Currently Reading 01/15/2010
From Baghdad to Beirut, by Michael Totten. Totten compares Iraq and Lebanon, the Arab world's two putative democracies. Money quote:
Iraq’s sectarian divisions, like those in Lebanon, attract outside powers. Many Sunni Arabs enlisted al-Qaida terrorists from 2004 to 2007 in their fight against the American military and the Shi’a-dominated central government, for instance. But no Middle Eastern country interferes simultaneously in Lebanon and Iraq as much as Iran. In 2008, Ryan Crocker—the American ambassador to Lebanon from 1990 to 1993 and to Iraq from 2007 to 2009—told Congress that Iran was pursuing a “Lebanonization strategy” in Iraq, “using the same techniques they used in Lebanon to co-opt elements of the local Shi’a community and use them as basically instruments of Iranian force.” In his new book, The Gamble, Pulitzer Prize–winning author Thomas Ricks elaborates: Crocker raised concerns about “what he termed the Lebanonization of Iraq—that is, the weakening of the government, the division of the people into sectarian groups, and the rise of militias that rival the government in reliable firepower.”
Iraq’s sectarian divisions, like those in Lebanon, attract outside powers. Many Sunni Arabs enlisted al-Qaida terrorists from 2004 to 2007 in their fight against the American military and the Shi’a-dominated central government, for instance. But no Middle Eastern country interferes simultaneously in Lebanon and Iraq as much as Iran. In 2008, Ryan Crocker—the American ambassador to Lebanon from 1990 to 1993 and to Iraq from 2007 to 2009—told Congress that Iran was pursuing a “Lebanonization strategy” in Iraq, “using the same techniques they used in Lebanon to co-opt elements of the local Shi’a community and use them as basically instruments of Iranian force.” In his new book, The Gamble, Pulitzer Prize–winning author Thomas Ricks elaborates: Crocker raised concerns about “what he termed the Lebanonization of Iraq—that is, the weakening of the government, the division of the people into sectarian groups, and the rise of militias that rival the government in reliable firepower.”
Add Comment
Is No News Good News? 01/05/2010
Evan and I promised ourselves when we started this blog not to fall victim to America's ADD "breaking" news cycle, which ignores most of the world until a crisis occurs.
Well, you wouldn't know it from reading the news, but last month the US military had zero combat deaths in Iraq. December 2009 was the first month since the US invasion in which not a single American soldier was killed.
This is in large part because the US military is no longer very visible to Iraqi society since it has pulled out of most major cities. Over the past few months, insurgents have instead launched devastating attacks on Iraqi governmental ministries.
There are parliamentary elections due for March 7th, and for the first time, people will be able to vote for individual candidates rather than just candidate lists. This could make individual MPs more accountable.
Huge unresolved problems remain in Mosul and Kirkuk. There is still no real national reconciliation. And although the recent security breaches have not yet hurt PM Nuri al-Maliki's popularity on the street, it will if these attacks continue. The US is supposed to pull out all combat troops by August of this year. How that will turn out is anybody's guess.
For an informative interview on the current political situation in Iraq, check the CFR's discussion with the Christian Science Monitor's former Baghdad correspondent here.
Well, you wouldn't know it from reading the news, but last month the US military had zero combat deaths in Iraq. December 2009 was the first month since the US invasion in which not a single American soldier was killed.
This is in large part because the US military is no longer very visible to Iraqi society since it has pulled out of most major cities. Over the past few months, insurgents have instead launched devastating attacks on Iraqi governmental ministries.
There are parliamentary elections due for March 7th, and for the first time, people will be able to vote for individual candidates rather than just candidate lists. This could make individual MPs more accountable.
Huge unresolved problems remain in Mosul and Kirkuk. There is still no real national reconciliation. And although the recent security breaches have not yet hurt PM Nuri al-Maliki's popularity on the street, it will if these attacks continue. The US is supposed to pull out all combat troops by August of this year. How that will turn out is anybody's guess.
