Things I Miss About Hosni Mubarak 03/26/2011
With the Egyptian public itching for a full investigation of the old regime, it’s certain that we’ll be hearing a lot of negative things about Hosni Mubarak in coming weeks and months. It is true that he condoned the abuse of his citizens, perpetuated a system of endemic corruption, and did everything he could to prevent democratization, but let’s not forget the things that made Hosni so lovable.
1. His Contagious Laugh
1. His Contagious Laugh
Widely considered the funniest of the despots, Hosni knew how to light up a room with laughter—which was often the product of his own jokes. From the Arab League summits to meetings with American presidents, he took every chance he got to earn the nickname, "La Vache qui Rit."
2. That Hair
2. That Hair
Epic dye job or genetic gift, who really cares? Hosni’s hair was the envy of many a dictator and certainly a few democratically-elected leaders as well (I’m looking at you Silvio). Rumor has it Crayola invented the color “Midnight Black” just so Egyptian children could color pictures of the president.
3. Suzanne Mubarak
3. Suzanne Mubarak
Philanthropist, song writer, and bouffant and pearls aficionado, Hosni’s better half was a role model for authoritarian wives everywhere. How can you not love a woman who wrote tacky paeans to peace while her husband ran a regime built on the systematic repression and torture of his opponents?
4. The Suits
4. The Suits
Hosni nobly resisted the temptation to dress like a lunatic (à la Gaddafi or Kim Jong-il) and instead opted for a simple and understated style characterized by his suits with H-O-S-N-Y-M-U-B-A-R-A-K pinstripes. Despotism never looked so dapper.
-Evan
-Evan
Add Comment
Referendum Results 03/20/2011
Referendum Saturday in Egypt 03/18/2011
Information about the content and process of tomorrow’s referendum has changed almost daily over the last two months. I figured it was time to put together a quick backgrounder laying out what we know and what we don’t.
1. What’s up for vote? On Saturday, Egyptians will vote up or down on a bloc of nine constitutional amendments that would effectively end the longstanding state of emergency and address serious deficiencies in the Egyptian electoral system. Al Jazeera has a good breakdown of what the amendments will actually change here.
2. Who wrote the constitutional amendments? In mid-February, the ruling junta appointed an eight member panel of legal experts, former legislators, and representatives from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Coptic community to author the amendments.
3. How did military leaders influence the process? The Egyptian military has had little role in crafting the actual language of the amendments. After picking a panel they felt comfortable with, the generals left the authors alone. This move reflects the military’s desire to maintain their privileged position in Egyptian society while at the same time retreat from public scrutiny. As Nathan Brown puts it, “General Mohamed al-Tantawi is neither another dictator for life nor an Egyptian Cincinnatus; he and his colleagues seem to want to protect and return to their very comfortable (and extensive) enclave within the state apparatus.”
4. Who will administer the vote? The Egyptian military appointed a seven member committee composed of judicial officials and led by First Deputy Chairman of the State Council Mohamed Attiyeh to run the referendum. The committee in turn tapped thousands of judges to supervise polling places. These judges will be able to allow or deny independent election monitors access to polling places at will. Police and military will be present to provide security, although they will not (in theory) be allowed to enter polling places without permission from a judge. Not all Egyptian judges are happy with the arrangement. Earlier in the week, nearly 2000 prospective judicial election monitors announced they will boycott the election to protest what they claimed was the “political” appointment of judges to important polling stations.
1. What’s up for vote? On Saturday, Egyptians will vote up or down on a bloc of nine constitutional amendments that would effectively end the longstanding state of emergency and address serious deficiencies in the Egyptian electoral system. Al Jazeera has a good breakdown of what the amendments will actually change here.
2. Who wrote the constitutional amendments? In mid-February, the ruling junta appointed an eight member panel of legal experts, former legislators, and representatives from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Coptic community to author the amendments.
3. How did military leaders influence the process? The Egyptian military has had little role in crafting the actual language of the amendments. After picking a panel they felt comfortable with, the generals left the authors alone. This move reflects the military’s desire to maintain their privileged position in Egyptian society while at the same time retreat from public scrutiny. As Nathan Brown puts it, “General Mohamed al-Tantawi is neither another dictator for life nor an Egyptian Cincinnatus; he and his colleagues seem to want to protect and return to their very comfortable (and extensive) enclave within the state apparatus.”
