The Death of the Iranian Nuclear Timeline 03/20/2011
As we've discussed before, the use of precise timelines to describe Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon is unhelpful and misleading. The reality is that Iran's technical capacity has less to do with if or when it decides to build an actual bomb than its political calculus. To move from its current program, which is predicated on nuclear ambiguity, to a dedicated nuclear weapons program would require a difficult political decision. Considering Iran's multifaceted internal debate and the likely consequences of such a move, it's unlikely that the country's leadership would or even could make that decision.
DNI Clapper did a good job of discussing Iran's nuclear progress without help of an exact timeline during his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2011 NIE:
Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.
[...]
We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Read the full testimony here. Let's hope timelines are gone for good.
DNI Clapper did a good job of discussing Iran's nuclear progress without help of an exact timeline during his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2011 NIE:
Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.
[...]
We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Read the full testimony here. Let's hope timelines are gone for good.
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Tactical Failure 10/11/2010
The activists who broke into a NATO tactical nuclear weapon storage facility last January have done it again. This time they managed to actually get inside multiple hangers which either contain or recently contained nuclear bombs. (For a complete breakdown of their footage check out Jeffrey Lewis' recent post at Arms Control Wonk.)
The point of the activists' video raid was clearly to increase pressure on the U.S. and its NATO allies to remove these weapons from Europe- certainly a sensible goal. It's important to remember, however, that simply pulling these bombs won't completely solve the problem. Russia maintains a far larger tactical nuclear arsenal, which I can't help but worry is even less secure than NATO's.
While I've generally been positive on the new START agreement and the Obama administration's broader nuclear policy, the decision to exclude tactical nuclear weapons from the negotiations was a critical mistake. The issue isn't ignorance--the administration and U.S. military leaders are very much aware of the threat posed by these weapons--but political inertia. Over the past decade, the U.S. has attempt to raise the issue with Russia multiple times, only to have the Russians remind us that tactical nuclear weapons also remain at part of NATO's strategic nuclear posture. Many in Europe have been hesitant to let the nuclear weapons go for fear that they will be shut out of U.S.'s nuclear policy.
In November, NATO will release a new Strategic Concept, which could include a shift in nuclear posture. Last month leaders from five NATO countries, including three of the countries that host tactical nukes, called on the alliance to end the nuclear sharing agreement and remove the weapons from Europe, but key European powers--most notably France--remain opposed.
The U.S. must support these calls for a tactical nuclear reduction and put pressure on the holdouts. If NATO adjusts its policy (and that's a big if) the Obama administration must get Russia back to the negotiating table to forge a new agreement that includes tactical nukes. While none of these tasks will be particularly easy, they are essential to American security.
- Evan
The point of the activists' video raid was clearly to increase pressure on the U.S. and its NATO allies to remove these weapons from Europe- certainly a sensible goal. It's important to remember, however, that simply pulling these bombs won't completely solve the problem. Russia maintains a far larger tactical nuclear arsenal, which I can't help but worry is even less secure than NATO's.
While I've generally been positive on the new START agreement and the Obama administration's broader nuclear policy, the decision to exclude tactical nuclear weapons from the negotiations was a critical mistake. The issue isn't ignorance--the administration and U.S. military leaders are very much aware of the threat posed by these weapons--but political inertia. Over the past decade, the U.S. has attempt to raise the issue with Russia multiple times, only to have the Russians remind us that tactical nuclear weapons also remain at part of NATO's strategic nuclear posture. Many in Europe have been hesitant to let the nuclear weapons go for fear that they will be shut out of U.S.'s nuclear policy.
In November, NATO will release a new Strategic Concept, which could include a shift in nuclear posture. Last month leaders from five NATO countries, including three of the countries that host tactical nukes, called on the alliance to end the nuclear sharing agreement and remove the weapons from Europe, but key European powers--most notably France--remain opposed.
The U.S. must support these calls for a tactical nuclear reduction and put pressure on the holdouts. If NATO adjusts its policy (and that's a big if) the Obama administration must get Russia back to the negotiating table to forge a new agreement that includes tactical nukes. While none of these tasks will be particularly easy, they are essential to American security.
- Evan
Potent Quotable 06/18/2010
"The Russians hate (missile defense). They've hated it since the late 1960s. They will always hate it, mostly because we'll build it and they won't."
-Defense Secretary Robert Gate talking tough during Congressional testimony on the New START Agreement.
Hat tip to GSN.
-Defense Secretary Robert Gate talking tough during Congressional testimony on the New START Agreement.
Hat tip to GSN.
Free Stuff 05/24/2010
Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn are giving DVDs of their new movie Nuclear Tipping Point away for free. See the trailer below and order your copy here.
**Warning: The following clip contains excessive use of dramatic music and choice clips of alarmist sentiment (which are unfortunately necessary if you want to get people to give a s#$% about nuclear disarmament)**
**Warning: The following clip contains excessive use of dramatic music and choice clips of alarmist sentiment (which are unfortunately necessary if you want to get people to give a s#$% about nuclear disarmament)**
Response to "A new START?" 03/31/2010
Guest blogger Joe Pinilla recently published an interesting piece on the new START agreement between Russia and the US and the ongoing crisis in Iran. In my view Joe got some things very right and others very wrong. In the spirit of healthy debate I offer this response:
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
Not That Anyone Is Counting 03/18/2010
Why does China only have 180 strategic nukes? According to Jeffery Lewis's book on the subject, The Minimum Means of Reprisal, the Chinese believe that deterrence isn't found in numbers:
"Among the five nations authorized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to possess nuclear weapons, China has the smallest nuclear force and maintains the most restrained nuclear posture. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to develop an alternative assessment of China's nuclear forces.
