An Iranian blogger going by the name "Pedestian" is posting a realtime translation here and The Guardian's Ian Black has excellent analysis here.
To me the most striking aspect of the speech thus far was Rafsanjani's insistence that the Iranian Republic derives its legitimacy from the people and not from on high. This is a key distinction between Rafsanjani and Khamenei.
In the weeks following Iran's presidential election few men were at the center of more rumors than Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. He is widely reported to have been the driving force behind Moussavi's campaign and the subsequent protested that rocked Tehran. (For more background check out our "Iranian Election 2009" category.)
Despite all of the speculation, Rafsanjani has maintained a remarkably low profile appearing in public only once to meet with families of students who were killed during the protests.
Tomorrow he will break his silence when he gives the Friday sermon at Tehran University with Moussavi and Khatami in attendence. Abbas Milani has an excellent preview of what will certainly be a pivotal event here.
A view from the Arab side of the Gulf. From al-Arabiya:
"In order to avoid arousing the wrath of the Iranian citizen, the regime will be forced to increase domestic spending - which will place huge pressures on the budget – so as to win over the broad angry masses. No matter what it costs it and whatever the justifications may be, the regime will refrain from raising prices."
"Major powers that support Iran, like China and Russia, will wait and reassess the domestic performance of the Iranian government. If they realize that the popularity of this regime is dropping, this would be an indication of long and exhausting problems for the regime. They will thus not risk supporting Tehran's political stands as they used to do before Iran was struck with the recent political earthquake."
-Jon
Gambling analogies aside (you have no idea how tempted I was to use a Lady Gaga/Khamenei photo mash-up for this post), it is clear that Khamenei's only hope now is to out-last or out-muscle the protesters and the political elites they represent.
In a characteristically dour speech following Friday prayers, Khamenei said that the election was fair and that the results were not up for debate. He blamed outside influence, specifically British agents, for the recent demonstrations.
It seems to me that Khamenei had two main objectives: first, signal that a crackdown is forthcoming if the protests don't stop and second rally his supporters for what may prove to be a bloody battle, both figuratively and literally.
Strategically, this move makes sense. Khamenei's survival is now invariably linked to Ahmadinejad's presidency and the support of hardliners in the security service, Republican Guard, and militia. Any sign of weakness will in turn weaken his hand with these actors. There is little chance that he will be able to coax the protesters out of the street, so Khamenei must prepare to force them.
Its is going to be an interesting weekend.
Update: Sullivan has the transcript here.
Update 2: Also, just imagine how this speech would have read if Obama had come out in support of Mousavi. Obama did the right thing in not giving Khamenei political material.
-Evan
Excellent coverage from Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra (who sounds strangely like dracula).
In the aftermath of Iran's tumultuous election, Ayatollah Khamenei's increasingly public support for incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has come as somewhat of a shock to me. In effect, Khamenei has bet his own fortune and the fortune of the clerical elite that Ahmadinejad, with the support of the security services and hardline militias, will be able to put down the riots raging in the streets of Tehran. (For graphic coverage of the ongoing battles between protesters and police check out Andrew Sullivan's blog The Daily Dish.)
This move is very different from Khamenei's reaction to the election of reform-minded President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. In that case Khamenei used his considerable influence to undermine almost every aspect of Khatami's agenda without open confrontation. (For a very interesting account of how Khamenei used Khatami as a scapegoat for a series of crackdowns on student protesters click here.) In fact this strategy was nothing new. Ayatollah Khomeini perfected it during his tenure as Iran's supreme leader. This luxury is the result of Iran's political system, which positions the Ayatollah above plebeian occurrences such as elections, until now.
The obvious question: Why does Khamenei feel the need to break with tradition and risk a new strategies?
**Warning: Speculation Ahead**
The answer is primarily that Khamenei feels vulnerable and securing the presidency is a necessary step toward reestablishing control, both over the Iranian elite and the public. The sudden rise of Mousavi's campaign, paired with the widespread discontent in the Iranian elite, including members of the Guardian Council that oversees the Supreme Leader, augured a shift in power, a shift Khamenei would not tolerate. (While it is pure speculation, I believe that much of the disagreement in the Iranian elite was the result of differing opinions on how Iran should respond to Obama's recent overtures.)
This brings us to the present. Armed militias have driven protesters out of the streets and reports that government forces would be armed with live rounds forced the cancelation of a rally sponsored by the Mousavi campaign this afternoon. It is clear that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are prepared to do whatever is necessary to reestablish control over the city.
Control, however, is a poor substitute for legitimacy.
The Supreme Leader's fate is now a matter of public opinion and if the current round of protests precipitates any sort of revolution, it would be just as much a revolt against Khamenei as it is against Ahmadinejad.
-Evan
That's how I felt after hearing that Ahmadinejad won in a landslide.
There is no doubt in my mind that Khamenei stole the election for Ahmadinejad. This is a new step in Iran calcifying into a counter-revolutionary state. A section of the ruling elite (which both Moussavi and Karoubi are a part of) have been effectively thrown out. It will be interesting to see how Rafsanjani responds- he was apparently the muscle behind Moussavi. There are conflicting reports on what he's up to, check John Marshall's reporting here.
The most plausible explanation for what happened was given by Juan Cole, who's blog, informed comment, has been indispensable for understanding the election. Here is his recreation of what happened:
"As the real numbers started coming into the Interior Ministry late on Friday, it became clear that Mousavi was winning. Mousavi's spokesman abroad, filmmaker Mohsen Makhbalbaf, alleges that the ministry even contacted Mousavi's camp and said it would begin preparing the population for this victory.
