Sonorous Turkish tones = apartment sales
Well, the NYTimes didn't quite get Turkish singer Ibrahim Tatlises' name right in the photo caption (who the hell is Ibrahim Tatiless?), but the story about Turkey's wide influence in Iraq by Anthony Shadid is quality. As Shadid writes, the Turks have done an exceptional job of transcending ethnic and sectarian boundaries and now stand to benefit from Iraq's possible success as much as any other country.
Tatlises, a Turk with Arab and Kurdish blood born in the Southern city of Urfa, may well be the perfect symbol of Turkey's outreach in Iraq. Just 'cause, here is a scene from Ibo's 1985 film "Sevmek" (Love) that in my mind pretty much sums up the singer's continued popularity.
Tatlises, a Turk with Arab and Kurdish blood born in the Southern city of Urfa, may well be the perfect symbol of Turkey's outreach in Iraq. Just 'cause, here is a scene from Ibo's 1985 film "Sevmek" (Love) that in my mind pretty much sums up the singer's continued popularity.
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Japan surrenders to American occupation in 1945, aboard the USS Missouri
Is it possible for the U.S. to invade an authoritarian state and install a prosperous democracy? The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq make this one of the most pertinent questions of our time.
Proponents of transformative American power typically cite the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan to show that America’s forays into nation-building do not constitute folly. Rather, if the American missions to install democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan fail, it willl be because of a lack of will, they argue. After all, both Germany and Japan were a complete mess in 1945, and Japanese society was at least as unintelligible to Americans then as Arab culture is today. Yet, the American occupations transformed both former autocracies into prosperous, pro-Western democracies.
Since I recently wrote a very bearish piece on Iraq, I feel the need to refute this (admittedly seductive) argument, which for simplicity I will confine to Iraq. There are three main reasons why the occupations of Germany and Japan were different: total wars made insurgencies unthinkable, they didn't really require "nation-building", and both states feared the Soviet Union far more than they feared America.
The occupations of Japan and Germany, first of all, came after total wars that involved entire societies, exhausting entire populations. As a result, although the wars were far more difficult, the result was unambiguous defeat.
In Iraq, the U.S. fought a regime associated with the Sunni Arab minority. The country did not fight together—if it can be considered to have really fought at all. Thus, large elements or Iraq society retained the will and capacity to fight insurgencies.
This brings us to the second point. The occupations of Germany and Japan did not require nation-building. Corporate German and Japanese identities were already extremely strong, and, as a tragic result of war, consolidated. Indeed, the Allied forces were more concerned that Germany might rebuild centralized power too quickly. Americans made concerted efforts to strengthen German regional identities against Germany national identity, and to hitch West Germany economically to France in what became the European Union.
In Japan, the Americans allowed Emperor Hirohito to stay in power, a longsighted concession that conferred legitimacy onto the post-occupation regime.
The most important difference, however, was the presence of a shared external threat. Nothing turns enemies into friends faster than a common enemy. Germany, Japan, and the US all faced the same existential threat of Soviet communism. So, de-Nazification didn't have to work any better than de-Baathification (and it didn't). The important issue was that the German and Japanese needed the United States more than the United States needed either of them.
For Germany the threat was clear—Soviet troops occupied East Germany, with tanks and nukes facing west.
Japan had historically clashed with Russia over control of northeast Asia, fighting a war in 1905-1906. Japan won the war, sparking a revolution that marked the beginning of the end for the Tsarist regime. After WWII, turning against America again was simply too dangerous, as powerful, Soviet-backed communist movements in Korea, China, and Indochina encircled Japan.
Neither the Iraqi people, nor the Afghanis for that matter, share with America a common and clear existential enemy. US failure in Iraq or Afghanistan will not result in foreign communist domination. Indeed, its not clear that either local population sees a clear stake in American success. That’s the real reason why America's recent occupation regimes are not comparable to those of yesteryear.
- Jon
P.S. If you want a better comparison for Iraq, consider the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, another invasion that was the unlikely result of a surprise attack. (and in the case of the U.S.S. Maine, the conspiracy theorists actually have a good argument)
Proponents of transformative American power typically cite the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan to show that America’s forays into nation-building do not constitute folly. Rather, if the American missions to install democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan fail, it willl be because of a lack of will, they argue. After all, both Germany and Japan were a complete mess in 1945, and Japanese society was at least as unintelligible to Americans then as Arab culture is today. Yet, the American occupations transformed both former autocracies into prosperous, pro-Western democracies.