4. Who will administer the vote? The Egyptian military appointed a seven member committee composed of judicial officials and led by First Deputy Chairman of the State Council Mohamed Attiyeh to run the referendum. The committee in turn tapped thousands of judges to supervise polling places. These judges will be able to allow or deny independent election monitors access to polling places at will. Police and military will be present to provide security, although they will not (in theory) be allowed to enter polling places without permission from a judge. Not all Egyptian judges are happy with the arrangement. Earlier in the week, nearly 2000 prospective judicial election monitors announced they will boycott the election to protest what they claimed was the “political” appointment of judges to important polling stations.
The situation in Cairo has reached a critical juncture. With Hosni Mubarak's abdication on Friday, the army is once again in a position to reshape Egyptian society and governance for either good or ill. Some starry-eyed pundits suggest that that the country's brass understand the watershed moment they have just witnessed, and so will bow to demands for elections and representation. Reuel Marc Gerecht, however, casts serious doubts on such optimism, arguing that a democratic Egypt would threaten the military's economic privileges. A money quote:
"How much has the seductive idea of democracy percolated from the bottom up, and from the top down via intellectuals, into the officer ranks of the Egyptian Army? Do the senior officers really believe in a “soft landing” in a democratic Egypt? A democratic Egypt, cursed with bloated bureaucracies and a still vibrant socialist ethic, would likely cut back military expenditures severely in an effort to maintain public-sector civilian jobs. More or less, the Egyptian Army has been able to wall off its defense budget—and senior officers’ posh lifestyles—from economic reality. America’s yearly billion-dollar military-aid package has allowed the Egyptian Army to enjoy toys— advanced Abrams tanks, F-16 aircraft, and Israeli-ship-killing surface-to-surface missiles—that would be unthinkable if purchased only through Egyptian taxes. It’s a decent guess that a democratic Egypt will distance itself from America’s military largesse—seeing it, not incorrectly, as an enabler of autocracy. A democratic Egypt will demand a more humble, less well-fed military establishment. Do Egyptian military officers believe that angry liberals and even angrier Muslim Brothers won’t eventually expropriate all that their families have accumulated under martial rule? "
"How much has the seductive idea of democracy percolated from the bottom up, and from the top down via intellectuals, into the officer ranks of the Egyptian Army? Do the senior officers really believe in a “soft landing” in a democratic Egypt? A democratic Egypt, cursed with bloated bureaucracies and a still vibrant socialist ethic, would likely cut back military expenditures severely in an effort to maintain public-sector civilian jobs. More or less, the Egyptian Army has been able to wall off its defense budget—and senior officers’ posh lifestyles—from economic reality. America’s yearly billion-dollar military-aid package has allowed the Egyptian Army to enjoy toys— advanced Abrams tanks, F-16 aircraft, and Israeli-ship-killing surface-to-surface missiles—that would be unthinkable if purchased only through Egyptian taxes. It’s a decent guess that a democratic Egypt will distance itself from America’s military largesse—seeing it, not incorrectly, as an enabler of autocracy. A democratic Egypt will demand a more humble, less well-fed military establishment. Do Egyptian military officers believe that angry liberals and even angrier Muslim Brothers won’t eventually expropriate all that their families have accumulated under martial rule? "
"The Rent is too Damn High" Guy Cheers Egypt 02/11/2011
Funny, I think he presents a more cogent foreign policy than many of the other CPAC attendees.
If You Haven't Seen This Yet... 02/11/2011
The Disappointing Revolution 02/11/2011
On August 19, 1991, thousands of people gathered in front of Moscow’s White House to oppose the August Putsch. The protesters set up barricades around the building, distributed political flyers, and tried to convince the soldiers in the area not to follow orders. These actions—combined with Yeltsin’s famous speech from on top of a tank—caused massive defections among the military and eventually led to the unraveling of the coup attempt. By the end of the month, the Russian Federation had declared itself legally independent from the laws of the Soviet Union.
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
You're Killing Me Here Guys 02/10/2011
Mubarak really doesn't want this to end well.
Burke and Jefferson on Revolution 02/07/2011
I have entered some spirited debates over the past week about whether the Egyptian revolution is a cause for optimism. Many revolutions overthrow autocrats only to give birth to more vile regimes. The results of the Russian and Iranian revolutions are testaments to that possibility, which is useful to countenance. Here is Edmund Burke, in the his famous Reflections on the Revolution in France:
I must be tolerably sure, before I venture publicly to congratulate men upon a blessing, that they have actually received one. Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver; and adulation is not of more service to the people than to kings. I should therefore suspend my congratulation on the new liberty of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners.
