Ajaria: The "frozen conflict" that never was 04/10/2011
In 2008, a Georgian-Russian war made the obscure autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into household names. The few people who knew about these provinces beforehand could point to the fact that both resisted inclusion into independent Georgia in 1918, and rebelled again during the fall of the Soviet Union. So was the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia inevitable?
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
Add Comment
Is Russia Next? 02/23/2011
Expect to see more of this type of imagery
The unrest sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa has finally begun to reverberate in Russia. At a security meeting in North Ossetia yesterday, President Dmitri Medvedev warned that these uprisings could trigger the disintegration of Arab countries "into little pieces" and "bring fanatics to power." Such comments were clearly designed to tap into age-old Russian fears of territorial break-up and Islamification, which suggests that the Kremlin is worried that its corrupt, autocratic rule could soon face the tidal wave of people power. If that does indeed happen, Vladimir Putin and his cohort had better hope that their ten-year-old habit of trotting out bogeyman and engaging in empty PR continues to pacify dissent. Otherwise, it could be another long, hot summer in Moscow.
The Price is Right: Moscow 02/23/2011
Corruption has penetrated and infected all aspects of Russian society. From admission to university to a grave site in a cemetery, everything that the government controls has a price and is most definitely for sale. Bol'shoi Gorod, a Moscow-based weekly, recently published a list of estimated costs, along with testimonials from the Russians who buy and sell these 'services.' Here are some of the shocking figures that the magazine's reporters found:
Education:
-A place in a good kindergarten: $500-5000
-Admission to a top-flight university: €5000-20,000
-A passing grade on an exam: $30-500
Medicine:
-A sick note from work: $75-100
-A pass to use state-run swimming pools: $15-25
-An expedited surgery: $4,000 and a bottle of cognac
The DMV:
-A driver's license (without any sort of exam): $1200-2000
-To keep your license after being caught drunk driving: €2000-5000
Education:
-A place in a good kindergarten: $500-5000
-Admission to a top-flight university: €5000-20,000
-A passing grade on an exam: $30-500
Medicine:
-A sick note from work: $75-100
-A pass to use state-run swimming pools: $15-25
-An expedited surgery: $4,000 and a bottle of cognac
The DMV:
-A driver's license (without any sort of exam): $1200-2000
-To keep your license after being caught drunk driving: €2000-5000
Yelena Baturina and Corruption in Russia 02/19/2011
Russia's richest woman. For now.
Russian police recently stormed the corporate offices of Intenko, a construction company owned by Yelena Baturina. The raid was part of a larger probe investigating charges that the former first lady of Moscow embezzled $440 million in political kickbacks. Many people expect that both Ms. Baturina and her husband, Yuri Luzhkov, will soon face indictments related to an estimated $7.8 billion in malfeasance that occured during his tenure in office.
The investigation, however, is definitely not something to celebrate. As the cases of Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky demonstrated, the Kremlin uses this type of judicial action for political gamesmanship and score-settling, not justice. Only people with close connections to the political establishment will benefit in any way.
If the regime does intend to take on the Inteko empire, the big question is why now. Those who fall foul of the Kremlin have typically been able to keep their ill-gotten gains, provided that they do not interfere in politics. Mr. Luzhkov has not made any critical comments about either President Dmitri Medvedev or Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow's current mayor. Rather, he has spent most of his time looking for houses in London and trying to obtain EU citizenship. Without the leverage of being the elected representative of Russia’s largest city, Mr. Luzhkov seems to be a fairly harmless figure.
There are still several reasons why the Kremlin will benefit from prosecuting the ex-mayor and his wife. First, it allows the regime to pretend as if it is battling graft, while not actually threatening its own fraudulent apparatus. Conversely, it will provide a new influx of ‘capital’ for a patron-client system that runs on grease. Ms. Baturina’s personal fortune—which Forbes estimates at $2.9 billion—is clearly a tempting prize for those around Medvedev who have yet to cash in on government service. While it is certain that the Luzhkovs did not earn this money, it will be sad if it becomes part of another orgy of looting and so perpetuates this corrupt system.
Vladimir Putin’s declaration that "a thief must sit [in prison]" apparently only applies in select cases.
The investigation, however, is definitely not something to celebrate. As the cases of Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky demonstrated, the Kremlin uses this type of judicial action for political gamesmanship and score-settling, not justice. Only people with close connections to the political establishment will benefit in any way.