Since I recently wrote a very bearish piece on Iraq, I feel the need to refute this (admittedly seductive) argument, which for simplicity I will confine to Iraq. There are three main reasons why the occupations of Germany and Japan were different: total wars made insurgencies unthinkable, they didn't really require "nation-building", and both states feared the Soviet Union far more than they feared America.
The occupations of Japan and Germany, first of all, came after total wars that involved entire societies, exhausting entire populations. As a result, although the wars were far more difficult, the result was unambiguous defeat.
In Iraq, the U.S. fought a regime associated with the Sunni Arab minority. The country did not fight together—if it can be considered to have really fought at all. Thus, large elements or Iraq society retained the will and capacity to fight insurgencies.
This brings us to the second point. The occupations of Germany and Japan did not require nation-building. Corporate German and Japanese identities were already extremely strong, and, as a tragic result of war, consolidated. Indeed, the Allied forces were more concerned that Germany might rebuild centralized power too quickly. Americans made concerted efforts to strengthen German regional identities against Germany national identity, and to hitch West Germany economically to France in what became the European Union.
In Japan, the Americans allowed Emperor Hirohito to stay in power, a longsighted concession that conferred legitimacy onto the post-occupation regime.
The most important difference, however, was the presence of a shared external threat. Nothing turns enemies into friends faster than a common enemy. Germany, Japan, and the US all faced the same existential threat of Soviet communism. So, de-Nazification didn't have to work any better than de-Baathification (and it didn't). The important issue was that the German and Japanese needed the United States more than the United States needed either of them.
For Germany the threat was clear—Soviet troops occupied East Germany, with tanks and nukes facing west.
Japan had historically clashed with Russia over control of northeast Asia, fighting a war in 1905-1906. Japan won the war, sparking a revolution that marked the beginning of the end for the Tsarist regime. After WWII, turning against America again was simply too dangerous, as powerful, Soviet-backed communist movements in Korea, China, and Indochina encircled Japan.
Neither the Iraqi people, nor the Afghanis for that matter, share with America a common and clear existential enemy. US failure in Iraq or Afghanistan will not result in foreign communist domination. Indeed, its not clear that either local population sees a clear stake in American success. That’s the real reason why America's recent occupation regimes are not comparable to those of yesteryear.
- Jon
P.S. If you want a better comparison for Iraq, consider the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, another invasion that was the unlikely result of a surprise attack. (and in the case of the U.S.S. Maine, the conspiracy theorists actually have a good argument)
Is Iraq Moving Closer it Iran? 10/17/2010
Moqtada al-Sadr: Not the guy you want staffing your ministry of the interior
Although nobody is really paying attention, the news from Iraq looks very bleak: Hundreds of members of the Awakening Council—Sunni insurgents paid to renounce al-Qaeda and join the Americans—have defected back to al-Qaeda over the past few months. The Awakening council, started in 2006, combined with “the surge” to bring stability to Iraq over the past couple of years.
Sunnis have been on edge over the past 6 months, as Iraq’s ruling Shia elite has done everything possible to block Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya party from taking power after winning the last elections. News of a supposed Iran-brokered deal for a new government, led by the incumbent al-Maliki and supported by factions loyal to the firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have only made things worse. Lastly, this coalition will also have to include the Kurds in order to move forward, another group with interests inimical to Sunni Arabs.
For those that remember, a Shia-Kurdish coalition headed up Iraq’s first post-Coalition Provisional Authority (i.e. Paul Bremer) government after the Sunni Arabs boycotted elections. In other words, we are back to square one—with the Shia in a marriage of convenience with the Kurds, and the Sunni Arabs, left out of elite politics, taking to arms. Last time, this situation almost led to a civil war.
A Shia-Kurdish coalition will never deliver a stable Iraq. The Shia and the Kurds are two minorities in a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. The only option for the Shia central government is to ally instead with Iran—a nightmare for both Sunni Arabs and America. Meanwhile, Kurds will use an unstable Iraq to agitate for more power/independence for the Kurdistan region, further increasing Iraq’s centrifugal forces.
The addition of Sadr makes things worse. It’s not clear what Sadr’s convictions are, or if he even has any. He became a vehemently opponent of al-Maliki, his apparent new partner, after the Iraqi army quashed Sadr’s paramilitary forces in 2008. He tries to portray himself as an Iraqi nationalist, but he has spent the past few years living in Iran.
