According to Jason Pack, the most effective rebels in Libya are the army units from Cyrenaica that defected wholesale. Next come the Islamists, many of whom cut their teeth fighting America in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the bulk of the fighters are just ragtag civilians:

The most prevalent form of unit organization is ad hoc: a few brothers or friends sharing gas money, a few rifles, a rebel flag, and a pickup truck. Occasionally, whole villages or subsections of tribes have joined the rebels as a semicoherent unit. Yet even then, village headmen or tribal sheikhs do not appear to be leading or orchestrating the fighting. In fact, military leadership at the front, inasmuch as it exists, is entirely spontaneous. In late March, for example, the top military brass in Benghazi strongly advised the fighters not to push past Ajdabiya when it was retaken due to coalition airstrikes. The fighters did not obey orders and were quickly routed by Qaddafi's counterattacks.

Indeed, it is nearly impossible to imagine that the revolutionaries can defeat Qaddafi by military force alone. Lacking an effective chain of command or training, they have not yet learned to employ guerrilla tactics, siege tactics, or any formal coordinated military maneuvers. Arming the rebels with more sophisticated munitions will not help them congeal into a coherent fighting force. Training them might help, but it would take too much time.

The Dictators
An odor has remained among the sugarcane:
a mixture of blood and body, a penetrating
petal that brings nausea.
Between the coconut palms the graves are full
of ruined bones, of speechless death-rattles.
The delicate dictator is talking
with top hats, gold braid, and collars.
The tiny palace gleams like a watch
and the rapid laughs with gloves on
cross the corridors at times
and join the dead voices
and the blue mouths freshly buried.
The weeping cannot be seen, like a plant
whose seeds fall endlessly on the earth,
whose large blind leaves grow even without light.
Hatred has grown scale on scale,
blow on blow, in the ghastly water of the swamp,
with a snout full of ooze and silence 

-Pablo Neruda 

For better or worse (you know what this blog thinks) the U.S. and its allies have intervened in Libya. The difficult job now is to make sure the U.S. comes out unscathed and that when the intervention ends Libya isn’t further away from the democratic future we went in to protect.

So who has some ideas?

The Financial Times, which has been leading the intervention charge, writes: 

“The job of bringing down Col Gaddafi should be left to the Libyans themselves. It is to be hoped that once his military momentum is decisively punctured, as it surely will be, his hold over his own people will be similarly weakened. His armed forces are not formidable. They have performed poorly in the revolt, taking surprisingly heavy casualties when attacking relatively small rebel-held towns. […]  The coalition can help the rebels by protecting those parts of Libya that are free and by putting pressure on those doing Col Gaddafi’s bidding. That means not only attacking his military, but also by making it crystal clear to the regime’s servants that they will be held accountable for their actions when it is finally toppled."

Juan Cole provides a number of suggestions: 

“1. It should not be open-ended, but rather should have an expiration date. The no-fly zone is a response to a specific humanitarian crisis (the Qaddafi regime was firing tank and artillery shells at urban crowds protesting it). That crisis must not draw the UN allies into a years-long quagmire. (Such a situation developed in Iraq in the 1990s and contributed to the ultimate destruction of that country).

2. It should be a no-fly zone, not a war on the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi tank columns should be interdicted from moving on Benghazi or Tobruk. But tanks just sitting around in Tripoli should not be targeted.

3. Once the no-fly zone is in place and Benghazi and points east are protected from reprisals, brokers should intervene to negotiate a diplomatic solution.

4. Officers who committed war crimes, as with ordering live fire on civilian crowds, must be prosecuted, but not everyone in the Libyan military should be tarred with that brush.

5. Amnesty might be offered to pro-Qaddafi officers and politicians provided they break with the dictator and send him into exile, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. It is desirable that there be some continuity between the old regime and the new one, and that tribal factionalism and feuds and reprisals be avoided.

6. Countries opposed to or lukewarm toward the no-fly zone, but which are themselves democracies, such as India, Algeria and Russia, could be enlisted to meet with the officer corps in Tripoli and impress on them the need for a transition to parliamentary elections."