For an informative interview on the current political situation in Iraq, check the CFR's discussion with the Christian Science Monitor's former Baghdad correspondent here.
Most al-Qaeda terrorists cross into Iraq from Syria
Michael Bronner has a very interesting interview with "Abu Khalid," a terrorist from Lebanon who joined al-Qaeda to become a suicide bomber. Abu Khalid's Iraqi handlers decided that they already had enough suicide bombers, and sent him back to Lebanon to fundraise and recruit people with more high-level skills.
The interview sheds light on the role of foreign jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and especially the rise of suicide bombing as a tactic in Afghanistan, where it was insignificant until 2005.
Money quote:
In the fall of 2007, U.S. Special Forces recovered a set of computer hard drives during a raid on an al-Qaeda in Iraq (A.Q.I.) [safehouse]...Surprisingly detailed A.Q.I. personnel records, covering a period from August 2006 to August 2007, revealed a highly professional, highly efficient smuggling operation that moved some 600 foreign fighters from 21 countries across the Syrian border and into the insurgency network in that short period alone. They made their way to war through the most banal of channels, many by air, connecting to Damascus through international airports in Europe or Egypt, then moving, like Abu Khalid, alongside the daily illicit cross-border traffic of cattle, cigarettes, cement, pharmaceuticals, diesel, guns, and gold that have been smugglers’ sustenance in the border region through peace and war before.
The interview sheds light on the role of foreign jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and especially the rise of suicide bombing as a tactic in Afghanistan, where it was insignificant until 2005.
Money quote:
In the fall of 2007, U.S. Special Forces recovered a set of computer hard drives during a raid on an al-Qaeda in Iraq (A.Q.I.) [safehouse]...Surprisingly detailed A.Q.I. personnel records, covering a period from August 2006 to August 2007, revealed a highly professional, highly efficient smuggling operation that moved some 600 foreign fighters from 21 countries across the Syrian border and into the insurgency network in that short period alone. They made their way to war through the most banal of channels, many by air, connecting to Damascus through international airports in Europe or Egypt, then moving, like Abu Khalid, alongside the daily illicit cross-border traffic of cattle, cigarettes, cement, pharmaceuticals, diesel, guns, and gold that have been smugglers’ sustenance in the border region through peace and war before.
AKP's Ideal v. The Kurdish Reality 12/10/2009
Turkey's foreign policy since AKP solidified its domestic political position in 2007 has largely been defined by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's dogmatic interest in eliminating potential liabilities. One of his most notable successes has been the improvement of Turkey's relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq.
On October 31st, less than three years after Turkish troops invaded Northern Iraq, Davutoglu stood shoulder to shoulder with KRG President Masoud Barzani at the inauguration of Turkey's new consulate in Erbil--an image very few Turkey observers thought they would ever see.
Undergirding the dramatic improvement of diplomatic ties has been the growth of economic relations between Turkey and the KRG. Turkey is by far the region's largest source of foreign direct investment and Turkish companies participate in virtually every sector of the Kurdish economy from construction to airport management. Additionally, natural gas from the Kurdish controlled regions of Iraq is an important part of Turkey's plan to become a regional energy hub.
Unfortunately, Davutoglu's masterpiece is in danger.
More after the jump ->
On October 31st, less than three years after Turkish troops invaded Northern Iraq, Davutoglu stood shoulder to shoulder with KRG President Masoud Barzani at the inauguration of Turkey's new consulate in Erbil--an image very few Turkey observers thought they would ever see.
Undergirding the dramatic improvement of diplomatic ties has been the growth of economic relations between Turkey and the KRG. Turkey is by far the region's largest source of foreign direct investment and Turkish companies participate in virtually every sector of the Kurdish economy from construction to airport management. Additionally, natural gas from the Kurdish controlled regions of Iraq is an important part of Turkey's plan to become a regional energy hub.
Unfortunately, Davutoglu's masterpiece is in danger.