What is clear is that Sadr is a populist who deeply despises the United States, and is hated by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. He is poised to claim at least one of the security-related government ministries as part of the deal for joining the coalition, and he wants to incorporate his followers—who aspire to be like Hezbollah—into the national army. The last time he had significant power in Iraq, before the surge, he was a main contributor to the religious thuggery that reigned in parts of Baghdad and southern Iraq.
The United States is set to leave in December 2011. If I were a betting man, I would not be betting on Iraq’s future.
Sunnis have been on edge over the past 6 months, as Iraq’s ruling Shia elite has done everything possible to block Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya party from taking power after winning the last elections. News of a supposed Iran-brokered deal for a new government, led by the incumbent al-Maliki and supported by factions loyal to the firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have only made things worse. Lastly, this coalition will also have to include the Kurds in order to move forward, another group with interests inimical to Sunni Arabs.
For those that remember, a Shia-Kurdish coalition headed up Iraq’s first post-Coalition Provisional Authority (i.e. Paul Bremer) government after the Sunni Arabs boycotted elections. In other words, we are back to square one—with the Shia in a marriage of convenience with the Kurds, and the Sunni Arabs, left out of elite politics, taking to arms. Last time, this situation almost led to a civil war.
A Shia-Kurdish coalition will never deliver a stable Iraq. The Shia and the Kurds are two minorities in a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. The only option for the Shia central government is to ally instead with Iran—a nightmare for both Sunni Arabs and America. Meanwhile, Kurds will use an unstable Iraq to agitate for more power/independence for the Kurdistan region, further increasing Iraq’s centrifugal forces.
The addition of Sadr makes things worse. It’s not clear what Sadr’s convictions are, or if he even has any. He became a vehemently opponent of al-Maliki, his apparent new partner, after the Iraqi army quashed Sadr’s paramilitary forces in 2008. He tries to portray himself as an Iraqi nationalist, but he has spent the past few years living in Iran.
What is clear is that Sadr is a populist who deeply despises the United States, and is hated by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. He is poised to claim at least one of the security-related government ministries as part of the deal for joining the coalition, and he wants to incorporate his followers—who aspire to be like Hezbollah—into the national army. The last time he had significant power in Iraq, before the surge, he was a main contributor to the religious thuggery that reigned in parts of Baghdad and southern Iraq.
The United States is set to leave in December 2011. If I were a betting man, I would not be betting on Iraq’s future.
From a new RAND report on fallout from the Iraq War:
"The Iraq War’s reverberations in the region are broad ranging,
affecting relations between states, political and societal dynamics
inside states, the calculations of terrorists and paramilitaries, and shifts
in public views of American credibility. The balance sheet of these
changes does not bode well for long-term U.S. objectives in the Middle
East. That said, a better understanding of how Middle Eastern states
and nonstate actors are responding to the war’s aftermath can help
contribute to U.S. policies that may better contain and ameliorate the
negative consequences of the conflict and perhaps even increase U.S.
leverage."
"The Iraq War’s reverberations in the region are broad ranging,
affecting relations between states, political and societal dynamics
inside states, the calculations of terrorists and paramilitaries, and shifts
in public views of American credibility. The balance sheet of these
changes does not bode well for long-term U.S. objectives in the Middle
East. That said, a better understanding of how Middle Eastern states
and nonstate actors are responding to the war’s aftermath can help
contribute to U.S. policies that may better contain and ameliorate the
negative consequences of the conflict and perhaps even increase U.S.
leverage."
Read This: March 16th, 2010 03/16/2010
Zakaria on Obama's Pakistan Win:
There has been a spate of good news coming out of that complicated country, which has long promised to take action against Islamic militants but rarely done so. (The reason: Pakistan has used many of these same militants to destabilize its traditional foe, India, and to gain influence in Afghanistan.) Over the past few months, the Pakistani military has engaged in serious and successful operations in the militant havens of Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan, and Bajaur. Some of these areas are badlands where no Pakistani government has been able to establish its writ, so the achievement is all the more important. The Pakistanis have also ramped up their intelligence sharing with the U.S. This latter process led to the arrest a month ago of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban, among other Taliban figures.
'Temporary Marriage' and the Economy of Pleasure (in Iran)
During the past few years, the ninth government [Ahmadinejad's first administration, 2005-9] and the seventh and eighth parliaments have turned the revival of this custom and its promotion as "temporary marriage" into one of the foundations of their sexual politics. The government and the parliament went so far as to ratify the new family law bill despite women's strong opposition. This bill gives legal justification to conditional polygamy, including multiple [permanent] wives and sigheh. It no longer even requires permission from the first wife.
