Ninety-nine times out of a hundred I find Mark Lynch’s work incredibly informative and uniquely insightful. His new article on Libya, however, isn’t one of those times.
The overarching theme of the piece is that Libya’s saga has become central to the narrative of Arab revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and thus deserves special consideration and (possibly) justifies special measures:
“If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics. The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.”
I see three problems here. First, this statements is rather anachronistic. Did Saleh in Yemen, al-Khalifa in Bahrain, or al-Assad in Syria need a green light to start killing protesters? Who is even left to be deterred?
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. would or even could intervene in the same way elsewhere. The Libya no-fly zone was made possible by an exceptional set of factors including Gaddafi’s international pariah status, the eagerness of the French and British to lead the diplomatic and military charge, and the support of the Arab League and the GCC. Consequentially intervention in Libya will do little to limit tyrants or encourage citizens in other countries. If the rebels continue to flounder and the U.S. becomes more deeply involved or pulls out abruptly, the prospects are even worse.
Third, U.S. and European intervention is by nature diametrically opposed to the wave of organic revolutions sweeping across the Middle East. The power of what happened in Egypt and Tunisia was that it had nothing to do with what America said or did and everything to do with the determination and grit of Egyptians and Tunisians. They stood up and did the unthinkable. The tragic reality is that the pro-democracy camp doesn’t always win and in Libya specifically there is little we can do ensure it does without becoming far more involved than we already are.
-Evan
The overarching theme of the piece is that Libya’s saga has become central to the narrative of Arab revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and thus deserves special consideration and (possibly) justifies special measures:
“If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics. The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.”
I see three problems here. First, this statements is rather anachronistic. Did Saleh in Yemen, al-Khalifa in Bahrain, or al-Assad in Syria need a green light to start killing protesters? Who is even left to be deterred?
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. would or even could intervene in the same way elsewhere. The Libya no-fly zone was made possible by an exceptional set of factors including Gaddafi’s international pariah status, the eagerness of the French and British to lead the diplomatic and military charge, and the support of the Arab League and the GCC. Consequentially intervention in Libya will do little to limit tyrants or encourage citizens in other countries. If the rebels continue to flounder and the U.S. becomes more deeply involved or pulls out abruptly, the prospects are even worse.
Third, U.S. and European intervention is by nature diametrically opposed to the wave of organic revolutions sweeping across the Middle East. The power of what happened in Egypt and Tunisia was that it had nothing to do with what America said or did and everything to do with the determination and grit of Egyptians and Tunisians. They stood up and did the unthinkable. The tragic reality is that the pro-democracy camp doesn’t always win and in Libya specifically there is little we can do ensure it does without becoming far more involved than we already are.
-Evan
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Referendum Results 03/20/2011
Referendum Saturday in Egypt 03/18/2011
Information about the content and process of tomorrow’s referendum has changed almost daily over the last two months. I figured it was time to put together a quick backgrounder laying out what we know and what we don’t.
1. What’s up for vote? On Saturday, Egyptians will vote up or down on a bloc of nine constitutional amendments that would effectively end the longstanding state of emergency and address serious deficiencies in the Egyptian electoral system. Al Jazeera has a good breakdown of what the amendments will actually change here.
2. Who wrote the constitutional amendments? In mid-February, the ruling junta appointed an eight member panel of legal experts, former legislators, and representatives from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Coptic community to author the amendments.
3. How did military leaders influence the process? The Egyptian military has had little role in crafting the actual language of the amendments. After picking a panel they felt comfortable with, the generals left the authors alone. This move reflects the military’s desire to maintain their privileged position in Egyptian society while at the same time retreat from public scrutiny. As Nathan Brown puts it, “General Mohamed al-Tantawi is neither another dictator for life nor an Egyptian Cincinnatus; he and his colleagues seem to want to protect and return to their very comfortable (and extensive) enclave within the state apparatus.”
