Ajaria: The "frozen conflict" that never was 04/10/2011
In 2008, a Georgian-Russian war made the obscure autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into household names. The few people who knew about these provinces beforehand could point to the fact that both resisted inclusion into independent Georgia in 1918, and rebelled again during the fall of the Soviet Union. So was the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia inevitable?
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
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Kurt Volker, the former US Ambassador to NATO, frets about the upcoming Olympics in Sochi, Russia - right next to the breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia:
Imagine the practicalities. Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgian territory according to every country in the world except Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Already, Olympic construction workers are being housed in Abkhazia. By 2014, we could see housing for tourists, regular border crossings between Russia and Abkhazia without a hint of Georgian sovereignty, high-visibility symbols of Abkhaz "statehood" such as flags and travel documents, and the presence of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian "presidents" at Olympic ceremonies -- alongside U.S. and European leaders.
He also sees opportunity for engagement- read the whole piece here.
Imagine the practicalities. Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgian territory according to every country in the world except Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Already, Olympic construction workers are being housed in Abkhazia. By 2014, we could see housing for tourists, regular border crossings between Russia and Abkhazia without a hint of Georgian sovereignty, high-visibility symbols of Abkhaz "statehood" such as flags and travel documents, and the presence of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian "presidents" at Olympic ceremonies -- alongside U.S. and European leaders.
He also sees opportunity for engagement- read the whole piece here.
Read This: April 22, 2010 04/22/2010
Bryza to Baku (Finally)? (LeVine)
I've received confirmation that -- after the clearing of a couple of remaining administrative hurdles -- the White House will officially nominate Bryza as U.S. ambassador. He will then be scheduled for a nomination hearing in the Sentate. The hearings should be lively. For starters, Bryza himself has been something of a lighting rod of attention. This blog has written about his time as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.
Over recent years, I received fairly frequent emails griping about this or that impolitic (read: anti-Russian) speech that Bryza delivered on his journeys, and his inexhaustible supply of rationales for building the ill-fated Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Bryza seemed to rub the Foggy Bottom crowd the wrong way when he made no secret of his desire for the Azeri post, and when it seemed he might get it since he was a favorite of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.
The Greatest Deterrent of All (Munayyer, LA Times)
The reality of Palestinian casualties, the destruction of Jerusalem, the onset of regional war and the immediate destruction of Iran's regime as a result of a multilateral conventional or even nuclear counterattack all serve as a credible deterrent to a nuclear Iran. The Iranian leadership has shown a demonstrable interest in self-preservation
De Waal Reviews "A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West" (The National Interest)
To truly decode the “Russia threat,” we must inevitably return to the events of the five-day war of August 2008 and the age-old question: “Who is to blame?” Ronald Asmus, executive director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund, has his answer, in book-long form. For him, the 2008 war was a preplanned Russian military intervention in Georgia, designed to halt Saakashvili’s choice to “go West.” Russia was punishing a small neighbor that dared to defy it by choosing a Western model of democratic development: “The more successful Tbilisi was, the more hostile and worried Moscow became.”
I've received confirmation that -- after the clearing of a couple of remaining administrative hurdles -- the White House will officially nominate Bryza as U.S. ambassador. He will then be scheduled for a nomination hearing in the Sentate. The hearings should be lively. For starters, Bryza himself has been something of a lighting rod of attention. This blog has written about his time as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.
Over recent years, I received fairly frequent emails griping about this or that impolitic (read: anti-Russian) speech that Bryza delivered on his journeys, and his inexhaustible supply of rationales for building the ill-fated Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Bryza seemed to rub the Foggy Bottom crowd the wrong way when he made no secret of his desire for the Azeri post, and when it seemed he might get it since he was a favorite of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.
The Greatest Deterrent of All (Munayyer, LA Times)
The reality of Palestinian casualties, the destruction of Jerusalem, the onset of regional war and the immediate destruction of Iran's regime as a result of a multilateral conventional or even nuclear counterattack all serve as a credible deterrent to a nuclear Iran. The Iranian leadership has shown a demonstrable interest in self-preservation
De Waal Reviews "A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West" (The National Interest)
To truly decode the “Russia threat,” we must inevitably return to the events of the five-day war of August 2008 and the age-old question: “Who is to blame?” Ronald Asmus, executive director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund, has his answer, in book-long form. For him, the 2008 war was a preplanned Russian military intervention in Georgia, designed to halt Saakashvili’s choice to “go West.” Russia was punishing a small neighbor that dared to defy it by choosing a Western model of democratic development: “The more successful Tbilisi was, the more hostile and worried Moscow became.”
Panic in Georgia 03/26/2010
She has heard all of this before
Georgia has a well-earned reputation for engaging in hyperbolic rhetoric. Both the government and the opposition routinely accuse each other of acts of “treason” and of being “psychologically sick people.” Even the EU’s anodyne fact-finding report on the August War highlighted the country’s penchant for “over-playing its hand and acting in the heat of the moment without careful consideration.”
A fake news report that aired on Georgian television two weeks ago only confirms this characterization. The broadcast falsely alleged that Russia had invaded Georgia and that the president had been killed. It went on to show images of Russian jets supposedly on their way to bomb Georgian cities and President Obama announcing sanctions against Russia. Throughout the half-hour show, the Imedi network only ran the disclaimer that it was “an imitation of possible events” twice.
On the streets of Tbilisi and other cities, the population went into panic. Some residents rushed to stores to buy bread and water or take out cash from the ATM. Others jumped into their cars and joined the massive traffic jam of frightened people fleeing the city. The chaos lasted for almost three hours, as cell phone services became overwhelmed with calls and rumors circled of escalating bloodshed. For Georgians still recovering from the real invasion in August 2008, it seemed that their worst fears had been realized.
Read more ---->
A fake news report that aired on Georgian television two weeks ago only confirms this characterization. The broadcast falsely alleged that Russia had invaded Georgia and that the president had been killed. It went on to show images of Russian jets supposedly on their way to bomb Georgian cities and President Obama announcing sanctions against Russia. Throughout the half-hour show, the Imedi network only ran the disclaimer that it was “an imitation of possible events” twice.
On the streets of Tbilisi and other cities, the population went into panic. Some residents rushed to stores to buy bread and water or take out cash from the ATM. Others jumped into their cars and joined the massive traffic jam of frightened people fleeing the city. The chaos lasted for almost three hours, as cell phone services became overwhelmed with calls and rumors circled of escalating bloodshed. For Georgians still recovering from the real invasion in August 2008, it seemed that their worst fears had been realized.
Read more ---->
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