The NYTimes on Corruption in Iraq
Investigators looking into corruption involving reconstruction in Iraq say they have opened more than 50 new cases in six months by scrutinizing large cash transactions — involving banks, land deals, loan payments, casinos and even plastic surgery — made by some of the Americans involved in the nearly $150 billion program.
There has been a spate of good news coming out of that complicated country, which has long promised to take action against Islamic militants but rarely done so. (The reason: Pakistan has used many of these same militants to destabilize its traditional foe, India, and to gain influence in Afghanistan.) Over the past few months, the Pakistani military has engaged in serious and successful operations in the militant havens of Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan, and Bajaur. Some of these areas are badlands where no Pakistani government has been able to establish its writ, so the achievement is all the more important. The Pakistanis have also ramped up their intelligence sharing with the U.S. This latter process led to the arrest a month ago of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban, among other Taliban figures.
'Temporary Marriage' and the Economy of Pleasure (in Iran)
During the past few years, the ninth government [Ahmadinejad's first administration, 2005-9] and the seventh and eighth parliaments have turned the revival of this custom and its promotion as "temporary marriage" into one of the foundations of their sexual politics. The government and the parliament went so far as to ratify the new family law bill despite women's strong opposition. This bill gives legal justification to conditional polygamy, including multiple [permanent] wives and sigheh. It no longer even requires permission from the first wife.
The NYTimes on Corruption in Iraq
Investigators looking into corruption involving reconstruction in Iraq say they have opened more than 50 new cases in six months by scrutinizing large cash transactions — involving banks, land deals, loan payments, casinos and even plastic surgery — made by some of the Americans involved in the nearly $150 billion program.
Read This: March 12, 2010 03/12/2010
Al Jazeera correspondent Omar Chatriwala on food culture in Iraq:
It’s a daily street food staple now, but my colleague Omar al-Saleh tells me growing up in Baghdad, falafel was practically unheard of. Faced with tough international sanctions in the 1990s and a resulting failed economy, Iraqis had to find new ways to survive, and this cheap Egyptian fare was one of them. Almost two decades later, it seems that situation continues.
Barbara Sude on the current state of Al Qaeda:
The obvious question now is whether the pace of UAV strikes has been intense enough to break up the organization—or at least to remove the most experienced people and disrupt planning. Some reports say recruits have trouble staying in one location for fear of strikes, and the Guardian estimated in September 2009 that the core senior leadership has been reduced to “six to eight” men. What we can verify in the past two years is successful targeting of well-known figures, including senior operational leader Abu Laith al-Libi and chemical and poison specialist Abu Khabab al-Masri. The tempo of drone strikes also has caught some less publicly known but important al-Qaeda figures such as Pakistan operations chief Usama al-Kini (Fahid Msalam) and his lieutenant Ahmed Salim Swedan. Both men, suspects in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, were killed in January 2009.
The Algerian Review on the Algerian Jewish community:
While digging through history books, specifically Mohamed Harbi’s “La Guerre d’Algérie”, published in 2004, I came through a letter from the FLN written to the Jewish community in 1962. The FLN tried to engage the Jewish community and appealed to them to side with the Algerian revolution. The FLN was sympathetic to the plight that the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis and Vichy’s government. It aknowledges the help of many Jews that were in the cause of the revolution.
It’s a daily street food staple now, but my colleague Omar al-Saleh tells me growing up in Baghdad, falafel was practically unheard of. Faced with tough international sanctions in the 1990s and a resulting failed economy, Iraqis had to find new ways to survive, and this cheap Egyptian fare was one of them. Almost two decades later, it seems that situation continues.
Barbara Sude on the current state of Al Qaeda:
The obvious question now is whether the pace of UAV strikes has been intense enough to break up the organization—or at least to remove the most experienced people and disrupt planning. Some reports say recruits have trouble staying in one location for fear of strikes, and the Guardian estimated in September 2009 that the core senior leadership has been reduced to “six to eight” men. What we can verify in the past two years is successful targeting of well-known figures, including senior operational leader Abu Laith al-Libi and chemical and poison specialist Abu Khabab al-Masri. The tempo of drone strikes also has caught some less publicly known but important al-Qaeda figures such as Pakistan operations chief Usama al-Kini (Fahid Msalam) and his lieutenant Ahmed Salim Swedan. Both men, suspects in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, were killed in January 2009.