And Micah Zenko suggests that a negotiated settlement is the way out:

"Libya’s conflict will likely end as most civil wars end: through a negotiated settlement under which the rebels receive substantial political autonomy. Enforcing such a cease-fire will require tens of thousands of peacekeepers operating under an international mandate. While American officials embraced one Arab League resolution as reflecting the will of the region, they conveniently ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council’s resolution on Libya, which affirmed the union’s 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.' 

Just as they are reluctant to fly their combat aircraft over Libya, Arab League member states participate negligibly or not at all in UN peacekeeping, with the exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Given that those states have their hands full with domestic challenges of their own, the onus of peacekeeping will fall on countries from sub-Saharan Africa that regularly contribute troops. The Obama administration should make efforts to get them ready now."

What else is out there, folks?

Ninety-nine times out of a hundred I find Mark Lynch’s work incredibly informative and uniquely insightful. His new article on Libya, however, isn’t one of those times.

The overarching theme of the piece is that Libya’s saga has become central to the narrative of Arab revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and thus deserves special consideration and (possibly) justifies special measures:

“If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics. The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.”

I see three problems here. First, this statements is rather anachronistic. Did Saleh in Yemen, al-Khalifa in Bahrain, or al-Assad in Syria need a green light to start killing protesters? Who is even left to be deterred? 

Second, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. would or even could intervene in the same way elsewhere. The Libya no-fly zone was made possible by an exceptional set of factors including Gaddafi’s international pariah status, the eagerness of the French and British to lead the diplomatic and military charge, and the support of the Arab League and the GCC. Consequentially intervention in Libya will do little to limit tyrants or encourage citizens in other countries. If the rebels continue to flounder and the U.S. becomes more deeply involved or pulls out abruptly, the prospects are even worse.

Third, U.S. and European intervention is by nature diametrically opposed to the wave of organic revolutions sweeping across the Middle East. The power of what happened in Egypt and Tunisia was that it had nothing to do with what America said or did and everything to do with the determination and grit of Egyptians and Tunisians. They stood up and did the unthinkable. The tragic reality is that the pro-democracy camp doesn’t always win and in Libya specifically there is little we can do ensure it does without becoming far more involved than we already are. 

-Evan

$150 million: The democracy and development assistance Hillary Clinton announced will be divided between new programs in Egypt and Tunisia. 

$81 million: The cost of the 110 American Tomahawk missiles used during the first day of Operation Odyssey Dawn alone. 

$30-100 million per week: The cost of maintaining a partial no-fly zone over Libya. (Be sure to read the rest of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments' backgrounder on the issue.)

So, the US has invaded a third Muslim country, under the pretense that we’ll be greeted as liberators.

Don’t be blinded by the UN resolution, or the coalition. This is another ill-considered fool's errand without an exit strategy.

1. For those who think that invading Iraq was a bad idea, but support invading Libya:

Was Saddam not evil enough? Would Iraq really have worked differently if the US had “international support”, which apparently means France? You’re a hypocrite.

2. For those who think that the invasion of Iraq was a success, and that Libya will also be one:

a: Are you European?

If Iraq was a success, then I don't want to imagine what failure looks like. Go intervene with your austerity militaries. But don’t grandstand while expecting the US to do all of the hard work.

b: Are you American? Did the idea of your government using your tax dollars to subsidize your fellow American’s health insurance make you go crazy?

Does the idea of your government using your tax dollars to nation-build in Libya make more sense?

Let’s do a quick recap. The US is bombing Libya to protect “civilians”. Who are the civilians? Anyone who is fighting Gaddafi? Residents of Benghazi? Can you think of a more nebulous, arbitrary mission?

The people of Libya won’t be safe until Gaddafi is gone. If the US just pushes him back and then pulls out, it’s Iraq in the 1990s. If the US arms the rebels, pushes Gaddafi out, and then leaves, it’s Afghanistan in 1990s. If the US pushes him out and then sticks around, it’s Iraq 2003.

