Memoirs of the Taliban 02/23/2010
Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former minister in Afghanistan's Taliban government and the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, published his memoirs this winter. He was released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005.
His writings contain lots of juicy tidbits about the relationship between Pakistan's notorious ISI intelligence services and the Taliban. Money quote from Steve Coll's commentary:
While in office, Zaeef found that he “couldn’t entirely avoid” the influence of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Its officers volunteered money and political support. Late in 2001, as the United States prepared to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the I.S.I.’s then commanding general, Mahmud Ahmad, visited Zaeef’s home in Islamabad, wept in solidarity, and promised, “We want to assure you that you will not be alone in this jihad against America. We will be with you.” And yet Zaeef never trusted his I.S.I. patrons. He sought to protect the Taliban’s independence: “I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out.”
Read the Telegraph's review here.
His writings contain lots of juicy tidbits about the relationship between Pakistan's notorious ISI intelligence services and the Taliban. Money quote from Steve Coll's commentary:
While in office, Zaeef found that he “couldn’t entirely avoid” the influence of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. Its officers volunteered money and political support. Late in 2001, as the United States prepared to attack Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the I.S.I.’s then commanding general, Mahmud Ahmad, visited Zaeef’s home in Islamabad, wept in solidarity, and promised, “We want to assure you that you will not be alone in this jihad against America. We will be with you.” And yet Zaeef never trusted his I.S.I. patrons. He sought to protect the Taliban’s independence: “I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out.”
Read the Telegraph's review here.
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Taliban #2 Captured in Pakistan 02/16/2010
This is big news, and causes a pause to reconsider how half-assed the original invasion of Afghanistan was. I personally was surprised that Mullah Baradar was found in Karachi, not in the tribal regions. Karachi is Pakistan's biggest city and financial center. Juan Cole's analysis:
Obama's drone attacks on the Taliban leadership forced Mullah Baradar and some other commanders to relocate to the southern port city of Karachi, hundreds of miles from the action in the tribal areas of the northwest. He is said to attempted to restructure the military command of the Taliban in fall of 2009, but met a good deal of resistance. The episode is said to have resulted in poor morale in the Old Taliban.
My own suspicion is that Mullah Baradar was behind the violence against Shiites in Karachi this winter. Provoking Sunni-Shiite violence so as to destabilize Pakistan's financial and industrial hub would be a typical al-Qaeda tactic. The bombings succeeded in provoking major riots and property damage. But when you hurt stock prices and harm government revenues, you rather draw the attention to yourself of the country's elite and their security forces, since you have mightily inconvenienced them. As long as the Old Taliban were mainly bothering the government of Hamid Karzai over the border in Pakistan, the ISI might have been able to turn a blind eye to them. But if they were going to cause billions of dollars of damage to Karachi, which they did this winter, that is intolerable.
I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that Mullah Baradar's capture will destroy the Old Taliban. And even if that organization is weakened, there are at least three other major insurgent groups only loosely connected to them, which have the operational autonomy and resources to go on fighting.
Certainly, we shouldn't jump to any conclusions that this will precipitate the collapse of the Taliban. However, the same was said about killing Zarqawi and the durability of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Combined with the surge and proposals for buying off middle and lower ranking insurgents, this does start resembling the Iraq case. If the recent events also signal a change in Pakistan's posture-- then, perhaps, this could be the beginning of the end.
Update: Members of the Taliban moved to Karachi to get out of the range of drone attacks. Karachi has 3 million Pashtuns, mostly living in ghettos where the Taliban can blend in.
Obama's drone attacks on the Taliban leadership forced Mullah Baradar and some other commanders to relocate to the southern port city of Karachi, hundreds of miles from the action in the tribal areas of the northwest. He is said to attempted to restructure the military command of the Taliban in fall of 2009, but met a good deal of resistance. The episode is said to have resulted in poor morale in the Old Taliban.
My own suspicion is that Mullah Baradar was behind the violence against Shiites in Karachi this winter. Provoking Sunni-Shiite violence so as to destabilize Pakistan's financial and industrial hub would be a typical al-Qaeda tactic. The bombings succeeded in provoking major riots and property damage. But when you hurt stock prices and harm government revenues, you rather draw the attention to yourself of the country's elite and their security forces, since you have mightily inconvenienced them. As long as the Old Taliban were mainly bothering the government of Hamid Karzai over the border in Pakistan, the ISI might have been able to turn a blind eye to them. But if they were going to cause billions of dollars of damage to Karachi, which they did this winter, that is intolerable.