The Algerian Review on the Algerian Jewish community:
While digging through history books, specifically Mohamed Harbi’s “La Guerre d’Algérie”, published in 2004, I came through a letter from the FLN written to the Jewish community in 1962. The FLN tried to engage the Jewish community and appealed to them to side with the Algerian revolution. The FLN was sympathetic to the plight that the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis and Vichy’s government. It aknowledges the help of many Jews that were in the cause of the revolution.
Meet the Blues 03/05/2010
There is a new party in Kurdish politics and it's likely that it will have a significant effect on the ongoing Iraqi election. The Goran or "change" party was founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa specifically to challenge the two party PUK, KDP coalition that has dominated politics in the region since it became semi-autonomous after the first Gulf War.
Al Jazeera correspondent Zeina Khodr has an excellent profile on the newcomers here.
Money quote:
For the first time since 2003, Kurdish politicians will lack unity. But that doesn't seem to bother Goran's supporters. I went to one of their rallies and most of them will tell you that they welcome new parties because it brings about a real democracy.
But the question is how will this new reality affect the Kurds' political influence in Baghdad? After all, Sunday's national elections is not just about rival Kurdish parties vying for parliamentary seats, it is about Kurds wanting to expand their influence in Baghdad.
That's influence they need if they want to resolve pending Arab-Kurdish issues, like the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, the oil law and the status of federalism.
It is still not clear if Nawshirwan Mustafa, the head of the Goran movement, will co-operate with his Kurdish rivals in the next Iraqi parliament. "I hope we do," is what he told me an hour before he addressed a crowd of his supporters.
For more background check out this article Jon wrote way back in July 2009.
Al Jazeera correspondent Zeina Khodr has an excellent profile on the newcomers here.
Money quote:
For the first time since 2003, Kurdish politicians will lack unity. But that doesn't seem to bother Goran's supporters. I went to one of their rallies and most of them will tell you that they welcome new parties because it brings about a real democracy.
But the question is how will this new reality affect the Kurds' political influence in Baghdad? After all, Sunday's national elections is not just about rival Kurdish parties vying for parliamentary seats, it is about Kurds wanting to expand their influence in Baghdad.
That's influence they need if they want to resolve pending Arab-Kurdish issues, like the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, the oil law and the status of federalism.
It is still not clear if Nawshirwan Mustafa, the head of the Goran movement, will co-operate with his Kurdish rivals in the next Iraqi parliament. "I hope we do," is what he told me an hour before he addressed a crowd of his supporters.
For more background check out this article Jon wrote way back in July 2009.
The American Mandate? 02/24/2010
Thomas Ricks, a respected Washington war reporter, argues that the U.S. needs to renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement and keep 30,000-50,000 troops in Iraq indefinitely. The current agreement, signed by both the Bush administration and the Iraqi leadership in 2008, stipulates that all US forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of the next year. Andrew Sullivan, sensing the coming pushback against withdrawal, is livid:
If Obama does not have the courage to withdraw [from Iraq] regardless of the consequences, he will end up entrenching Bush's insane gamble, not ending it, as he was elected to do. If Obama increases troop levels in Afghanistan and extends Bush's timetable for leaving Iraq, why on earth did we support him? Those were McCain's policies. Why have elections if they are essentially meaningiless?
Occupations are the foreign [policy] equivalent [sic] of entitlement programs. They never end. Why should Americans be denied basic access to health insurance because the money is going to sustain 50,000 troops in Germany, for Pete's sake, or to tamp down sectarian conflicts that have existed for centuries in a country we had no troops in for all of US history until 2003?
When will this madness end? Do we really have to go completely bankrupt and be forced to withdraw from these anachronistic pretensions? Are seven years not enough?
If Obama does not have the courage to withdraw [from Iraq] regardless of the consequences, he will end up entrenching Bush's insane gamble, not ending it, as he was elected to do. If Obama increases troop levels in Afghanistan and extends Bush's timetable for leaving Iraq, why on earth did we support him? Those were McCain's policies. Why have elections if they are essentially meaningiless?
Occupations are the foreign [policy] equivalent [sic] of entitlement programs. They never end. Why should Americans be denied basic access to health insurance because the money is going to sustain 50,000 troops in Germany, for Pete's sake, or to tamp down sectarian conflicts that have existed for centuries in a country we had no troops in for all of US history until 2003?
