Excellent coverage from Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra (who sounds strangely like dracula).
Since the Revolution in 1979, Iranian politics have been shaped by the actions of political and religious elites who operate well outside of the public sphere. For all of the dramatic marches and university crackdowns, the current crisis in Iran is at its core the result of conflict between these rival elites. Even more importantly, the resolution will be the result of victory by one group or a tenuous compromise between them.
Predicting the exact trajectory of events in Iran in the coming weeks and months is a fool's task. That said, a firm grasp of the Iranian political system and the elites who inhabit it will go a long way toward understanding the events as they occur. I recommend the BBC's brief guide to the Iranian political system as a good starting point.
Let's begin with Assembly of Experts, where a proxy war for Iran's future is being waged. On one side is prominent pragmatist Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who currently heads the Assembly. On the other is Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric with close ties to Ahmadinejad. Reports indicate that Rafsanjani's posse is more powerful than Yazdi's, although it is unclear if Rafsanjani has an absolute majority.
In the broader landscape of Iranian politics, Rafsanjani's control over the Assembly of Experts and significant influence in the clerical community in Qom are his most effective weapons in his longstanding rivalry with Supreme Leader Khamenei (check out this CIA report from 1983 for some background; the article is one of those scan to text jobs so it can be a bit hard to read at points, but it's worth it). The ultimate prize in the conflict is no less than control of Iran's political future.
As Khamenei ages (rather rapidly according some sources), the selection of his successor is a political reality, especially for those with vested interests. The selection of the next Supreme Leader will be a highly political affair. Three men have been rumored to be candidates: Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Rafsanjani, and the Khamenei's son Mojtaba.
Consequentially, the current electoral cycle has been the terrain for a proxy war between Rafsanjani and Khamenei for political control. A Mousavi victory would have thrown the balance of power toward Rafsanjani both symbolically and practically. Khamenei understood this and worked to undermine Mousavi's victory.
So far, nothing out of the ordinary for Iranian politics. Khamenei basically did the same thing in the 2005 presidential election to ensure Ahmadinejad's victory over Rafsanjani.
The point where Khamenei and Rafsanjani's political ballet devolved into a knife fight was when Khamenei publicly threw his support behind Ahmadinejad by rushing to validate the contested electoral results. Khamenei's big misstep was that he underestimated public support for Mousavi and latent discontent with Ahmadinejad's policies, especially in Tehran. (The irony is when you don't actually count the votes, it's hard to see how many people are against you.)
Since then reports have surfaced that Rafsanjani is actively conducting a head count of his supporters in the Assembly of Experts and allies in Qom with the hope that he will have enough elite support to capitalize on the popular discontent with Khamenei and force the selection of a new Supreme Leader.
It's anyone guess if Rafsanjani will be successful in this endeavor. If he is, Khamenei would be well served to take a lesson from the Iranian Revolution and gracefully step aside instead of challenging the mullahs.
-Evan
In the aftermath of Iran's tumultuous election, Ayatollah Khamenei's increasingly public support for incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has come as somewhat of a shock to me. In effect, Khamenei has bet his own fortune and the fortune of the clerical elite that Ahmadinejad, with the support of the security services and hardline militias, will be able to put down the riots raging in the streets of Tehran. (For graphic coverage of the ongoing battles between protesters and police check out Andrew Sullivan's blog The Daily Dish.)
This move is very different from Khamenei's reaction to the election of reform-minded President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. In that case Khamenei used his considerable influence to undermine almost every aspect of Khatami's agenda without open confrontation. (For a very interesting account of how Khamenei used Khatami as a scapegoat for a series of crackdowns on student protesters click here.) In fact this strategy was nothing new. Ayatollah Khomeini perfected it during his tenure as Iran's supreme leader. This luxury is the result of Iran's political system, which positions the Ayatollah above plebeian occurrences such as elections, until now.
The obvious question: Why does Khamenei feel the need to break with tradition and risk a new strategies?
**Warning: Speculation Ahead**
The answer is primarily that Khamenei feels vulnerable and securing the presidency is a necessary step toward reestablishing control, both over the Iranian elite and the public. The sudden rise of Mousavi's campaign, paired with the widespread discontent in the Iranian elite, including members of the Guardian Council that oversees the Supreme Leader, augured a shift in power, a shift Khamenei would not tolerate. (While it is pure speculation, I believe that much of the disagreement in the Iranian elite was the result of differing opinions on how Iran should respond to Obama's recent overtures.)
This brings us to the present. Armed militias have driven protesters out of the streets and reports that government forces would be armed with live rounds forced the cancelation of a rally sponsored by the Mousavi campaign this afternoon. It is clear that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are prepared to do whatever is necessary to reestablish control over the city.
Control, however, is a poor substitute for legitimacy.
The Supreme Leader's fate is now a matter of public opinion and if the current round of protests precipitates any sort of revolution, it would be just as much a revolt against Khamenei as it is against Ahmadinejad.