More after the jump ->
How the US killed Zarqawi 11/19/2009
He was a real looker
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was at the time the most wanted man in Iraq after trying to ignite a Sunni-Shia civil war in the country. Additionally, he was public enemy number 1 in his native Jordan for bombing 3 Amman hotels. This is the apparent story of how America killed him, from a NY Times piece on Gen. Stanley McChrystal:
This time, McChrystal believed, Zarqawi was in his sights. The tip was long in coming, a result of thousands of hours of intelligence work, but according to several sources, it boiled down to this: Under interrogation, an Iraqi insurgent who was a member of Zarqawi’s inner circle pointed to an Iraqi named Abd al-Rahman, who, the insurgent said, served as Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser.
Whenever Rahman was preparing to meet Zarqawi, the source told the Americans, he would send his wife and family out of Baghdad the day before. McChrystal and his JSOC team watched Rahman for 17 consecutive days. Then, on June 6, 2006, it happened — Rahman’s family was seen piling into a vehicle and leaving the city.
The next day, a Predator drone followed Rahman himself as he made his way northeast out of Baghdad, to a small house in a palm grove near the village of Hibhib. Rahman went inside. McChrystal had a commando team on the ground, 18 minutes away.
As McChrystal and his staff watched through the Predator camera, a man, dressed in black, walked from the house to the edge of the road. The man looked to his right, then to his left. It was Zarqawi. He walked back inside. They were sure it was him. At an operations center, a senior Special Forces commander, realizing that time was short, ordered an airstrike. Two F-16’s were dispatched; one of them was hooked up to a refueling plane; the second jet was told to go alone. A pair of 500-pound bombs killed Zarqawi.
This time, McChrystal believed, Zarqawi was in his sights. The tip was long in coming, a result of thousands of hours of intelligence work, but according to several sources, it boiled down to this: Under interrogation, an Iraqi insurgent who was a member of Zarqawi’s inner circle pointed to an Iraqi named Abd al-Rahman, who, the insurgent said, served as Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser.
Whenever Rahman was preparing to meet Zarqawi, the source told the Americans, he would send his wife and family out of Baghdad the day before. McChrystal and his JSOC team watched Rahman for 17 consecutive days. Then, on June 6, 2006, it happened — Rahman’s family was seen piling into a vehicle and leaving the city.
The next day, a Predator drone followed Rahman himself as he made his way northeast out of Baghdad, to a small house in a palm grove near the village of Hibhib. Rahman went inside. McChrystal had a commando team on the ground, 18 minutes away.
As McChrystal and his staff watched through the Predator camera, a man, dressed in black, walked from the house to the edge of the road. The man looked to his right, then to his left. It was Zarqawi. He walked back inside. They were sure it was him. At an operations center, a senior Special Forces commander, realizing that time was short, ordered an airstrike. Two F-16’s were dispatched; one of them was hooked up to a refueling plane; the second jet was told to go alone. A pair of 500-pound bombs killed Zarqawi.
Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan 11/13/2009
For anyone who follows Turkey, this image is shocking.
Developments between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have been moving at unbelievable speed.
On Friday Oct 31, in the evening (Bush's preferred time slot for making news disappear), Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Erbil and held a joint news conference with Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Massoud Barzani is despised by mainstream Turks.
In 2007, the the military scuttled attempts by the AKP to setup a meeting between then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and then Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani.
But since that time, the AKP has scored successive blows against the military, both by appointing Gul president in 2007 and then by defeating attempts by the military to shut down the AKP in the summer of 2008.
The AKP government agreed to let the military launch an invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in February 2008, perhaps in hindsight to placate the Turkish military and prepare for a rapprochement.
In conjunction with Davutoglu's visit, the AKP has been issuing amnesties for Kurdish PKK members without blood on their hands and relaxing restrictions on the Kurdish language. But by implicitly acknowledging Iraqi Kurdistan as a separate entity from the rest of Iraq, and agreeing to open a consulate in Erbil, the AKP is really entering untested waters. Many Turks deeply fear Kurdish separatist ambitions, and for them, the increasingly independent Kurds of Iraq are a nightmare.