And I’ll wager my life savings that whatever the US/UK/France does, the Arab Muslim world will not be grateful. After all, we’re just in it for the oil.

I wish I saw a way for the US, with Arab support, to save lives and help Libyans to rule themselves. But I’ve lived through the 2000s. And I’ve learned that bombs are not the seeds of democracy. I wish I could say the same about my representatives in the White House.

The New Statesman reports that activists have occupied Saif al-Islam's $17m London bachelor pad, and that British authorities, already stung by the image that they got too chummy with Gaddafi family, aren't doing anything about it.

Not a bad idea, I have to admit. I kind of wish that I had thought of it.

The humanitarian intervention caucus is back. For the first time since George Bush made the phrase “regime change” taboo, voices from both the right and left are again calling for intervention, this time to stop a bloodthirsty madman in Libya. Even Arab expats are joining the fray. The methods are familiar. The left calls for NATO and/or UN authorized no-fly zones and the deployment of peacekeepers, the right wants to arm rebels and recognize provisional governments.

The problem here is that the no-fly zone, while appearing to be a great idea, is unlikely to be terribly effective. For Gaddafi, fighter jets are inefficient at killing civilians on the ground, and pilots are unreliable—it's simply too easy to reroute to Malta. The planes are just instruments for fomenting fear. Tanks are an easy substitute, having worked just fine in 1956 Budapest and 1968 Prague. The no-fly zone is instead a slippery slope to full involvement in a conflict that America doesn’t understand, and doesn’t have will to see to the finish.

To clarify things, behind the acronyms “UN” an “NATO”, everybody means “US”. The only UN body that anyone takes seriously is the Security Council, and neither China nor Russia will support a popular movement against authoritarianism. NATO is more likely to authorize a no-fly zone, but it would require American leadership, planes, bases, and logistical support to in order to take any action.

Arming rebels and recognizing provisional governments is even more dangerous than a no-fly zone. Wasn’t this the failed Rumsfeld blueprint for Afghanistan and Iraq— cut off the head of the regime, fund the rebels, and everything takes care of itself?

The last part of the argument, and the most convincing one, is that the West has a duty to prevent wanton massacres and support the right to freedom of assembly. If not, then what do we stand for? This appeals to the collective security dreamers in Europe, and the “Team America” fantasists in the US. In reality, however, this is no more practical than using US troops to end hunger in Somalia. America has neither the ability nor the will to remake an unjust world.

It would be better if Egypt and Tunisia could tell Gaddafi that time is up, and be ready to use force if needed. These people speak the language, know the terrain, and have a lasting interest in a secure Libya—they are neighbors. I’m afraid, however, that the militaries of Egypt and Tunisia have their hands full at the moment.

So then, what should the West do? Keep denouncing Gaddafi, issue a warrant for him at the International Criminal Court, and enact sanctions. But the only sensible option, unfortunately, is unsatisfying: to wait and hope.

Here at Politics by Other Means, we’ve taken to mocking Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi, Libya’s leader for the past four decades. We made him into a running joke, because taking him seriously seemed futile. How else do you handle a tin-pot psychopath who goes from bombing French civilian aircraft to greeting French civil servants on the Champs Elysees with a camel and 30 virgins?

Thankfully, it looks like this odious goon’s 42-year reign is finally ending. Unfortunately, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libya lacks a strong sense of national identity. Gaddafi stayed in power, experts say, by playing divide and conquer with tribes. Even the military is supposedly divided on tribal lines. Tunisia is having enough trouble figuring out what to do after the ouster of Ben Ali. What are the chances for Libya, a state that Italy cobbled together from three Ottoman provinces, to build a stable and benign regime to succeed Gaddafi? (and talk about bad luck—having Italy as your colonizer!)

Nobody knows who or what will replace the discredited tyrannies collapsing across the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Libyan people, like the Tunisians and Egyptian before them, are declaring that the fear of the known is worse than the fear of the unknown. We stand with them, and hope that out of this struggle they can build a new Libya based on freedom and justice.