I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that Mullah Baradar's capture will destroy the Old Taliban. And even if that organization is weakened, there are at least three other major insurgent groups only loosely connected to them, which have the operational autonomy and resources to go on fighting.
Certainly, we shouldn't jump to any conclusions that this will precipitate the collapse of the Taliban. However, the same was said about killing Zarqawi and the durability of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Combined with the surge and proposals for buying off middle and lower ranking insurgents, this does start resembling the Iraq case. If the recent events also signal a change in Pakistan's posture-- then, perhaps, this could be the beginning of the end.
Update: Members of the Taliban moved to Karachi to get out of the range of drone attacks. Karachi has 3 million Pashtuns, mostly living in ghettos where the Taliban can blend in.
Hakimullah Mehsud is Dead? 02/02/2010
According to reports, the Pakistani Taliban leader, who claimed responsibility for the December 30th suicide attack on a CIA base in Pakistan, died from wounds caused by a drone attack on January 14th.
Hakimullah took over from Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by a drone attack last August. Perhaps being the leader of the Pakistani Taliban will become less of a prized job. Such turnover at the top also causes internal struggles and paranoia of infiltration.
Controversial drone attacks have both increased in number and effectiveness since Obama took over the presidency last year.
Now, I'd like to know, why can't we get Bin Laden already?
Hakimullah took over from Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by a drone attack last August. Perhaps being the leader of the Pakistani Taliban will become less of a prized job. Such turnover at the top also causes internal struggles and paranoia of infiltration.
Controversial drone attacks have both increased in number and effectiveness since Obama took over the presidency last year.
Now, I'd like to know, why can't we get Bin Laden already?
Will the Muslim Moderates Please Stand Up? 01/03/2010
The Pakistani Taliban carry out 'sharia law' 25km outside of Peshawar, Pakistan
Many people view the current struggle against Islamic extremism as a battle for hearts and minds. Within this framework, only a reform from within Islam can defeat fundamentalism. If this is true, then the Muslim moderates have to stand up. But when will that happen? This is a common refrain of Thomas Friedman, and it was the question posed recently by Paul Drescher, in response to my post What the Taliban Stand For. The argument goes something like this:
On a global scale, Muslims bomb mosques every year. They strap detonators to their belt for suicide missions that they know will kill innocent women and children. Although they carry out these actions in the name of Islam, the Quran forbids both suicide and the slaughter of women and children. Most victims of this nihilistic barbarism are other Muslims. Such savagery will only end when the umma (Muslim community) condemns this blasphemy with the same zeal that it protested the Danish cartoons…
It’s a seductive argument, but it’s misplaced. Extremism doesn’t flourish because moderates are too quiet. It flourishes because it is more relevant to a given context.
Click "Read More" to Continue------->
On a global scale, Muslims bomb mosques every year. They strap detonators to their belt for suicide missions that they know will kill innocent women and children. Although they carry out these actions in the name of Islam, the Quran forbids both suicide and the slaughter of women and children. Most victims of this nihilistic barbarism are other Muslims. Such savagery will only end when the umma (Muslim community) condemns this blasphemy with the same zeal that it protested the Danish cartoons…
It’s a seductive argument, but it’s misplaced. Extremism doesn’t flourish because moderates are too quiet. It flourishes because it is more relevant to a given context.
Click "Read More" to Continue------->
Too Much AfPak 12/07/2009
Diplomatic skill and foreign policy acumen are both finite resources. Over the past couple of months we've wasted a lot of both debating and implementing the Obama administration's AfPak policy. Stephen Walt explicates the argument:
But there is another cost to digging in deeper in Afghanistan. Obama has now bet the future of his presidency on being able to achieve something he can describe as "success" there, and he has only 18 months to do it. He's shackled with a sluggish economy that is unlikely to turn around soon, so there are going to be plenty of disaffected voters by 2012. The Dems are going to lose a bunch of seats in the midterms, making it even tougher to pass domestic legislation that might win broad voter approval. And having alienated a lot of the people who worked their butts off for him in 2008 (because they thought he would be different), he's going to have a hard time generating the sort of grass roots enthusiasm that won him the White House in the first place. Progressive Dems won't switch sides, but some of them will stay home. He may even have trouble getting Shepard Fairey's endorsement if Afghanistan doesn't turn around fast.