4. Who will administer the vote? The Egyptian military appointed a seven member committee composed of judicial officials and led by First Deputy Chairman of the State Council Mohamed Attiyeh to run the referendum. The committee in turn tapped thousands of judges to supervise polling places. These judges will be able to allow or deny independent election monitors access to polling places at will. Police and military will be present to provide security, although they will not (in theory) be allowed to enter polling places without permission from a judge. Not all Egyptian judges are happy with the arrangement. Earlier in the week, nearly 2000 prospective judicial election monitors announced they will boycott the election to protest what they claimed was the “political” appointment of judges to important polling stations.
1. What’s up for vote? On Saturday, Egyptians will vote up or down on a bloc of nine constitutional amendments that would effectively end the longstanding state of emergency and address serious deficiencies in the Egyptian electoral system. Al Jazeera has a good breakdown of what the amendments will actually change here.
2. Who wrote the constitutional amendments? In mid-February, the ruling junta appointed an eight member panel of legal experts, former legislators, and representatives from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Coptic community to author the amendments.
3. How did military leaders influence the process? The Egyptian military has had little role in crafting the actual language of the amendments. After picking a panel they felt comfortable with, the generals left the authors alone. This move reflects the military’s desire to maintain their privileged position in Egyptian society while at the same time retreat from public scrutiny. As Nathan Brown puts it, “General Mohamed al-Tantawi is neither another dictator for life nor an Egyptian Cincinnatus; he and his colleagues seem to want to protect and return to their very comfortable (and extensive) enclave within the state apparatus.”
4. Who will administer the vote? The Egyptian military appointed a seven member committee composed of judicial officials and led by First Deputy Chairman of the State Council Mohamed Attiyeh to run the referendum. The committee in turn tapped thousands of judges to supervise polling places. These judges will be able to allow or deny independent election monitors access to polling places at will. Police and military will be present to provide security, although they will not (in theory) be allowed to enter polling places without permission from a judge. Not all Egyptian judges are happy with the arrangement. Earlier in the week, nearly 2000 prospective judicial election monitors announced they will boycott the election to protest what they claimed was the “political” appointment of judges to important polling stations.
The Potential of the Egyptian Revolution 02/01/2011
A less obvious, but extremely important reason why the success of the Egyptian revolution is crucial: its potential to restore a discourse of agency to the Arab people.
For too long, cynicism has dominated popular politics in the Middle East. Local people blame international conspiracies for their problems--while turning a blind eye to the complicity inherent in their own complacency. The discourse of victimhood, unhinged to any strategy of empowerment, is the status quo's best friend.
The only two ideologies to gain significant followings in the Middle East over the past 60 years are Nasserism (Arab nationalism) and Islamism. Both gained traction because they empowered Arabs to overcome their humility. Rather than being doomed to foreign domination, Arabs belonged to proud, ancient civilizations, and were thus destined to rise again.
Unfortunately, Nasserism was based on both fantasy--the idea that the Arab world could unite under one (Egyptian-led) government--and on a fiction--that a "one-party republic" could lead to something other than dictatorship.
Islamism, likewise, is based on the fantasy of Islamic unity, and on the fiction that Islam can solve the problems of modern governance. Alas, the Quran has no prescriptions for reducing unemployment.
The Egyptian people, by rediscovering agency, have a chance to end this perverse cycle of rationalized decadence, while avoiding the dead-end of utopian fantasy. The route forward is not to be found in grand ideologies or in great men, but in the only system to ever produce freedom from tyranny: liberal democracy.
- Jon
P.S. I know that Tunisia is already more than a few steps ahead of Egypt. But the hard truth is that in Egypt, the modern leader of the Arab world, the stakes are much, much higher.
For too long, cynicism has dominated popular politics in the Middle East. Local people blame international conspiracies for their problems--while turning a blind eye to the complicity inherent in their own complacency. The discourse of victimhood, unhinged to any strategy of empowerment, is the status quo's best friend.
The only two ideologies to gain significant followings in the Middle East over the past 60 years are Nasserism (Arab nationalism) and Islamism. Both gained traction because they empowered Arabs to overcome their humility. Rather than being doomed to foreign domination, Arabs belonged to proud, ancient civilizations, and were thus destined to rise again.
Unfortunately, Nasserism was based on both fantasy--the idea that the Arab world could unite under one (Egyptian-led) government--and on a fiction--that a "one-party republic" could lead to something other than dictatorship.
