The Kurdish Swing Vote? 09/08/2010
An AKP rally in Diyarbakir
The deciding vote on Turkey’s upcoming constitutional referendum will likely fall to the country’s marginalized and maligned Kurdish population. Polls ahead of this Sunday’s ballot indicate that the country is evenly divided with a significant chuck of voters still undecided—many of whom are Kurds.
The challenge for AKP is to convince Kurds that they should vote at all. The Kurdish Peace and Development Party (BDP) has promised to boycott the vote on the grounds that the reforms don’t address key issues relating to Kurdish rights. For many Kurds, however, the referendum is less about rights and more about revenge. One of the 26 proposed amendments would revoke immunity for the military leaders who planned the 1980 coup and the subsequent crackdown on Kurds, exposing them to prosecution in civilian courts.
During a rally last week in Diyarbakir, Erdogan explicitly tied the referendum to justice for the Kurds by promising to raze the infamous Diyarbakir prison where thousands were tortured and murdered in 1980. AKP has also gathered support for the referendum from important members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and prominent Kurdish businessmen, who have largely benefited from AKP’s rule.
Whether AKP’s push in the Southeast will be successful is a matter of conjecture. Gut feeling: enough Kurds turn out to vote and almost all vote for the referendum giving AKP a slight but nonetheless significant win on Sunday.
For those of you in the DC area, be sure to check out the Project on Middle East Democracy’s event September 13 titled “Is Turkey Becoming Less Democratic?” It should be a good referendum wrap up. Full event description here and you can RSVP here.
The challenge for AKP is to convince Kurds that they should vote at all. The Kurdish Peace and Development Party (BDP) has promised to boycott the vote on the grounds that the reforms don’t address key issues relating to Kurdish rights. For many Kurds, however, the referendum is less about rights and more about revenge. One of the 26 proposed amendments would revoke immunity for the military leaders who planned the 1980 coup and the subsequent crackdown on Kurds, exposing them to prosecution in civilian courts.
During a rally last week in Diyarbakir, Erdogan explicitly tied the referendum to justice for the Kurds by promising to raze the infamous Diyarbakir prison where thousands were tortured and murdered in 1980. AKP has also gathered support for the referendum from important members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and prominent Kurdish businessmen, who have largely benefited from AKP’s rule.
Whether AKP’s push in the Southeast will be successful is a matter of conjecture. Gut feeling: enough Kurds turn out to vote and almost all vote for the referendum giving AKP a slight but nonetheless significant win on Sunday.
For those of you in the DC area, be sure to check out the Project on Middle East Democracy’s event September 13 titled “Is Turkey Becoming Less Democratic?” It should be a good referendum wrap up. Full event description here and you can RSVP here.
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Meet the Blues 03/05/2010
There is a new party in Kurdish politics and it's likely that it will have a significant effect on the ongoing Iraqi election. The Goran or "change" party was founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa specifically to challenge the two party PUK, KDP coalition that has dominated politics in the region since it became semi-autonomous after the first Gulf War.
Al Jazeera correspondent Zeina Khodr has an excellent profile on the newcomers here.
Money quote:
For the first time since 2003, Kurdish politicians will lack unity. But that doesn't seem to bother Goran's supporters. I went to one of their rallies and most of them will tell you that they welcome new parties because it brings about a real democracy.
But the question is how will this new reality affect the Kurds' political influence in Baghdad? After all, Sunday's national elections is not just about rival Kurdish parties vying for parliamentary seats, it is about Kurds wanting to expand their influence in Baghdad.
That's influence they need if they want to resolve pending Arab-Kurdish issues, like the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, the oil law and the status of federalism.
It is still not clear if Nawshirwan Mustafa, the head of the Goran movement, will co-operate with his Kurdish rivals in the next Iraqi parliament. "I hope we do," is what he told me an hour before he addressed a crowd of his supporters.
For more background check out this article Jon wrote way back in July 2009.
