From the Economist's eulogy for Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Fadlallah:

"Once damned by Westerners as a mentor to hostage-takers and suicide-bombers, he was viewed by his own flock as the most open-minded of ayatollahs. He boldly championed women’s rights. He preached the duty of Muslims to fight foreign invaders but counselled Iraqis to be patient with the Americans who had rid them of Saddam Hussein. He immediately and unequivocally condemned the 9/11 attacks on America, the first leading Muslim cleric to do so. [...] The ayatollah will be hard to replace. No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the world’s Shias."

From Baghdad to Beirut, by Michael Totten. Totten compares Iraq and Lebanon, the Arab world's two putative democracies. Money quote:

Iraq’s sectarian divisions, like those in Lebanon, attract outside powers. Many Sunni Arabs enlisted al-Qaida terrorists from 2004 to 2007 in their fight against the American military and the Shi’a-dominated central government, for instance. But no Middle Eastern country interferes simultaneously in Lebanon and Iraq as much as Iran. In 2008, Ryan Crocker—the American ambassador to Lebanon from 1990 to 1993 and to Iraq from 2007 to 2009—told Congress that Iran was pursuing a “Lebanonization strategy” in Iraq, “using the same techniques they used in Lebanon to co-opt elements of the local Shi’a community and use them as basically instruments of Iranian force.” In his new book, The Gamble, Pulitzer Prize–winning author Thomas Ricks elaborates: Crocker raised concerns about “what he termed the Lebanonization of Iraq—that is, the weakening of the government, the division of the people into sectarian groups, and the rise of militias that rival the government in reliable firepower.”

Context here.

Hat tip to Diana

During Israel's 2006 invasion of Lebanon, the predominately Shiite suburbs of south Beirut were the focus intense bombardment by Israel's Air Force. None of these suburbs was hit harder than Dahiyah, which was home to Hezbollah's headquarters. Three years later, the area is thriving and surprisingly moderate. It's a remarkable testament to Hezbollah's ability to rebuild. 

For more check out Hamza Hendawi's recent article for AP.

Saudi Arabia is back on the diplomatic offensive in the Middle East. This week King Abdullah made a rare trip outside the Kingdom to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. During the visit, the two leaders signed a series of agreements aimed at ameliorating relations between their two countries and made a joint statement calling for the formation of a unity government in Lebanon.

Syria, in partnership with Iran, has long backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, while the Saudis support the ruling March 14 coalition. Enmity between the two Lebanese parties is deep-seated but has been exacerbated in recent years by Saudi, Syrian and Iranian influence.

For the Saudis, the visit is less about actually solving the Lebanese political stalemate and more about countermanding Iranian influence in the region.

King Abdullah’s visit is the most recent in a series of diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, which include the appointment of a Saudi ambassador to Syria after an 18 month absence and a state visit by President al-Assad for the inauguration of the new Saudi research university.

In most countries, when a party loses an election its political power diminishes. Well, Lebanon isn't "most countries" and Hezbollah isn't your average political party. Mohamad Bazzi has an excellent article in Foreign Affairs on how Hezbollah, inspite of its electoral defeat by the March 14 Alliance in June, has managed to remain the strongest party in Lebanon's splintered political system:

       Since the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections, an alluring but simplistic narrative has emerged in the West: because Hezbollah and its allies were defeated at the polls, the militant group would lose some of its luster and a pro-American political coalition would rule Lebanon. In fact, Hezbollah remains the country's dominant military and political force. Moreover, it holds the key to both domestic and external stability -- its actions will determine whether there is another war with Israel or if Lebanon will once again be wracked by internal conflict. By losing the election, Hezbollah also avoided being held accountable by Lebanon's other sects -- without power, there is little responsibility.