Islamism, likewise, is based on the fantasy of Islamic unity, and on the fiction that Islam can solve the problems of modern governance. Alas, the Quran has no prescriptions for reducing unemployment.
The Egyptian people, by rediscovering agency, have a chance to end this perverse cycle of rationalized decadence, while avoiding the dead-end of utopian fantasy. The route forward is not to be found in grand ideologies or in great men, but in the only system to ever produce freedom from tyranny: liberal democracy.
- Jon
P.S. I know that Tunisia is already more than a few steps ahead of Egypt. But the hard truth is that in Egypt, the modern leader of the Arab world, the stakes are much, much higher.
There are three primary angles to choose from in responding to the unrest in Egypt.
1) Support Mubarak in leading a transition to democracy. If we don’t support Mubarak, he will fall and dangerous elements might come to power—individuals who are anti-American, anti-Israeli, and possibly Islamist. America must not forget the terror that seized 1990s Egypt and birthed the ideology of al-Qaeda. Moreover, we must not offend the other dictators in the region, lest the stop supporting us in our counterterrorism agenda, by pulling out the rug from under Mubarak.
This, which is what appears to be US policy, is wrong on a number of fronts. First, democracy as envisioned by its advocates is a secular and pro-American one. Mubarak had 30 years to create such a democracy: It never happened. Real democracy in Egypt will contain undesirable elements, and perhaps worse, so this argument is either fantasy or support for dictatorship in disguise. Such a democracy would also put Mubarak on trial, something no dictator would tolerate. Worse, it is very likely that Mubarak will have to massacre civilians to stay in power until elections in September. Does the US want to support that? No.
2) Publicly do nothing and say nothing of significance. The US cannot and should not micromanage events in the Middle East. Moreover, this is not an opportunity for excitement. When the dust settles and the dreamers get their heads out of the clouds, they’ll remember that transitions to democracy are messy, chaotic, and frequently fail. In the former Soviet Union, “revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan proved phoney. In the Middle East, they have been downright dangerous. See exhibit a, b, and c: the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and theocracy in Iran.
This is not be a bad argument—if we were living in another universe. In the universe I live in, the US has nearly 200,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the putative purpose of bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East. You can't backtrack now.
Moreover, the examples of “failed” revolutions are virtual non-sequiturs. Georgian and Lebanon are ethnically divided, feeble nations. In Ukraine, barely half of the country supported the “Orange Revolution”. Kyrgyzstan is, well, Kyrgyzstan. The Palestinian elections occurred in a non-state, intending to be a referendum supporting the rule of Fatah.
Iran is a better parallel. In both cases, autocrats with poor health sat on socio-demographic time-bombs. Confused American policy (which is what we are seeing again) made things worse. Once the revolution started, American attempts to stop it were doomed to fail. What is different is that Khomeini was truly a unique character, without any counterpart in Egypt. Iran, furthermore, was more divided, and more violent.
3) The better policy is for the US to call for Mubarak to step down, and hold elections soon- perhaps in a few months time (Mubarak’s call for the people to wait until elections in September is a joke). A transitional government, led by the military, with El-Baradei, Amr Moussa, or some other benign figurehead at the top, is a much better plan. The military is the only institution able to keep order and avoid the power vacuum that currently exists in Tunisia. A constitutional assembly will have to come afterwards.
And for some editorializing: Any advocate of freedom and democracy has to support the undivided calls of the Egyptian people for Mubarak to leave. If you don’t, then you need to reexamine your values. After sacrificing untold blood and treasure in Iraq for Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, this is the American response to a genuine call for democracy? Such hypocrisy defies description.
- Jon
1) Support Mubarak in leading a transition to democracy. If we don’t support Mubarak, he will fall and dangerous elements might come to power—individuals who are anti-American, anti-Israeli, and possibly Islamist. America must not forget the terror that seized 1990s Egypt and birthed the ideology of al-Qaeda. Moreover, we must not offend the other dictators in the region, lest the stop supporting us in our counterterrorism agenda, by pulling out the rug from under Mubarak.