The ministry must have informed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has had a feud with Mousavi for over 30 years [anyone have more info on this?], who found this outcome unsupportable. And, apparently, he and other top leaders had been so confident of an Ahmadinejad win that they had made no contingency plans for what to do if he looked as though he would lose.
They therefore sent blanket instructions to the Electoral Commission to falsify the vote counts.
This clumsy cover-up then produced the incredible result of an Ahmadinejad landlside in Tabriz and Isfahan and Tehran.
The reason for which Rezaie and Karoubi had to be assigned such implausibly low totals was to make sure Ahmadinejad got over 51% of the vote and thus avoid a run-off between him and Mousavi next Friday, which would have given the Mousavi camp a chance to attempt to rally the public and forestall further tampering with the election."
- Friedman
I wish coverage of the Iranian election aftermath was more like one of those choose your own adventure books.
If you believe that Ahmadinejad stole the election, go to page 2.
If you believe that support for Mousavi was greatly exaggerated by overly optimistic West media outlets in the run up to the election, go to page 3.
These two theories have dominated dialogue in the hours since the Iranian Ministry of the Interior announced that, by their count, the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had soundly beaten challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi, taking home 62.63% of the vote.
For those who see systemic fraud as the only explanation, evidence abounds. Critics cite Ahmadinejad's victory in the predominantly Azeri town of Tabriz as a prime example. Mousavi is ethically Azeri and Iran's Azeris have historical voted along ethnic lines with little exception making an Ahmadinejad victory in the region next to impossible.
The MoI is filled with Ahmadinejad appointees and rigging the election would have been ridiculously easy. (My personal favorite theory is that Mousavi actually won 62.63% of the vote and that Ahmadinejad's cronies just switched the names.)
On the flip side, cynics and Ahmadinejad supporters say that Mousavi reformist wave was just the machination of a small, elite segment of the Iran's population magnified by the hope of the Western media.
From all I've seen and read, I'm guessing that the election was much closer to a statistical tie than the MoI the reported. Ahmadinejad probably had a slim lead, but neither candidate had the 50% necessary to declare absolute victory, which would have forced a run-off election next week. This would have given Mousavi valuable time to build on the momentum he generated since his debate with Ahmadinejad on June 3, resulting in a Mousavi win. But that's just speculation.
The real outcome of the Iranian election is exceptionally important to how the U.S. orients it Iran policy in the coming months. If Ahmadinejad really did receive over 60% of the popular vote, the Obama administration has some thinking to do. If the result are fraudulent and a popular shift is underway in Iran, the implications are even more dizzying. More on this when I get some free time to write.
-Evan
P.S. At least we can look forward to more award winning PSAs from VEVAK!
The textbook line on Iran's electoral system is that while there are clear limitations on who can run, once the candidates are approved by the Guardian Council Iranian elections are competitive. Dramatic upsets are not completely uncommon and even western electioneers could learn a thing or two from the populist pandering schemes employed by Iranian candidates.
Even with this background, it is clear that this year's Presidential election (polls open Friday, June 12th) has taken on an entirely different tenor. In recent days political rallies have effectively brought Tehran to a standstill as supporters for both the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his main rival former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (who looks curiously like my undergrad thesis adviser Dr. Nozar Alaolmolki) have taken to the streets.
The turning point was the June 3rd televised debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. In a curious move, Ahmadinejad opened by accusing the Mousavi campaign of spreading lies about the ruling government. The discourse devolved from there. Ahmadinejad criticized Mousavi's wife, a well respected academic, Mousavi shot back that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy had disgraced Iran and marginalized it position in global politics.
Since, the two candidates have effectively been at war. Ahmadinejad has impugned the opposition with crimes ranging from corruption to out and out treason while Mousavi has countered by calling Ahmadinejad a megalomaniac.
It goes without saying that for all the recent theatrics, the results of the election will come down to economics, or more precisely individual voter's perceptions of the Iranian economy. Ahmadinejad supporters, who are on the whole poorer and more likely to reside in rural Iran, view their candidate's populist economic policies as overwhelmingly positive. Ahmadinejad reinforces this view by presenting a carefully selected set of figures at campaign rallies and in debates that indicate Iran is weathering the global economic crisis better than its peers. Detractors counter that Ahmadinejad's populism has created massive inflation (over 23% according to a recent report from Iran's Central Bank) and driven unemployment up.
Excluding the very real possibility of election fraud or interference by Iran's clerical elite, Mousavi has a solid shot. If Mousavi is to win, it won't be because he changed the minds of Ahmadinejad supporters but instead because he inspired and mobilized previously marginalized or disinterested sections of the electorate. If recent rallies are any indication he is doing this quite well. Famously shy in front of photographers, Mousavi has become the face of a united front composed of reformists, youth, women, and even conservatives elites who have grown dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad's economic policies.
Regardless of the outcome, the real significance of the current Iranian electoral cycle is the intangible shift in Iranian popular psychology. Latent dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad's policies, both foreign and domestic has poured into the public sphere. Suppressing this sentiment will be a difficult task for Ahmadinejad if he is reelected.
Moreover, it is unclear if he will once again have the full support of the Ayatollah Khamenei in the aftermath of a tumultuous political cycle. Ahmadinejad has become somewhat of a political liability for Iran's spiritual and political leader. In a recent open letter to the Ayatollah published in newspapers across Iran former Iranian President and current member of the Expediency Council called on Khamenei to reign Ahmadinejad in and resolve the "mutiny" he has incurred.
That said, it is hard to be too optimistic even if Mousavi triumphs. Historically, Iranian reformers have only disappointed both the Iranian people and their supporters in the West. Time will tell.