All this means that Obama will have to devote a lot of time and attention and political capital to the war in Afghanistan, an impoverished land-locked country of modest strategic importance. Meanwhile, life will go on in the rest of the world, and U.S. relations with a number of far more important countries will not receive the attention they should. Here are three examples.
Walt goes on to suggest that this intense focus on AfPak has hurt American interests specifically in Japan, Turkey, and Brazil. While I'm not normally a huge Walt fan, his argument is consistent with my experience in Azerbaijan. The Embassy here is virtually hamstrung by the Obama administration's failure to even nominate a candidate for the ambassadorship. This has strained relations with the Azerbaijani government, imperiled the ever tenuous Nabucco pipeline, and allowed the Azeris to get away with an alarming series of human right violations.
But there is another cost to digging in deeper in Afghanistan. Obama has now bet the future of his presidency on being able to achieve something he can describe as "success" there, and he has only 18 months to do it. He's shackled with a sluggish economy that is unlikely to turn around soon, so there are going to be plenty of disaffected voters by 2012. The Dems are going to lose a bunch of seats in the midterms, making it even tougher to pass domestic legislation that might win broad voter approval. And having alienated a lot of the people who worked their butts off for him in 2008 (because they thought he would be different), he's going to have a hard time generating the sort of grass roots enthusiasm that won him the White House in the first place. Progressive Dems won't switch sides, but some of them will stay home. He may even have trouble getting Shepard Fairey's endorsement if Afghanistan doesn't turn around fast.
All this means that Obama will have to devote a lot of time and attention and political capital to the war in Afghanistan, an impoverished land-locked country of modest strategic importance. Meanwhile, life will go on in the rest of the world, and U.S. relations with a number of far more important countries will not receive the attention they should. Here are three examples.
Walt goes on to suggest that this intense focus on AfPak has hurt American interests specifically in Japan, Turkey, and Brazil. While I'm not normally a huge Walt fan, his argument is consistent with my experience in Azerbaijan. The Embassy here is virtually hamstrung by the Obama administration's failure to even nominate a candidate for the ambassadorship. This has strained relations with the Azerbaijani government, imperiled the ever tenuous Nabucco pipeline, and allowed the Azeris to get away with an alarming series of human right violations.
What Do All These Afghanistan Numbers Mean? 11/23/2009
The argument over how many troops Obama should send to Afghanistan has largely been distilled to an argument of scale instead of strategy by much of the media. Numbers like 40,000 or 10,000 have come to represent simply how gung-ho a commentator is about the war in Afghanistan. It's easy to forget that there are fundamentally different tasks that these troop levels will, in theory, allow US forces to accomplish.
NYT Military Analyst Elisabeth Bumiller explains what these numbers will actually mean once boots hit the ground:
Should President Obama decide to send 40,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan, the most ambitious plan under consideration at the White House, the military would have enormous flexibility to deploy as many as 15,000 troops to the Taliban center of gravity in the south, 5,000 to the critical eastern border with Pakistan and 10,000 as trainers for the Afghan security forces.
If Mr. Obama limited any additional American troops to 10,000 to 15,000, the military would deploy them largely as trainers, with some reinforcements likely in the southern province of Kandahar, the Taliban’s spiritual home. The neighboring, and opium-rich, Helmand Province and the eastern border with Pakistan, military analysts say, would receive few if any American troops and would remain largely as they are today.
Check out the full article here.
NYT Military Analyst Elisabeth Bumiller explains what these numbers will actually mean once boots hit the ground:
Should President Obama decide to send 40,000 additional American troops to Afghanistan, the most ambitious plan under consideration at the White House, the military would have enormous flexibility to deploy as many as 15,000 troops to the Taliban center of gravity in the south, 5,000 to the critical eastern border with Pakistan and 10,000 as trainers for the Afghan security forces.
If Mr. Obama limited any additional American troops to 10,000 to 15,000, the military would deploy them largely as trainers, with some reinforcements likely in the southern province of Kandahar, the Taliban’s spiritual home. The neighboring, and opium-rich, Helmand Province and the eastern border with Pakistan, military analysts say, would receive few if any American troops and would remain largely as they are today.