This, which is what appears to be US policy, is wrong on a number of fronts. First, democracy as envisioned by its advocates is a secular and pro-American one. Mubarak had 30 years to create such a democracy: It never happened. Real democracy in Egypt will contain undesirable elements, and perhaps worse, so this argument is either fantasy or support for dictatorship in disguise. Such a democracy would also put Mubarak on trial, something no dictator would tolerate. Worse, it is very likely that Mubarak will have to massacre civilians to stay in power until elections in September. Does the US want to support that? No.
2) Publicly do nothing and say nothing of significance. The US cannot and should not micromanage events in the Middle East. Moreover, this is not an opportunity for excitement. When the dust settles and the dreamers get their heads out of the clouds, they’ll remember that transitions to democracy are messy, chaotic, and frequently fail. In the former Soviet Union, “revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan proved phoney. In the Middle East, they have been downright dangerous. See exhibit a, b, and c: the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and theocracy in Iran.
This is not be a bad argument—if we were living in another universe. In the universe I live in, the US has nearly 200,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the putative purpose of bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East. You can't backtrack now.
Moreover, the examples of “failed” revolutions are virtual non-sequiturs. Georgian and Lebanon are ethnically divided, feeble nations. In Ukraine, barely half of the country supported the “Orange Revolution”. Kyrgyzstan is, well, Kyrgyzstan. The Palestinian elections occurred in a non-state, intending to be a referendum supporting the rule of Fatah.
Iran is a better parallel. In both cases, autocrats with poor health sat on socio-demographic time-bombs. Confused American policy (which is what we are seeing again) made things worse. Once the revolution started, American attempts to stop it were doomed to fail. What is different is that Khomeini was truly a unique character, without any counterpart in Egypt. Iran, furthermore, was more divided, and more violent.
3) The better policy is for the US to call for Mubarak to step down, and hold elections soon- perhaps in a few months time (Mubarak’s call for the people to wait until elections in September is a joke). A transitional government, led by the military, with El-Baradei, Amr Moussa, or some other benign figurehead at the top, is a much better plan. The military is the only institution able to keep order and avoid the power vacuum that currently exists in Tunisia. A constitutional assembly will have to come afterwards.
And for some editorializing: Any advocate of freedom and democracy has to support the undivided calls of the Egyptian people for Mubarak to leave. If you don’t, then you need to reexamine your values. After sacrificing untold blood and treasure in Iraq for Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, this is the American response to a genuine call for democracy? Such hypocrisy defies description.
- Jon
A 'made in U.S.A.' tear gas canister. Symbols are important, and this is the wrong image for America.
Over the past few days, the Obama administration has blown an opportunity to get ahead of events. The best it can do now is acknowledge what is already clear: the Mubarak regime is finished. If we are lucky, dictatorship in Egypt may also be nearing its end. For millions of people who have only known despotism, democracy is within reach.
And what has been the response of the Obama administration? Dithering diplomatic blather. Afraid to offend anyone, Obama has confirmed the suspicions of cynics across that Middle East—that when America talks about government by the people, it’s just empty rhetoric.
I don’t envy Obama’s situation. He surely has the Saudis and Israelis breathing down his neck. Moreover, the risks are real. A leaderless revolution can easily descend into chaos, or be hijacked by demagogic opportunists. What is clear is that whatever form the new Egyptian regime takes, it will be less pro-American, less stable, and more antipathetic towards Israel. It will likely contain Islamist elements.
Regardless, the US needs to make clear that it stands on the side of freedom and democracy. The only way to do that is to say, publicly, that it’s time for Mubarak to go. Saying a bunch of nonsense about needing a “national dialogue” (as Clinton did) is a tone-deaf embarrassment. I usually admire Obama for his patience and prudence. But leadership also means knowing when to be bold, and this is one of those times.
There is an argument that this is an Egyptian affair, and that Obama should stay out of it. That was the case, or instance, during the “Green” protests in Iran. But America doesn’t have the luxury of not expressing an opinion about a regime that it subsidized for four decades.
The Mubarak regime is going to fall, sooner than later. And when dictators do fall, the people who replace them remember who their backers were. This is America’s chance to redeem itself.