Al Jazeera correspondent Zeina Khodr has an excellent profile on the newcomers here.
Money quote:
For the first time since 2003, Kurdish politicians will lack unity. But that doesn't seem to bother Goran's supporters. I went to one of their rallies and most of them will tell you that they welcome new parties because it brings about a real democracy.
But the question is how will this new reality affect the Kurds' political influence in Baghdad? After all, Sunday's national elections is not just about rival Kurdish parties vying for parliamentary seats, it is about Kurds wanting to expand their influence in Baghdad.
That's influence they need if they want to resolve pending Arab-Kurdish issues, like the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, the oil law and the status of federalism.
It is still not clear if Nawshirwan Mustafa, the head of the Goran movement, will co-operate with his Kurdish rivals in the next Iraqi parliament. "I hope we do," is what he told me an hour before he addressed a crowd of his supporters.
For more background check out this article Jon wrote way back in July 2009.
AKP's Ideal v. The Kurdish Reality 12/10/2009
Turkey's foreign policy since AKP solidified its domestic political position in 2007 has largely been defined by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's dogmatic interest in eliminating potential liabilities. One of his most notable successes has been the improvement of Turkey's relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq.
On October 31st, less than three years after Turkish troops invaded Northern Iraq, Davutoglu stood shoulder to shoulder with KRG President Masoud Barzani at the inauguration of Turkey's new consulate in Erbil--an image very few Turkey observers thought they would ever see.
Undergirding the dramatic improvement of diplomatic ties has been the growth of economic relations between Turkey and the KRG. Turkey is by far the region's largest source of foreign direct investment and Turkish companies participate in virtually every sector of the Kurdish economy from construction to airport management. Additionally, natural gas from the Kurdish controlled regions of Iraq is an important part of Turkey's plan to become a regional energy hub.
Unfortunately, Davutoglu's masterpiece is in danger.
More after the jump ->
On October 31st, less than three years after Turkish troops invaded Northern Iraq, Davutoglu stood shoulder to shoulder with KRG President Masoud Barzani at the inauguration of Turkey's new consulate in Erbil--an image very few Turkey observers thought they would ever see.
Undergirding the dramatic improvement of diplomatic ties has been the growth of economic relations between Turkey and the KRG. Turkey is by far the region's largest source of foreign direct investment and Turkish companies participate in virtually every sector of the Kurdish economy from construction to airport management. Additionally, natural gas from the Kurdish controlled regions of Iraq is an important part of Turkey's plan to become a regional energy hub.
Unfortunately, Davutoglu's masterpiece is in danger.
More after the jump ->
Turkish PM Erdogan at an AKP rally in Diyarbakir before the March 29, 2009 elections. The scarf is of the local football club.
Over the past year, Turkey's ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), under the leadership of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, has made an unprecedented push for Kurdish rights in Turkey.
An article in last week's edition of the Economist, "Turkey and the Kurds: Peace Time?", fumbles badly in its attempt analyze this push and explain its ramifications.
Surely, the Economist does a fine job of reviewing the Kurdish problem in Turkey, and details recent reforms. However, its fatal flaw is that it never examines why Erdoğan is pushing so hard for Kurdish rights. Erdoğan is no Nelson Mandela, and he's certainly no liberal-- despite the picture that the Economist paints for the unacquainted reader.
But it is in concluding sentences that the article really takes a nosedive:
"[Solving the Kurdish problem] will not be easy, but Mr Erdogan seems determined to plough on. If he succeeds, says Sezgin Tanrikulu, a human-rights lawyer in Diyarbakir, the Kurds will flock to back him..."
This might be Sezgin Tanrikulu speaking, but by finishing with this quote, the Economist is endorsing this view.
The only problem is, Sezgin notwithstanding, there is absolutely ZERO evidence that Erdoğan (whom Kurdish nationalists like to call Katil Erdoğan: Erdoğan the killer) is on the cusp of winning over the Kurdish electorate.