Check out the full article here.
China Sent Enriched Uranium to Pakistan, Can it Now Teach Pakistan How to Read and Write? 11/13/2009
According to corroborated reports from A.Q. Khan's personal accounts, China sent weapons-grade uranium to Pakistan in 1982.
Horrified by India's test of a nuclear bomb in 1974, Mao Zedong and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Benazir's father) met in 1976 to discuss cooperation in nuclear arms. A.Q. Khan, who gained access to European methods for nuclear enrichment while working at a Dutch centrifuge manufacturer, passed expertise to China, which had nuclear bombs but was frustrated by its slow pace of enrichment.
Pakistan in return received warhead designs, 15 tons of uranium hexaflouride (feeder for centrifuges) and enough weapons-grade uranium for 2 atom bombs.
As Khan boasted in a report for Pakistani intelligence:
"The speed of our work and our achievements surprised our worst enemies and adversaries and the West stood helplessly by to see a Third World nation, unable even to produce bicycle chains or sewing needles, mastering the most advanced nuclear technology in the shortest possible span of time..."
Yes, by spying on the Dutch and capitalizing on Chinese fears of India. But what does it mean to be a country that can produce nuclear weapons, but can't teach half of its population how to read and write? Would it not be better to surprise the world by creating a modern, stable society? Despite Pakistan's enormous pride for its nuclear capability, I don't think that many Third World countries envy Pakistan today.
Horrified by India's test of a nuclear bomb in 1974, Mao Zedong and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Benazir's father) met in 1976 to discuss cooperation in nuclear arms. A.Q. Khan, who gained access to European methods for nuclear enrichment while working at a Dutch centrifuge manufacturer, passed expertise to China, which had nuclear bombs but was frustrated by its slow pace of enrichment.
Pakistan in return received warhead designs, 15 tons of uranium hexaflouride (feeder for centrifuges) and enough weapons-grade uranium for 2 atom bombs.
As Khan boasted in a report for Pakistani intelligence:
"The speed of our work and our achievements surprised our worst enemies and adversaries and the West stood helplessly by to see a Third World nation, unable even to produce bicycle chains or sewing needles, mastering the most advanced nuclear technology in the shortest possible span of time..."
Yes, by spying on the Dutch and capitalizing on Chinese fears of India. But what does it mean to be a country that can produce nuclear weapons, but can't teach half of its population how to read and write? Would it not be better to surprise the world by creating a modern, stable society? Despite Pakistan's enormous pride for its nuclear capability, I don't think that many Third World countries envy Pakistan today.
In Focus: Baluchistan, Part 1 11/05/2009
One of the greatest things about blogging is the unparalleled speed with which commentators can address the day's news. Unfortunately this paradigm also has a significant downside: it is easy for bloggers to get caught in a reactive rut. Instead of seeking out new stories and perspectives, they end up simply responding to the articles produced by mainstream sources.
Our goal at PBOM is to counter this trend by pushing coverage of international affairs outside the popular purview. As part of this effort we are pleased to introduce a new monthly feature titled "In Focus." The basic idea is every month we will select an under-reported or under-analyzed topic and bring you a series of articles on that topic.
First up, Baluchistan.
Those of you who keep abreast of current affairs have probably heard of this ethnic quasi-state in relation to the recent bombing in the southeastern Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan that killed six Revolutionary Guard officers including General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the Guards' ground force. Yet little of the coverage of the bombings provided the depth or breath of insight necessary to understand this isolated region. Most of the coverage instead chose to focus on Iran's assertion that foreign powers (read the U.S., Pakistan, and/or Saudi Arabia) were behind the attack.
Over the next month, we will attempt answer the following questions: Who are the Baluch? Where and how do they live? And what role do they play in regional politics? Today, I'll begin with a general overview of Baluchistan's geography and political history.
Click for more ------>
Our goal at PBOM is to counter this trend by pushing coverage of international affairs outside the popular purview. As part of this effort we are pleased to introduce a new monthly feature titled "In Focus." The basic idea is every month we will select an under-reported or under-analyzed topic and bring you a series of articles on that topic.
First up, Baluchistan.