If the regime does intend to take on the Inteko empire, the big question is why now. Those who fall foul of the Kremlin have typically been able to keep their ill-gotten gains, provided that they do not interfere in politics. Mr. Luzhkov has not made any critical comments about either President Dmitri Medvedev or Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow's current mayor. Rather, he has spent most of his time looking for houses in London and trying to obtain EU citizenship. Without the leverage of being the elected representative of Russia’s largest city, Mr. Luzhkov seems to be a fairly harmless figure.
There are still several reasons why the Kremlin will benefit from prosecuting the ex-mayor and his wife. First, it allows the regime to pretend as if it is battling graft, while not actually threatening its own fraudulent apparatus. Conversely, it will provide a new influx of ‘capital’ for a patron-client system that runs on grease. Ms. Baturina’s personal fortune—which Forbes estimates at $2.9 billion—is clearly a tempting prize for those around Medvedev who have yet to cash in on government service. While it is certain that the Luzhkovs did not earn this money, it will be sad if it becomes part of another orgy of looting and so perpetuates this corrupt system.
Vladimir Putin’s declaration that "a thief must sit [in prison]" apparently only applies in select cases.
The Disappointing Revolution 02/11/2011
A more hopeful time
On August 19, 1991, thousands of people gathered in front of Moscow’s White House to oppose the August Putsch. The protesters set up barricades around the building, distributed political flyers, and tried to convince the soldiers in the area not to follow orders. These actions—combined with Yeltsin’s famous speech from on top of a tank—caused massive defections among the military and eventually led to the unraveling of the coup attempt. By the end of the month, the Russian Federation had declared itself legally independent from the laws of the Soviet Union.
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
As Cairo sleeps, a brief comedic non-sequitur from Russia. GQ, in what appears to be a desperate attempt to sell magazines, sent Naomi Campbell to interview Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Global Tiger Summit in St. Petersburg last November.
The former model began her inquisition by asking, as one would expect, about the former president's health and fitness regime. Putin's responses were downright flirty:
"Naomi Campbell: You're in pretty good physical shape. How do you manage to keep yourself so fit?
Vladimir Putin: Probably the same way you do.
Actually, I don't work out as much as I should, but I do believe that it's a healthy mind as well as a healthy body that keeps me fit, sound and calm.
Exactly. You just answered your own question.
What's your fitness regime?
I go to the gym, I swim daily and from time to time I meet with friends and do extra-curricular stuff. I had a good work-out just the day before yesterday."
Putin then flexed, killed and ate a grizzly bear, washed it down with a liter of vodka, and proposed to Campbell.
Flag this one for a full read after Mubarak falls, inshallah.
The former model began her inquisition by asking, as one would expect, about the former president's health and fitness regime. Putin's responses were downright flirty:
"Naomi Campbell: You're in pretty good physical shape. How do you manage to keep yourself so fit?
Vladimir Putin: Probably the same way you do.
Actually, I don't work out as much as I should, but I do believe that it's a healthy mind as well as a healthy body that keeps me fit, sound and calm.
Exactly. You just answered your own question.
What's your fitness regime?
I go to the gym, I swim daily and from time to time I meet with friends and do extra-curricular stuff. I had a good work-out just the day before yesterday."
Putin then flexed, killed and ate a grizzly bear, washed it down with a liter of vodka, and proposed to Campbell.
Flag this one for a full read after Mubarak falls, inshallah.
How Russia Responds 01/26/2011
Julia Ioffe reports on why the Kremlin fires a couple of mid-level individuals after every crisis, but never makes any big changes. Money quote:
“The idea of political responsibility [in Russia] is now seen as political terror, as Stalinism." The fear of repeating the purges of the late 1930s has swung so far the other way that now "there's a tendency to look for that one specific person who didn't put the metal detector in the right place, and maybe his boss, and fire them…the people who matter -- whose departures could significantly improve the ministries and agencies they head -- never get fired. The officials who are publicly fired are usually of middling deputy rank, sacrificial lambs whose departures rarely make a difference save for a quick political catharsis, and quick political hay.