Obama, in his speech to the Egyptian people on Friday, told Mubarak to “give meaning to your words.” The Obama administration should do the same, and take a clear stand in favor of the Egyptian people.
- Jon
And what has been the response of the Obama administration? Dithering diplomatic blather. Afraid to offend anyone, Obama has confirmed the suspicions of cynics across that Middle East—that when America talks about government by the people, it’s just empty rhetoric.
I don’t envy Obama’s situation. He surely has the Saudis and Israelis breathing down his neck. Moreover, the risks are real. A leaderless revolution can easily descend into chaos, or be hijacked by demagogic opportunists. What is clear is that whatever form the new Egyptian regime takes, it will be less pro-American, less stable, and more antipathetic towards Israel. It will likely contain Islamist elements.
Regardless, the US needs to make clear that it stands on the side of freedom and democracy. The only way to do that is to say, publicly, that it’s time for Mubarak to go. Saying a bunch of nonsense about needing a “national dialogue” (as Clinton did) is a tone-deaf embarrassment. I usually admire Obama for his patience and prudence. But leadership also means knowing when to be bold, and this is one of those times.
There is an argument that this is an Egyptian affair, and that Obama should stay out of it. That was the case, or instance, during the “Green” protests in Iran. But America doesn’t have the luxury of not expressing an opinion about a regime that it subsidized for four decades.
The Mubarak regime is going to fall, sooner than later. And when dictators do fall, the people who replace them remember who their backers were. This is America’s chance to redeem itself.
Obama, in his speech to the Egyptian people on Friday, told Mubarak to “give meaning to your words.” The Obama administration should do the same, and take a clear stand in favor of the Egyptian people.
- Jon
The Meaning of the Revolution in Tunisia 01/16/2011
Crying Tunisian policemen comforted by protesters
Why is there no (functioning) democracy in the Middle East and North Africa? This is one of the fundamental questions of our time. When you ask people from the region, foreigners are the favored answer. Did the Europeans not carve out artificial states without respect for local conditions, laying the foundations of authoritarianism by dividing and conquering? Does America not give billions of dollars to local strongmen, like Mubarak, helping them to buy off their populations and arm their security services?
The people of Tunisia, like the people of Iran four decades earlier, have affirmed that on the contrary, Western interference is rarely decisive in maintaining autocracy. Those who blame Americans, or their dead European cousins, for political backwardness in their home countries are mostly excusing themselves for their own acquiescence to dictatorship. The crux of any authoritarian regime, in reality, rests on two variables: the willingness of the people to repeatedly test the security forces, and the willingness of the security forces to, in return, kill civilians for a sustained period of time.
The Tunisian people did their part, and the security forces refused to continue oppressing their brothers and sisters. That’s what makes the picture of the crying policeman so moving.
Mohamad Bouazizi has also reminded everyone of the power of the original and far more courageous form of political suicide: self immolation. It stands in stark moral contrast to the brainwashed goons who publicly protest with detonators and the blood of passerby. If Tunisia turns into a free democracy, then the sacrifice of Bouazizi and his fellow protesters will be the greatest triumph of the 21st century. However, there are reasons to be cautious. Leaders in the region have previously lost enthusiasm for democracy in the face of rising Islamism. It would be a tragedy if the promise of Tunisia’s revolution is lost to continuing instability, as happened in Algeria, hijacked by Islamists, as in Iran, or, in an effort to avoid the above scenarios, the revolution simply opens the door for a new tyrant.
Indeed, the original use of the word “revolution” in politics, to refer to events in Britain in 1668, described a reversion to a previous order, not the dawn of a new one. Here is to hoping that Tunisia’s revolution will be different.
- Jon
The people of Tunisia, like the people of Iran four decades earlier, have affirmed that on the contrary, Western interference is rarely decisive in maintaining autocracy. Those who blame Americans, or their dead European cousins, for political backwardness in their home countries are mostly excusing themselves for their own acquiescence to dictatorship. The crux of any authoritarian regime, in reality, rests on two variables: the willingness of the people to repeatedly test the security forces, and the willingness of the security forces to, in return, kill civilians for a sustained period of time.