Those of you who keep abreast of current affairs have probably heard of this ethnic quasi-state in relation to the recent bombing in the southeastern Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan that killed six Revolutionary Guard officers including General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the Guards' ground force. Yet little of the coverage of the bombings provided the depth or breath of insight necessary to understand this isolated region. Most of the coverage instead chose to focus on Iran's assertion that foreign powers (read the U.S., Pakistan, and/or Saudi Arabia) were behind the attack.
Over the next month, we will attempt answer the following questions: Who are the Baluch? Where and how do they live? And what role do they play in regional politics? Today, I'll begin with a general overview of Baluchistan's geography and political history.
Click for more ------>
Drones: Reality v. Perception 11/02/2009
Photo: Chad Slattery
New America Foundation scholars Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann recently published a new report on the effectiveness of drone attacks in Pakistan. According to their figures, drones actually kill far fewer civilians than previously thought.
By the numbers:
82 Number of drone attacks in Pakistan since 2006.
34 Number of strikes in 2008
43 Number of strikes thus far in 2009
750-1000 Total number of causalities.
68% Percentage of causalities that were Taliban or Al Qaeda.
32% Percentage of causalities that were civilian.
20 Number of high ranking Taliban/Al Qaeda members killed
(Interestingly all of these kills occurred after Obama became
President in January 2009)
Check out the full article here for more.
As Bergen and Tiedemann acknowledge, however, the main issue policy makers should consider isn't the drones' absolute efficacy but instead their power as negative symbol of overreaching American power in Pakistan. According to a recent Gallop survey, only 9% of Pakistanis approve of the strikes.
By the numbers:
82 Number of drone attacks in Pakistan since 2006.
34 Number of strikes in 2008
43 Number of strikes thus far in 2009
750-1000 Total number of causalities.
68% Percentage of causalities that were Taliban or Al Qaeda.
32% Percentage of causalities that were civilian.
20 Number of high ranking Taliban/Al Qaeda members killed
(Interestingly all of these kills occurred after Obama became
President in January 2009)
Check out the full article here for more.
As Bergen and Tiedemann acknowledge, however, the main issue policy makers should consider isn't the drones' absolute efficacy but instead their power as negative symbol of overreaching American power in Pakistan. According to a recent Gallop survey, only 9% of Pakistanis approve of the strikes.
What the Taliban Stand For 11/01/2009
The main point about my post on Pakistan was to be sober about the limits of American power. Big nations lose small wars precisely because of the problems we are having in Afghanistan. It has nothing to do with troop counts. It is because America has to win, while the Taliban only has to not lose. Our interests are asymmetrical- for the Taliban, its a matter of existence, for America- well, we're not exactly sure.
Creating a legitimate, self-sustaining government under occupation is maddeningly difficult, as recent events make all too clear. And in Pakistan, what can the U.S. do? If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to destroy the Pakistani Taliban, the U.S. isn't going to invade Waziristan itself. The drone attacks can be useful, but they are ultimately a stopgap to make us feel like we have control in an area that in which we do not.
The good news is that those who oppose the Taliban are on the right side of history. War strains the moral fiber and muddies the moral compass. But ultimately the Taliban are nothing more than philistine thugs who worship death and distort faith for their own ends. Al-Qaeda is cut from the same cloth, and for all its bluster, its mission has been a complete failure. Terrorist groups rarely last more than a couple of decades because they consume themselves. In the end, this is a battle of ideals, and the fundamentalist terrorists will not be the last ones standing.
- Jon
Creating a legitimate, self-sustaining government under occupation is maddeningly difficult, as recent events make all too clear. And in Pakistan, what can the U.S. do? If Pakistan is unable or unwilling to destroy the Pakistani Taliban, the U.S. isn't going to invade Waziristan itself. The drone attacks can be useful, but they are ultimately a stopgap to make us feel like we have control in an area that in which we do not.
The good news is that those who oppose the Taliban are on the right side of history. War strains the moral fiber and muddies the moral compass. But ultimately the Taliban are nothing more than philistine thugs who worship death and distort faith for their own ends. Al-Qaeda is cut from the same cloth, and for all its bluster, its mission has been a complete failure. Terrorist groups rarely last more than a couple of decades because they consume themselves. In the end, this is a battle of ideals, and the fundamentalist terrorists will not be the last ones standing.
- Jon
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