-Evan
I wish coverage of the Iranian election aftermath was more like one of those choose your own adventure books.
If you believe that Ahmadinejad stole the election, go to page 2.
If you believe that support for Mousavi was greatly exaggerated by overly optimistic West media outlets in the run up to the election, go to page 3.
These two theories have dominated dialogue in the hours since the Iranian Ministry of the Interior announced that, by their count, the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had soundly beaten challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi, taking home 62.63% of the vote.
For those who see systemic fraud as the only explanation, evidence abounds. Critics cite Ahmadinejad's victory in the predominantly Azeri town of Tabriz as a prime example. Mousavi is ethically Azeri and Iran's Azeris have historical voted along ethnic lines with little exception making an Ahmadinejad victory in the region next to impossible.
The MoI is filled with Ahmadinejad appointees and rigging the election would have been ridiculously easy. (My personal favorite theory is that Mousavi actually won 62.63% of the vote and that Ahmadinejad's cronies just switched the names.)
On the flip side, cynics and Ahmadinejad supporters say that Mousavi reformist wave was just the machination of a small, elite segment of the Iran's population magnified by the hope of the Western media.
From all I've seen and read, I'm guessing that the election was much closer to a statistical tie than the MoI the reported. Ahmadinejad probably had a slim lead, but neither candidate had the 50% necessary to declare absolute victory, which would have forced a run-off election next week. This would have given Mousavi valuable time to build on the momentum he generated since his debate with Ahmadinejad on June 3, resulting in a Mousavi win. But that's just speculation.
The real outcome of the Iranian election is exceptionally important to how the U.S. orients it Iran policy in the coming months. If Ahmadinejad really did receive over 60% of the popular vote, the Obama administration has some thinking to do. If the result are fraudulent and a popular shift is underway in Iran, the implications are even more dizzying. More on this when I get some free time to write.
-Evan
P.S. At least we can look forward to more award winning PSAs from VEVAK!
The textbook line on Iran's electoral system is that while there are clear limitations on who can run, once the candidates are approved by the Guardian Council Iranian elections are competitive. Dramatic upsets are not completely uncommon and even western electioneers could learn a thing or two from the populist pandering schemes employed by Iranian candidates.
Even with this background, it is clear that this year's Presidential election (polls open Friday, June 12th) has taken on an entirely different tenor. In recent days political rallies have effectively brought Tehran to a standstill as supporters for both the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his main rival former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (who looks curiously like my undergrad thesis adviser Dr. Nozar Alaolmolki) have taken to the streets.
The turning point was the June 3rd televised debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. In a curious move, Ahmadinejad opened by accusing the Mousavi campaign of spreading lies about the ruling government. The discourse devolved from there. Ahmadinejad criticized Mousavi's wife, a well respected academic, Mousavi shot back that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy had disgraced Iran and marginalized it position in global politics.
Since, the two candidates have effectively been at war. Ahmadinejad has impugned the opposition with crimes ranging from corruption to out and out treason while Mousavi has countered by calling Ahmadinejad a megalomaniac.
It goes without saying that for all the recent theatrics, the results of the election will come down to economics, or more precisely individual voter's perceptions of the Iranian economy. Ahmadinejad supporters, who are on the whole poorer and more likely to reside in rural Iran, view their candidate's populist economic policies as overwhelmingly positive. Ahmadinejad reinforces this view by presenting a carefully selected set of figures at campaign rallies and in debates that indicate Iran is weathering the global economic crisis better than its peers. Detractors counter that Ahmadinejad's populism has created massive inflation (over 23% according to a recent report from Iran's Central Bank) and driven unemployment up.
Excluding the very real possibility of election fraud or interference by Iran's clerical elite, Mousavi has a solid shot. If Mousavi is to win, it won't be because he changed the minds of Ahmadinejad supporters but instead because he inspired and mobilized previously marginalized or disinterested sections of the electorate. If recent rallies are any indication he is doing this quite well. Famously shy in front of photographers, Mousavi has become the face of a united front composed of reformists, youth, women, and even conservatives elites who have grown dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad's economic policies.
Regardless of the outcome, the real significance of the current Iranian electoral cycle is the intangible shift in Iranian popular psychology. Latent dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad's policies, both foreign and domestic has poured into the public sphere. Suppressing this sentiment will be a difficult task for Ahmadinejad if he is reelected.
Moreover, it is unclear if he will once again have the full support of the Ayatollah Khamenei in the aftermath of a tumultuous political cycle. Ahmadinejad has become somewhat of a political liability for Iran's spiritual and political leader. In a recent open letter to the Ayatollah published in newspapers across Iran former Iranian President and current member of the Expediency Council called on Khamenei to reign Ahmadinejad in and resolve the "mutiny" he has incurred.
That said, it is hard to be too optimistic even if Mousavi triumphs. Historically, Iranian reformers have only disappointed both the Iranian people and their supporters in the West. Time will tell.