For Turkey, this new Iraqi Kurdistan policy fits in well with Davutoglu's vision for Turkey as a new Middle Eastern power. For Turkish business, it means a windfall of profits in the underdeveloped but oil-rich Kurdistan. For Barzani, the Iraqi Arabs are the real foes, followed by the Persians and Syrians. Turkey is the least antipathetic of Iraqi Kurdistan's neighbors and has good ties with the West, which has traditionally been the Kurds' protector.
But the Turkish public is way behind Davutoglu and the Turkish business community on this one. After 80 years of denying that the Kurds even existed, and a brutal 20 year war against the PKK in Turkey's southeast, the AKP has to do more to encourage reconciliation in society. Otherwise, prepare for an ugly backlash.
On Friday Oct 31, in the evening (Bush's preferred time slot for making news disappear), Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Erbil and held a joint news conference with Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Massoud Barzani is despised by mainstream Turks.
In 2007, the the military scuttled attempts by the AKP to setup a meeting between then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and then Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani.
But since that time, the AKP has scored successive blows against the military, both by appointing Gul president in 2007 and then by defeating attempts by the military to shut down the AKP in the summer of 2008.
The AKP government agreed to let the military launch an invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in February 2008, perhaps in hindsight to placate the Turkish military and prepare for a rapprochement.
In conjunction with Davutoglu's visit, the AKP has been issuing amnesties for Kurdish PKK members without blood on their hands and relaxing restrictions on the Kurdish language. But by implicitly acknowledging Iraqi Kurdistan as a separate entity from the rest of Iraq, and agreeing to open a consulate in Erbil, the AKP is really entering untested waters. Many Turks deeply fear Kurdish separatist ambitions, and for them, the increasingly independent Kurds of Iraq are a nightmare.
For Turkey, this new Iraqi Kurdistan policy fits in well with Davutoglu's vision for Turkey as a new Middle Eastern power. For Turkish business, it means a windfall of profits in the underdeveloped but oil-rich Kurdistan. For Barzani, the Iraqi Arabs are the real foes, followed by the Persians and Syrians. Turkey is the least antipathetic of Iraqi Kurdistan's neighbors and has good ties with the West, which has traditionally been the Kurds' protector.
But the Turkish public is way behind Davutoglu and the Turkish business community on this one. After 80 years of denying that the Kurds even existed, and a brutal 20 year war against the PKK in Turkey's southeast, the AKP has to do more to encourage reconciliation in society. Otherwise, prepare for an ugly backlash.
Crazy World Leaders 10/26/2009
Quran Written with Saddam's Blood - BBC
I was recently talking to some friends about one of my favorite topics- crazy heads of state- when my comment that Saddam had ordered a Quran written with his own blood drew incredulous looks and suggestions that these were American rumors.
According to the BBC, Saddam gave this explanation to the official Iraqi media:
My life has been full of dangers in which I should have lost a lot of blood...but since I have bled only a little, I asked somebody to write God's words with my blood in gratitude.
I feel bad for whoever had to write it.
According to the BBC, Saddam gave this explanation to the official Iraqi media:
My life has been full of dangers in which I should have lost a lot of blood...but since I have bled only a little, I asked somebody to write God's words with my blood in gratitude.
I feel bad for whoever had to write it.
The Iraqi Air Force 08/30/2009
The Saudi Air Force on Display at the Al-Ain Airshow in UAE, 2007
Doesn't exist. In the rush to expand the Iraqi Army, there has been little effort to create an air force.
While this might sound unimportant from a hierarchy of needs standpoint, it is a useful reminder that Iraq is not really prepared to take over its own sovereignty.
No country can control its borders if it can't control its airspace, and Iraq lives in a tough neighborhood. Northern Iraq is already subject to regular bombing campaigns by Turkey. Iraq has generally unfavorable relations with the Sunni Arab Gulf states. Iran is a friend, but has been meddling in Iraqi affairs ever since the 2003 invasion. Syria is still its unpredictable, mischievous self.