All these (in their way) are good things too; and, without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and it not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please: We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations, which may soon be turned into complaints…liberty, when men act in bodies, is power. Considerate people before they declare themselves will observe the use which is made of power; and particularly of so trying a thing as new power in new persons, of whose principles, tempers, and dispositions, they have little or no experience…
What Egypt will do with freedom, we cannot know. But we know freedom to be, a priori, good and just. Arguing against freedom for fear of Islamism is an argument for perpetual despotism, which we know for certain to be neither good nor just. If some despots yield to Islamists, so be it. All types of governments have their weaknesses. Democracy's weakness, as the Ancients knew well, is its susceptibility to demagoguery.
I remain hopeful, because people in the region are finally taking responsibility for their own destinies. This is key to the sustenance of liberty. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence:
[T]o secure these rights [to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness], Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
I must be tolerably sure, before I venture publicly to congratulate men upon a blessing, that they have actually received one. Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the giver; and adulation is not of more service to the people than to kings. I should therefore suspend my congratulation on the new liberty of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners.
All these (in their way) are good things too; and, without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and it not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please: We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations, which may soon be turned into complaints…liberty, when men act in bodies, is power. Considerate people before they declare themselves will observe the use which is made of power; and particularly of so trying a thing as new power in new persons, of whose principles, tempers, and dispositions, they have little or no experience…
What Egypt will do with freedom, we cannot know. But we know freedom to be, a priori, good and just. Arguing against freedom for fear of Islamism is an argument for perpetual despotism, which we know for certain to be neither good nor just. If some despots yield to Islamists, so be it. All types of governments have their weaknesses. Democracy's weakness, as the Ancients knew well, is its susceptibility to demagoguery.
I remain hopeful, because people in the region are finally taking responsibility for their own destinies. This is key to the sustenance of liberty. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence:
[T]o secure these rights [to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness], Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
The Potential of the Egyptian Revolution 02/01/2011
A less obvious, but extremely important reason why the success of the Egyptian revolution is crucial: its potential to restore a discourse of agency to the Arab people.
For too long, cynicism has dominated popular politics in the Middle East. Local people blame international conspiracies for their problems--while turning a blind eye to the complicity inherent in their own complacency. The discourse of victimhood, unhinged to any strategy of empowerment, is the status quo's best friend.
The only two ideologies to gain significant followings in the Middle East over the past 60 years are Nasserism (Arab nationalism) and Islamism. Both gained traction because they empowered Arabs to overcome their humility. Rather than being doomed to foreign domination, Arabs belonged to proud, ancient civilizations, and were thus destined to rise again.
Unfortunately, Nasserism was based on both fantasy--the idea that the Arab world could unite under one (Egyptian-led) government--and on a fiction--that a "one-party republic" could lead to something other than dictatorship.
Islamism, likewise, is based on the fantasy of Islamic unity, and on the fiction that Islam can solve the problems of modern governance. Alas, the Quran has no prescriptions for reducing unemployment.
The Egyptian people, by rediscovering agency, have a chance to end this perverse cycle of rationalized decadence, while avoiding the dead-end of utopian fantasy. The route forward is not to be found in grand ideologies or in great men, but in the only system to ever produce freedom from tyranny: liberal democracy.
- Jon
P.S. I know that Tunisia is already more than a few steps ahead of Egypt. But the hard truth is that in Egypt, the modern leader of the Arab world, the stakes are much, much higher.
For too long, cynicism has dominated popular politics in the Middle East. Local people blame international conspiracies for their problems--while turning a blind eye to the complicity inherent in their own complacency. The discourse of victimhood, unhinged to any strategy of empowerment, is the status quo's best friend.
The only two ideologies to gain significant followings in the Middle East over the past 60 years are Nasserism (Arab nationalism) and Islamism. Both gained traction because they empowered Arabs to overcome their humility. Rather than being doomed to foreign domination, Arabs belonged to proud, ancient civilizations, and were thus destined to rise again.
Unfortunately, Nasserism was based on both fantasy--the idea that the Arab world could unite under one (Egyptian-led) government--and on a fiction--that a "one-party republic" could lead to something other than dictatorship.
Islamism, likewise, is based on the fantasy of Islamic unity, and on the fiction that Islam can solve the problems of modern governance. Alas, the Quran has no prescriptions for reducing unemployment.
The Egyptian people, by rediscovering agency, have a chance to end this perverse cycle of rationalized decadence, while avoiding the dead-end of utopian fantasy. The route forward is not to be found in grand ideologies or in great men, but in the only system to ever produce freedom from tyranny: liberal democracy.
- Jon
P.S. I know that Tunisia is already more than a few steps ahead of Egypt. But the hard truth is that in Egypt, the modern leader of the Arab world, the stakes are much, much higher.
Loading