When will this madness end? Do we really have to go completely bankrupt and be forced to withdraw from these anachronistic pretensions? Are seven years not enough?
Iraq is Not Unraveling...Yet 02/24/2010
Nir Rosen, recently back from Iraq, rebuts the idea that Sunnis are going to stage a repeat of the 2005, when they boycotted elections and turned instead to militias for power. This is part of the general worry amongst American policymakers that for all the successes of the surge, there is still no political reconciliation and no agreed method for distributing government revenues. Money quote:
...what can Sunnis do? Nothing, they're screwed and they have to accept it, and they have. The alternative is far worse for them. Sunnis in the region will not go to war alongside the Sunnis of Iraq. That moment came and went in 2006. Iraqi Sunnis don't even have a single leader who is charismatic and has real appeal, they're divided among themselves and these days your average Iraqi just isn't that into politics. I've heard it hundreds of times by now, they blame the religious parties, they say they got fooled and now they understand. Now that's not completely true, but the militias were able to mobilize people because of a security vacuum. These days it doesn't matter how remote and shitty the village I visit is, there are Iraqi Security Forces, and people have good things to say about them. Compared to the first three years of the occupation, Sunnis seem downright docile, maybe bitter or wistful, maybe angry, but their leadership is emasculated, in jail, abroad, just trying to survive, or just trying to make money.
...what can Sunnis do? Nothing, they're screwed and they have to accept it, and they have. The alternative is far worse for them. Sunnis in the region will not go to war alongside the Sunnis of Iraq. That moment came and went in 2006. Iraqi Sunnis don't even have a single leader who is charismatic and has real appeal, they're divided among themselves and these days your average Iraqi just isn't that into politics. I've heard it hundreds of times by now, they blame the religious parties, they say they got fooled and now they understand. Now that's not completely true, but the militias were able to mobilize people because of a security vacuum. These days it doesn't matter how remote and shitty the village I visit is, there are Iraqi Security Forces, and people have good things to say about them. Compared to the first three years of the occupation, Sunnis seem downright docile, maybe bitter or wistful, maybe angry, but their leadership is emasculated, in jail, abroad, just trying to survive, or just trying to make money.
Check out Daniel Larison's short piece in the The Week. Money quote:
Today, we are at the end of an era defined by conservative internationalism, a creed both exceedingly ambitious in its goals and extremely parsimonious in the resources provided to reach them. For the past 30 years, conservative internationalists have largely dominated national security debates; even internationalist Democrats have been influenced by them or been forced to mimic their arguments. During and after Vietnam, conservative internationalists wished to preserve an active, "forward" foreign policy while avoiding the political costs such a policy entails. Consequently, they turned to air power, missile defenses, covert operations, and short wars to minimize both American casualties and public backlash. In short, conservative internationalists found a way to insulate an activist national security state from the people it was supposed to serve….
…In recent years, it was common for liberals to ask why President Bush never asked for collective sacrifice in support of a war effort that his administration routinely described as vital, even "existential." As Zelizer explains, Bush couldn’t have done so without undermining a pillar of conservative internationalism—the "promise of minimal sacrifice." In reality, the sacrifice is not so small, but it is made to seem small by pushing the fiscal costs of war into the future and carefully hiding the human costs from public scrutiny. The pain is buried in abstract projections of future deficits and in the quiet stoicism of the professional military.
Today, we are at the end of an era defined by conservative internationalism, a creed both exceedingly ambitious in its goals and extremely parsimonious in the resources provided to reach them. For the past 30 years, conservative internationalists have largely dominated national security debates; even internationalist Democrats have been influenced by them or been forced to mimic their arguments. During and after Vietnam, conservative internationalists wished to preserve an active, "forward" foreign policy while avoiding the political costs such a policy entails. Consequently, they turned to air power, missile defenses, covert operations, and short wars to minimize both American casualties and public backlash. In short, conservative internationalists found a way to insulate an activist national security state from the people it was supposed to serve….
…In recent years, it was common for liberals to ask why President Bush never asked for collective sacrifice in support of a war effort that his administration routinely described as vital, even "existential." As Zelizer explains, Bush couldn’t have done so without undermining a pillar of conservative internationalism—the "promise of minimal sacrifice." In reality, the sacrifice is not so small, but it is made to seem small by pushing the fiscal costs of war into the future and carefully hiding the human costs from public scrutiny. The pain is buried in abstract projections of future deficits and in the quiet stoicism of the professional military.
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