The Tunisian people did their part, and the security forces refused to continue oppressing their brothers and sisters. That’s what makes the picture of the crying policeman so moving.
Mohamad Bouazizi has also reminded everyone of the power of the original and far more courageous form of political suicide: self immolation. It stands in stark moral contrast to the brainwashed goons who publicly protest with detonators and the blood of passerby. If Tunisia turns into a free democracy, then the sacrifice of Bouazizi and his fellow protesters will be the greatest triumph of the 21st century. However, there are reasons to be cautious. Leaders in the region have previously lost enthusiasm for democracy in the face of rising Islamism. It would be a tragedy if the promise of Tunisia’s revolution is lost to continuing instability, as happened in Algeria, hijacked by Islamists, as in Iran, or, in an effort to avoid the above scenarios, the revolution simply opens the door for a new tyrant.
Indeed, the original use of the word “revolution” in politics, to refer to events in Britain in 1668, described a reversion to a previous order, not the dawn of a new one. Here is to hoping that Tunisia’s revolution will be different.
- Jon
What Should the U.S. Do Now? 01/14/2011
What comes next for Tunisia won’t come easy, but the U.S. can and should help. Here’s how:
1. Get a statement out before the long holiday weekend in the States. The Obama administration will be judged by how quickly it responds and which member of the administration makes the statement--obviously the higher up the better. It’s important to let the world (and especially the despots) know that when citizens take to the streets and oust an authoritarian regime, the US will cheer their success and offer support for the road ahead. (Update: The White House and State Department came pretty close to nailing this one.)
2. Keep Tunisia’s new leaders honest. Old habits die hard and it is easy for the military and security services to overstay their welcome. Over the next couple of weeks, the U.S. must keep the focus on Tunisia; make statements as the situation develops, send important diplomats to visit (Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner would be a good choice), and rally international support for democratic reforms there.
3. Support democratic process. The Middle East Partnership Initiative’s regional office is in Tunis for Christ’s sake. Get IFES, NDI, IRI, etc. on the ground and working with Tunisian officials as soon as possible to prepare for upcoming elections and reforms. This will both publicize the situation making a reversal harder and provide Tunisia with the technical capacity to move forward politically.
4. Help Tunisia address the issues at the core of the unrest. Just because Ben Ali is gone doesn’t mean that Tunisia’s unemployment rate will go down or food will get any cheaper. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in her speech at the Forum for the Future in Doha earlier this week there are no easy answers:
Across the region, one in five young people is unemployed. And in some places, the percentage is far more. While some countries have made great strides in governance, in many others people have grown tired of corrupt institutions and a stagnant political order. They are demanding reform to make their governments more effective, more responsive, and more open. And all this is taking place against a backdrop of depleting resources: water tables are dropping, oil reserves are running out, and too few countries have adopted long-term plans for addressing these problems. […]
I am here to pledge my country’s support for those who step up to solve the problems that we and you face. We want to build stronger partnerships with societies that are on the path to long-term stability and progress -- business, government and civil society, as represented on this panel, must work together, as in our new regional initiative called Partners for a New Beginning.
For another perspectives check out Shadi Hamid’s recent piece at Democracy Arsenal.
1. Get a statement out before the long holiday weekend in the States. The Obama administration will be judged by how quickly it responds and which member of the administration makes the statement--obviously the higher up the better. It’s important to let the world (and especially the despots) know that when citizens take to the streets and oust an authoritarian regime, the US will cheer their success and offer support for the road ahead. (Update: The White House and State Department came pretty close to nailing this one.)
2. Keep Tunisia’s new leaders honest. Old habits die hard and it is easy for the military and security services to overstay their welcome. Over the next couple of weeks, the U.S. must keep the focus on Tunisia; make statements as the situation develops, send important diplomats to visit (Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner would be a good choice), and rally international support for democratic reforms there.
3. Support democratic process. The Middle East Partnership Initiative’s regional office is in Tunis for Christ’s sake. Get IFES, NDI, IRI, etc. on the ground and working with Tunisian officials as soon as possible to prepare for upcoming elections and reforms. This will both publicize the situation making a reversal harder and provide Tunisia with the technical capacity to move forward politically.