Click "Read More" to Continue ------>
An article in last week's edition of the Economist, "Turkey and the Kurds: Peace Time?", fumbles badly in its attempt analyze this push and explain its ramifications.
Surely, the Economist does a fine job of reviewing the Kurdish problem in Turkey, and details recent reforms. However, its fatal flaw is that it never examines why Erdoğan is pushing so hard for Kurdish rights. Erdoğan is no Nelson Mandela, and he's certainly no liberal-- despite the picture that the Economist paints for the unacquainted reader.
But it is in concluding sentences that the article really takes a nosedive:
"[Solving the Kurdish problem] will not be easy, but Mr Erdogan seems determined to plough on. If he succeeds, says Sezgin Tanrikulu, a human-rights lawyer in Diyarbakir, the Kurds will flock to back him..."
This might be Sezgin Tanrikulu speaking, but by finishing with this quote, the Economist is endorsing this view.
The only problem is, Sezgin notwithstanding, there is absolutely ZERO evidence that Erdoğan (whom Kurdish nationalists like to call Katil Erdoğan: Erdoğan the killer) is on the cusp of winning over the Kurdish electorate.
Click "Read More" to Continue ------>
Kurdish Election Update 07/26/2009
It appears that Gorran- "change" in Kurdish, has won the province of Sulaimaniya, one of the three official provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan. The city of Sulaimaniya itself is widely considered by Kurds to be the most beautiful in the region- when I was there last year, Kurds bragged that it was the "Paris of Kurdistan." Sulaimaniya has been historically controlled by Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
This guarantees that for the first time, Iraqi Kurdistan will have a true political opposition party in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament. This is a crucial step in invigorating Kurdistan's civil society, which is currently little more than a well-oiled patronage system controlled by leading Kurdish families.
It is important to note that Nawshiran Mustafa, the leader of Gorran, has strong historical ties to Jalal Talabani and the PUK. Gorran did not even bother to field a candidate against President Massoud Barzani, who is revered, along with his late father Mullah Mustafa Barzani, for leading generations of peshmerga. However, if Mustafa is able to claim a strong popular mandate, he may be able to resist selling himself off to the PUK or Barzani's KDP (Democratic Party of Kurdistan).
This guarantees that for the first time, Iraqi Kurdistan will have a true political opposition party in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament. This is a crucial step in invigorating Kurdistan's civil society, which is currently little more than a well-oiled patronage system controlled by leading Kurdish families.
It is important to note that Nawshiran Mustafa, the leader of Gorran, has strong historical ties to Jalal Talabani and the PUK. Gorran did not even bother to field a candidate against President Massoud Barzani, who is revered, along with his late father Mullah Mustafa Barzani, for leading generations of peshmerga. However, if Mustafa is able to claim a strong popular mandate, he may be able to resist selling himself off to the PUK or Barzani's KDP (Democratic Party of Kurdistan).
The Return of Kurdistan 07/11/2009
The process of forging a lasting political structure in Iraq will be hard, tedious, and disappointing. Nowhere is this reality more apparent than in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq. Two weeks ago the Kurdish parliament approved a new constitution that formalizes the Kurd's longstanding geographical claims.
This move is the most recent in a series audacious attempts by the KRG to push the limits of Kurdish autonomy. For an excellent review of these developments, check out the International Crisis Group's report "Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line."
In an ironic twist, Obama recently selected VP Joe Biden as his point man on Iraq. As many of you may remember during the presidential primary, Biden favored Peter Galbraith's dubious proposal that Iraq should be divided into three distinct regions. During his recent trip to Baghdad, Biden had to eat his words and criticize the Kurd's recent moves as "not helpful."
Thankfully there is a silver lining. Recent reports indicate that Turkish-Kurdish relations remain stable despite Erbil's territorial ambitions, largely because of common economic interests.
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