have been shaped by the actions of  political and religious elites who operate well outside of the public sphere. For all of the dramatic marches and university crackdowns, the current crisis in Iran is at its core the result of conflict between these rival elites. Even more importantly, the resolution will be the result of victory by one group or a tenuous compromise between them.

Predicting the exact trajectory of events in Iran in the coming weeks and months is a fool's task. That said, a firm grasp of the Iranian political system and  the elites who inhabit it will go a long way toward understanding the events as they occur. I recommend the BBC's brief guide to the Iranian political system as a good starting point.

From the BBC

In the aftermath of Iran's tumultuous election, Ayatollah Khamenei's increasingly public support for incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has come as somewhat of a shock to me. In effect, Khamenei has bet his own fortune and the fortune of the clerical elite that Ahmadinejad, with the support of the security services and hardline militias, will be able to put down the riots raging in the streets of Tehran.  (For graphic coverage of the ongoing battles between protesters and police check out Andrew Sullivan's blog The Daily Dish.)

This move is very different from Khamenei's reaction to the election of reform-minded President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. In that case Khamenei used his considerable influence to undermine almost every aspect of Khatami's agenda without open confrontation. (For a very interesting account of how Khamenei used Khatami as a scapegoat for a series of crackdowns on student protesters click here.) In fact this strategy was nothing new. Ayatollah Khomeini perfected it during his tenure as Iran's supreme leader. This luxury is the result of Iran's  political system, which positions the Ayatollah above plebeian occurrences such as elections, until now. 

The obvious question: Why does Khamenei feel the need to break with tradition and risk a new strategies?


**Warning: Speculation Ahead**


The answer is primarily that Khamenei feels vulnerable and securing the presidency is a necessary step toward reestablishing control, both over the Iranian elite and the public. The sudden rise of Mousavi's campaign, paired with the widespread discontent in the Iranian elite, including members of the Guardian Council that oversees the Supreme Leader, augured a shift in power, a shift Khamenei would not tolerate. (While it is pure speculation, I believe that much of the disagreement in the Iranian elite was the result of differing opinions on how Iran should respond to Obama's recent overtures.) 
 
This brings us to the present. Armed militias have driven protesters out of the streets and reports that government forces would be armed with live rounds forced the cancelation of a rally sponsored by the Mousavi campaign this afternoon.  It is clear that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are prepared to do whatever is necessary to reestablish control over the city.

Control, however, is a poor substitute for legitimacy. 

The Supreme Leader's fate is now a matter of public opinion and if the current round of protests precipitates any sort of revolution, it would be just as much a revolt against Khamenei as it is against Ahmadinejad. 



-Evan