4. Help Tunisia address the issues at the core of the unrest. Just because Ben Ali is gone doesn’t mean that Tunisia’s unemployment rate will go down or food will get any cheaper. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in her speech at the Forum for the Future in Doha earlier this week there are no easy answers:
Across the region, one in five young people is unemployed. And in some places, the percentage is far more. While some countries have made great strides in governance, in many others people have grown tired of corrupt institutions and a stagnant political order. They are demanding reform to make their governments more effective, more responsive, and more open. And all this is taking place against a backdrop of depleting resources: water tables are dropping, oil reserves are running out, and too few countries have adopted long-term plans for addressing these problems. […]
I am here to pledge my country’s support for those who step up to solve the problems that we and you face. We want to build stronger partnerships with societies that are on the path to long-term stability and progress -- business, government and civil society, as represented on this panel, must work together, as in our new regional initiative called Partners for a New Beginning.
For another perspectives check out Shadi Hamid’s recent piece at Democracy Arsenal.
There are some compelling arguments to be made that we should reconsider the role democracy promotion plays in American foreign policy. Pat Buchanan’s recent critique of what he calls America’s “democracy obsession” in The American Conservative isn’t one of them.
Buchanan bases in his argument against democracy promotion on a rather warped history of America’s relations with tyrants:
“Historically, we have often made common cause with autocrats and dictators when our vital national interests commanded it. […] During Vietnam, autocratic South Korea and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines sent troops. The Brits and French traded with the enemy. Gen. Pinochet, who seized power in a coup in 1973, was a better friend than Chile’s Salvador Allende, who was elected. While the Nixon White House did not cause Allende’s ouster, neither did they weep over it.
Democratic France denied Ronald Reagan overflight rights for his F-111s to hit Moammar Gadhafi’s Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack, but Portugal’s dictatorship gave permission for Nixon to use the Azores as a fueling station in resupplying Israel during the Yom Kippur war.
Ought not nations judge friends less by the ideals they profess than by how they behave when you need them most.”
Buchanan’s apparent ardor for dictators aside, the reality is that tyrants rarely make good strategic partners; they are far more likely to be mercurial and demanding and in the long run are generally unstable. The idea that we can manipulate a chosen crop of autocrats is more hubristic than the notion that we can force democratic change on a country.
Even more galling, Buchanan claims that in recent decades it has been our despot chums who have been our real friends while our democratic allies have often turned against us when we needed them most. This just isn’t true.
Take Afghanistan—certainly a more relevant example than our de facto alliance with Napoleon during the war of 1812 or any of the other cases Buchanan cites. Of of the 28 nations contributing soldiers to the ISAF only three (Azerbaijan, Jordan and UAE) are "not free" and of the 18 countries contributing 500 or more soldiers to the ISAF, 15 are ranked by Freedom House as “free” and the remaining three are “partially free.”
One thing I do agree with Buchanan on: American democracy promotion has failed under the weight of its own hype. It is clear that America cannot force or directly cause a country to shift toward democracy. Even our record of providing assistance to countries that are actually interested in reform isn’t particularly impressive. The answer, however, isn’t to abandon democracy promotion and instead embrace every dictator who offer us some passing strategic benefit. Instead, the United States needs to take more incremental, targeted and strategic approach to promoting democracy around the world.
Right now, I’m working on a paper outlining what the US can and should do to promote democracy in Azerbaijan, a prototypical state in democratic decline. Until that drops (hopefully before Azeri Parliamentary election this fall), I recommend you check out Thomas Carother’s comprehensive “Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenges of USAID.” A teaser:
Most of the current structures and methods for funding and implementing this assistance were developed in the 1980s and 1990s, a time when democracy was spreading rapidly in the world, the international acceptance of crossborder political aid was growing, and the United States enjoyed clear geostrategic hegemony. Those conditions no longer hold. Democracy promoters face a world today where democracy is largely stagnant (having retreated as much as advanced over the past decade), suspicion of and hostility toward international democracy aid has burgeoned, and the weight of the United States on the international political stage, although still enormous, is not what it was before. The U.S. democracy assistance community has only started to adjust to these profound changes.