More importantly for the U.S., Iraqi armed forces are reluctant to attack insurgents without air support. They are accustomed to executing combat missions with American air cover- the finest in the world. How will they fight insurgents once America leaves?
While this might sound unimportant from a hierarchy of needs standpoint, it is a useful reminder that Iraq is not really prepared to take over its own sovereignty.
No country can control its borders if it can't control its airspace, and Iraq lives in a tough neighborhood. Northern Iraq is already subject to regular bombing campaigns by Turkey. Iraq has generally unfavorable relations with the Sunni Arab Gulf states. Iran is a friend, but has been meddling in Iraqi affairs ever since the 2003 invasion. Syria is still its unpredictable, mischievous self.
More importantly for the U.S., Iraqi armed forces are reluctant to attack insurgents without air support. They are accustomed to executing combat missions with American air cover- the finest in the world. How will they fight insurgents once America leaves?
Al-Maliki's Fortunes Reverse 08/29/2009
Earlier this summer Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appeared to have a strong hold on political life in Iraq. He had silenced both his Sunni and Shiite rivals and was riding a wave of popularity after having pushed the US Army back to its bases.
Funny how much can change in two months.
In the aftermath of the August 20 bombing of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, al-Maliki's political standing and popular support are once again precarious. Old political rivalries are back as is the perception that things are getting worse in Iraq. Here is the Economist's take:
"Like a hormonal teenager, Iraqi politics evolves in spurts. Just take these past weeks. The insurgency has revived, culminating in a series of audacious and bloody attacks in the heart of Baghdad. And that has turned the fortunes of the prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, on their head. From being a shoo-in at the next election, the man who was supposed to have tamed the terrorists is now looking more like a has-been. Rivals are lining up to take him on and old alliances are unravelling. All that Iraqis know for sure is that they have reached another turning-point in their turbulent post-invasion history." Full article here.
Funny how much can change in two months.
In the aftermath of the August 20 bombing of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, al-Maliki's political standing and popular support are once again precarious. Old political rivalries are back as is the perception that things are getting worse in Iraq. Here is the Economist's take:
"Like a hormonal teenager, Iraqi politics evolves in spurts. Just take these past weeks. The insurgency has revived, culminating in a series of audacious and bloody attacks in the heart of Baghdad. And that has turned the fortunes of the prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, on their head. From being a shoo-in at the next election, the man who was supposed to have tamed the terrorists is now looking more like a has-been. Rivals are lining up to take him on and old alliances are unravelling. All that Iraqis know for sure is that they have reached another turning-point in their turbulent post-invasion history." Full article here.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq's Menacing Banner
In the six weeks since US troops withdrew from Iraqi cities, the insurgency has made a remarkable recovery. According to a BBC report 157 people were killed in the first 10 days of August alone, a significant jump from July. Both Iraqi and American officials blame Al-Qaeda in Iraq for the recent upsurge in violence. The attacks have specifically targeted Shiite Iraqis in a blatant attempt to restart the sectarian civil war that rocked the country in 2006.
AQI's resurgence is a perfect example of how hard it is to wipe out a terrorist organization's institutional memory. Despite the success of US and Iraqi forces in breaking up its structure and leadership, AQI has maintained the technical and strategic acumen necessary to conduct an insurgency campaign; it still knows how recruit operatives, pick targets, build bombs, and get money to pay for it all.
With US troops restricted to the Green Zone and a few bases scattered around the country how can America effectively counter AQI?
More after the jump -->
AQI's resurgence is a perfect example of how hard it is to wipe out a terrorist organization's institutional memory. Despite the success of US and Iraqi forces in breaking up its structure and leadership, AQI has maintained the technical and strategic acumen necessary to conduct an insurgency campaign; it still knows how recruit operatives, pick targets, build bombs, and get money to pay for it all.
With US troops restricted to the Green Zone and a few bases scattered around the country how can America effectively counter AQI?
More after the jump -->
Loading
