Potent Quotable 06/18/2010
 "The Russians hate (missile defense). They've hated it since the late 1960s. They will always hate it, mostly because we'll build it and they won't." -Defense Secretary Robert Gate talking tough during Congressional testimony on the New START Agreement. Hat tip to GSN. Free Stuff 05/24/2010
 Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn are giving DVDs of their new movie Nuclear Tipping Point away for free. See the trailer below and order your copy here. **Warning: The following clip contains excessive use of dramatic music and choice clips of alarmist sentiment (which are unfortunately necessary if you want to get people to give a s#$% about nuclear disarmament)** Response to "A new START?" 03/31/2010
Guest blogger Joe Pinilla recently published an interesting piece on the new START agreement between Russia and the US and the ongoing crisis in Iran. In my view Joe got some things very right and others very wrong. In the spirit of healthy debate I offer this response: First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors. The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t. As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's. Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not: Read more after the jump ---> Not That Anyone Is Counting 03/18/2010
 Why does China only have 180 strategic nukes? According to Jeffery Lewis's book on the subject, The Minimum Means of Reprisal, the Chinese believe that deterrence isn't found in numbers: "Among the five nations authorized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to possess nuclear weapons, China has the smallest nuclear force and maintains the most restrained nuclear posture. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to develop an alternative assessment of China's nuclear forces. The Minimum Means of Reprisal finds that China's nuclear deployment and arms control patterns stem from the belief that deterrence is relatively unaffected by changes in the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces. As a result, Lewis argues, Chinese policy has tended to sacrifice offensive capability in favor of greater political control and lower economic costs." For those too cheap to buy the book- I'll loan you my copy if you send me BBQ sauce. My address is: Evan Tachovsky Open Society Institute-Assistance Foundation Hasan Aliyev str. 117 a Genclik, Baku, AZ1110 Top-10 Nuclear Quotes 12/31/2009
Its that time of year. That's right: top-10 time. Since I've had limited internet access over the holidays, my contribution to the list-making fury is secondhand. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) has a great list of the top ten quotes about all things nuclear in '09. My favorites: 10. “Let’s sanction Iran, marry Pakistan, and bomb North Korea”- Joe Cirincione, on the Colbert Report, November 30 3. “Putin . . . showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared, and I told him he needed a new intelligence service.” - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referring to Russia’s claim that Iran would not have a missile capable of reaching Western Europe by 2020, June 9 You can check the full list here. -Evan Diplomatic Calisthenics Watch 12/18/2009
 North Korea confirmed today that the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il received a personal letter from Barack Obama. The precise contents of the letter are unknown, but the goal is to bring the hermit kingdom back to the six-nation talks aimed at nuclear disarmament. I pity the diplomats who have to waste their time in farcical negotiations with the North Koreans.  Western governments' attempts to halt Iran's nuclear program are often rebuked rhetorically by the argument of "double standards." Without forcing Israel to denuclearize, the argument goes, the West has no right to deny Iran the right to an atom bomb. But on the international system differing standards exist everywhere--not all regimes are created equal. It's also not clear why Iran's denuclearization should be morally based on Israel's (opposed to Pakistan's, or even America's for that matter) denuclearization. Nevertheless, the important point is that the ideal world is one without nuclear weapons. In the real world, a minority of countries have nukes. As that number increases, the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands increases exponentially. The collective moral goal must be to stop this at all costs--lest we want to face a future of nuclear terrorism. Thus, a universal standard for nuclear weapons is similar to Hammurabi's famous eye-for-an-eye penal code. On an individual level, it is certainly the most equitable--nothing is more fair. But on a collective level everyone goes blind. Bushehr Delayed (Again) 11/16/2009
 Bushehr Reactor Plant Citing ever dubious "technical issues," Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced that work on the Bushehr nuclear plant in Southern Iran will not be completed this year as expected. This isn't the first time Russia has balked at finishing the Bushehr project. The date has been pushed back multiple times since the Russia officially agreed to begin work in 1995. Analyzing the timing of events like this always has the quality of a tea leaf reading. With that in mind, the most obvious explanation is that the Russians are actually committed to working with the West to impede Iran's nuclear progress and are using Bushehr (which isn't directly involved in Iran's nuclear weapons program) to generate leverage. Last year while interning for the Hudson Institute I wrote a piece on the history of contemporary Russian-Iranian relations. Anyone interested in 50 pages of background on Bushehr, Russian-Iranian arms trade, etc. can download the whole paper below. -Evan 
China Sent Enriched Uranium to Pakistan, Can it Now Teach Pakistan How to Read and Write? 11/13/2009
 According to corroborated reports from A.Q. Khan's personal accounts, China sent weapons-grade uranium to Pakistan in 1982. Horrified by India's test of a nuclear bomb in 1974, Mao Zedong and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Benazir's father) met in 1976 to discuss cooperation in nuclear arms. A.Q. Khan, who gained access to European methods for nuclear enrichment while working at a Dutch centrifuge manufacturer, passed expertise to China, which had nuclear bombs but was frustrated by its slow pace of enrichment. Pakistan in return received warhead designs, 15 tons of uranium hexaflouride (feeder for centrifuges) and enough weapons-grade uranium for 2 atom bombs. As Khan boasted in a report for Pakistani intelligence: "The speed of our work and our achievements surprised our worst enemies and adversaries and the West stood helplessly by to see a Third World nation, unable even to produce bicycle chains or sewing needles, mastering the most advanced nuclear technology in the shortest possible span of time..." Yes, by spying on the Dutch and capitalizing on Chinese fears of India. But what does it mean to be a country that can produce nuclear weapons, but can't teach half of its population how to read and write? Would it not be better to surprise the world by creating a modern, stable society? Despite Pakistan's enormous pride for its nuclear capability, I don't think that many Third World countries envy Pakistan today. 2007 NIE Redux 11/08/2009
 Thomas Fingar When November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate came out, it completely overturned the standing logic on Iran's nuclear program by suggesting that the Iranians had actually stopped work on a nuclear device in 2003. At the time, most of the media were too distracted with this revelation to dig into the politics behind NIE's curious release. Two years later Thomas Fingar, who was the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time, is talking about who ordered the NIE's findings leaked and why: "This example is drawn from the highly contentious 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. It became contentious, in part, because the White House instructed the Intelligence Community to release an unclassified version of the report’s key judgments but declined to take responsibility for ordering its release." See the full speech here and Joshua Pollack's analysis here. | By Evan Tachovsky and Jon Friedman
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