Evan
Buchanan bases in his argument against democracy promotion on a rather warped history of America’s relations with tyrants:
“Historically, we have often made common cause with autocrats and dictators when our vital national interests commanded it. […] During Vietnam, autocratic South Korea and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines sent troops. The Brits and French traded with the enemy. Gen. Pinochet, who seized power in a coup in 1973, was a better friend than Chile’s Salvador Allende, who was elected. While the Nixon White House did not cause Allende’s ouster, neither did they weep over it.
Democratic France denied Ronald Reagan overflight rights for his F-111s to hit Moammar Gadhafi’s Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack, but Portugal’s dictatorship gave permission for Nixon to use the Azores as a fueling station in resupplying Israel during the Yom Kippur war.
Ought not nations judge friends less by the ideals they profess than by how they behave when you need them most.”
Buchanan’s apparent ardor for dictators aside, the reality is that tyrants rarely make good strategic partners; they are far more likely to be mercurial and demanding and in the long run are generally unstable. The idea that we can manipulate a chosen crop of autocrats is more hubristic than the notion that we can force democratic change on a country.
Even more galling, Buchanan claims that in recent decades it has been our despot chums who have been our real friends while our democratic allies have often turned against us when we needed them most. This just isn’t true.
Take Afghanistan—certainly a more relevant example than our de facto alliance with Napoleon during the war of 1812 or any of the other cases Buchanan cites. Of of the 28 nations contributing soldiers to the ISAF only three (Azerbaijan, Jordan and UAE) are "not free" and of the 18 countries contributing 500 or more soldiers to the ISAF, 15 are ranked by Freedom House as “free” and the remaining three are “partially free.”
One thing I do agree with Buchanan on: American democracy promotion has failed under the weight of its own hype. It is clear that America cannot force or directly cause a country to shift toward democracy. Even our record of providing assistance to countries that are actually interested in reform isn’t particularly impressive. The answer, however, isn’t to abandon democracy promotion and instead embrace every dictator who offer us some passing strategic benefit. Instead, the United States needs to take more incremental, targeted and strategic approach to promoting democracy around the world.
Right now, I’m working on a paper outlining what the US can and should do to promote democracy in Azerbaijan, a prototypical state in democratic decline. Until that drops (hopefully before Azeri Parliamentary election this fall), I recommend you check out Thomas Carother’s comprehensive “Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenges of USAID.” A teaser:
Most of the current structures and methods for funding and implementing this assistance were developed in the 1980s and 1990s, a time when democracy was spreading rapidly in the world, the international acceptance of crossborder political aid was growing, and the United States enjoyed clear geostrategic hegemony. Those conditions no longer hold. Democracy promoters face a world today where democracy is largely stagnant (having retreated as much as advanced over the past decade), suspicion of and hostility toward international democracy aid has burgeoned, and the weight of the United States on the international political stage, although still enormous, is not what it was before. The U.S. democracy assistance community has only started to adjust to these profound changes.
Evan
The Worst of the Worst 06/07/2010
Since 1972, the Freedom House has published the gold-standard report on the state of democracy and civil liberty around the world. The aptly named "Freedom in the World" attempts to measure the level of political and civil freedom in every country and major disputed territory using a simple 7-point scale (1 being most free and 7 least free).
In recent years, the Freedom House has added another report that focuses on the so called "worst of the worst"--countries that score 6.5 or above. This year, 17 countries and three territories fall into this category. These include personality-driven dictatorships (Libya and North Korea), Central Asian crackpots (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), disputed territories (South Ossetia and Tibet) and failed states (Somalia and Chad). Thankfully, only one of this year's WOW countries (Saudi Arabia) is a major US ally.
Check out the full report here
In recent years, the Freedom House has added another report that focuses on the so called "worst of the worst"--countries that score 6.5 or above. This year, 17 countries and three territories fall into this category. These include personality-driven dictatorships (Libya and North Korea), Central Asian crackpots (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), disputed territories (South Ossetia and Tibet) and failed states (Somalia and Chad). Thankfully, only one of this year's WOW countries (Saudi Arabia) is a major US ally.
Check out the full report here
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