The Minimum Means of Reprisal finds that China's nuclear deployment and arms control patterns stem from the belief that deterrence is relatively unaffected by changes in the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces. As a result, Lewis argues, Chinese policy has tended to sacrifice offensive capability in favor of greater political control and lower economic costs."
For those too cheap to buy the book- I'll loan you my copy if you send me BBQ sauce. My address is:
Evan Tachovsky
Open Society Institute-Assistance Foundation
Hasan Aliyev str. 117 a
Genclik, Baku, AZ1110
"Among the five nations authorized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to possess nuclear weapons, China has the smallest nuclear force and maintains the most restrained nuclear posture. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to develop an alternative assessment of China's nuclear forces.
The Minimum Means of Reprisal finds that China's nuclear deployment and arms control patterns stem from the belief that deterrence is relatively unaffected by changes in the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces. As a result, Lewis argues, Chinese policy has tended to sacrifice offensive capability in favor of greater political control and lower economic costs."
For those too cheap to buy the book- I'll loan you my copy if you send me BBQ sauce. My address is:
Evan Tachovsky
Open Society Institute-Assistance Foundation
Hasan Aliyev str. 117 a
Genclik, Baku, AZ1110
Top-10 Nuclear Quotes 12/31/2009
Its that time of year. That's right: top-10 time.
Since I've had limited internet access over the holidays, my contribution to the list-making fury is secondhand. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) has a great list of the top ten quotes about all things nuclear in '09. My favorites:
10. “Let’s sanction Iran, marry Pakistan, and bomb North Korea”- Joe Cirincione, on the Colbert Report, November 30
3. “Putin . . . showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared, and I told him he needed a new intelligence service.” - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referring to Russia’s claim that Iran would not have a missile capable of reaching Western Europe by 2020, June 9
You can check the full list here.
-Evan
Since I've had limited internet access over the holidays, my contribution to the list-making fury is secondhand. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) has a great list of the top ten quotes about all things nuclear in '09. My favorites:
10. “Let’s sanction Iran, marry Pakistan, and bomb North Korea”- Joe Cirincione, on the Colbert Report, November 30
3. “Putin . . . showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared, and I told him he needed a new intelligence service.” - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referring to Russia’s claim that Iran would not have a missile capable of reaching Western Europe by 2020, June 9
You can check the full list here.
-Evan
Diplomatic Calisthenics Watch 12/18/2009
North Korea confirmed today that the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il received a personal letter from Barack Obama. The precise contents of the letter are unknown, but the goal is to bring the hermit kingdom back to the six-nation talks aimed at nuclear disarmament. I pity the diplomats who have to waste their time in farcical negotiations with the North Koreans.
Western governments' attempts to halt Iran's nuclear program are often rebuked rhetorically by the argument of "double standards." Without forcing Israel to denuclearize, the argument goes, the West has no right to deny Iran the right to an atom bomb.
But on the international system differing standards exist everywhere--not all regimes are created equal. It's also not clear why Iran's denuclearization should be morally based on Israel's (opposed to Pakistan's, or even America's for that matter) denuclearization.
Nevertheless, the important point is that the ideal world is one without nuclear weapons. In the real world, a minority of countries have nukes. As that number increases, the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands increases exponentially. The collective moral goal must be to stop this at all costs--lest we want to face a future of nuclear terrorism.
Thus, a universal standard for nuclear weapons is similar to Hammurabi's famous eye-for-an-eye penal code. On an individual level, it is certainly the most equitable--nothing is more fair. But on a collective level everyone goes blind.
But on the international system differing standards exist everywhere--not all regimes are created equal. It's also not clear why Iran's denuclearization should be morally based on Israel's (opposed to Pakistan's, or even America's for that matter) denuclearization.
Nevertheless, the important point is that the ideal world is one without nuclear weapons. In the real world, a minority of countries have nukes. As that number increases, the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands increases exponentially. The collective moral goal must be to stop this at all costs--lest we want to face a future of nuclear terrorism.
Thus, a universal standard for nuclear weapons is similar to Hammurabi's famous eye-for-an-eye penal code. On an individual level, it is certainly the most equitable--nothing is more fair. But on a collective level everyone goes blind.
Bushehr Delayed (Again) 11/16/2009
Bushehr Reactor Plant
Citing ever dubious "technical issues," Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced that work on the Bushehr nuclear plant in Southern Iran will not be completed this year as expected. This isn't the first time Russia has balked at finishing the Bushehr project. The date has been pushed back multiple times since the Russia officially agreed to begin work in 1995.
Analyzing the timing of events like this always has the quality of a tea leaf reading. With that in mind, the most obvious explanation is that the Russians are actually committed to working with the West to impede Iran's nuclear progress and are using Bushehr (which isn't directly involved in Iran's nuclear weapons program) to generate leverage.
Last year while interning for the Hudson Institute I wrote a piece on the history of contemporary Russian-Iranian relations. Anyone interested in 50 pages of background on Bushehr, Russian-Iranian arms trade, etc. can download the whole paper below.
-Evan
Analyzing the timing of events like this always has the quality of a tea leaf reading. With that in mind, the most obvious explanation is that the Russians are actually committed to working with the West to impede Iran's nuclear progress and are using Bushehr (which isn't directly involved in Iran's nuclear weapons program) to generate leverage.
Last year while interning for the Hudson Institute I wrote a piece on the history of contemporary Russian-Iranian relations. Anyone interested in 50 pages of background on Bushehr, Russian-Iranian arms trade, etc. can download the whole paper below.
-Evan
| tachovsky_e._h._modern_russian-iranian_relations.doc |
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