Speaking today at the FSB board, Medvedev seemed to acknowledge the futility of this approach. "Unfortunately, it always happens like this here," he said. "After unfortunate events, we mobilize all our resources, everyone is called upon to be extremely attentive. Everything works in this way for a while -- the armed forces, the law enforcement agencies. Even the citizens have a more responsible attitude." And then? And then "there is a loss of control and vigilance."
And then Medvedev asked his interior minister for the list of people to fire.
“The idea of political responsibility [in Russia] is now seen as political terror, as Stalinism." The fear of repeating the purges of the late 1930s has swung so far the other way that now "there's a tendency to look for that one specific person who didn't put the metal detector in the right place, and maybe his boss, and fire them…the people who matter -- whose departures could significantly improve the ministries and agencies they head -- never get fired. The officials who are publicly fired are usually of middling deputy rank, sacrificial lambs whose departures rarely make a difference save for a quick political catharsis, and quick political hay.
Speaking today at the FSB board, Medvedev seemed to acknowledge the futility of this approach. "Unfortunately, it always happens like this here," he said. "After unfortunate events, we mobilize all our resources, everyone is called upon to be extremely attentive. Everything works in this way for a while -- the armed forces, the law enforcement agencies. Even the citizens have a more responsible attitude." And then? And then "there is a loss of control and vigilance."
And then Medvedev asked his interior minister for the list of people to fire.
A Scathing Rebuke 11/04/2010
Mikhail Khodorkovsky gives his verdict on Russia's political system. A true must-read:
"I am not at all an ideal person, but I am - a person with an idea. For me, as for anybody, it is hard to live in jail, and I do not want to die there.
But if I have to - I will not hesitate. The things I believe in are worth dying for. I think I have proven this. And you opponents? What do you believe in? That the bosses are always right? Do you believe in money? In the impunity of the system?"
"I am not at all an ideal person, but I am - a person with an idea. For me, as for anybody, it is hard to live in jail, and I do not want to die there.
But if I have to - I will not hesitate. The things I believe in are worth dying for. I think I have proven this. And you opponents? What do you believe in? That the bosses are always right? Do you believe in money? In the impunity of the system?"
Europe, Russia, and Gay Parades 10/22/2010
Better him than the EU
The European Union’s High Court awarded Russian gay-rights activists €29,510 in damages yesterday. According to the ruling, the Moscow city government violated articles eleven (free assembly), thirteen (effective legal remedy), and fourteen (equal protection) of the European Convention on Human Rights by prohibiting the organization of gay pride parades. The judges unequivocally stated that they believed the motivation behind this ban was bigotry, rather than concern for public order as the city had claimed.
The biggest question about this verdict is not whether it is correct, but whether it is enforceable. Although Russian citizens often seek legal redress in the European court system, this represents the first attempt to force the Russian government to allow unsanctioned demonstrations. If the court applied these principles universally, it would mean that other dissident groups could use them as a way to circumvent the Kremlin’s legal monopoly. Yabloko, Other Russia, and the National Bolsheviks would all have to receive permission to stage public rallies and run for office.
That is not likely to happen. As Russia’s long history with the UN demonstrates, the government has no problem flouting international treaties and conventions (think Abkhazia/South Ossetia). Indeed, this same court has already condemned the Kremlin for its handling of the Khodorkovsky case without having any effect. Unless something changes radically in Moscow, the EU is heading for another embarrassing climb-down, which will only serve to remind people of how ineffectual and inconsequential it really is.
The other issue that this decision brings up is the role of international courts in deciding social matters. Given what happened in Belgrade last week, European judges ought to consider whether it is prudent for them to oblige socially conservative countries like Russia and Serbia to adopt the sexual mores of Western Europe. Such well-intentioned decisions can even hurt the gay-rights movement by associating it with outside interference and threats to local culture and customs. To really uphold the EU’s position on human rights, a judge’s motto should always be: ‘first, do no harm.’
The biggest question about this verdict is not whether it is correct, but whether it is enforceable. Although Russian citizens often seek legal redress in the European court system, this represents the first attempt to force the Russian government to allow unsanctioned demonstrations. If the court applied these principles universally, it would mean that other dissident groups could use them as a way to circumvent the Kremlin’s legal monopoly. Yabloko, Other Russia, and the National Bolsheviks would all have to receive permission to stage public rallies and run for office.
That is not likely to happen. As Russia’s long history with the UN demonstrates, the government has no problem flouting international treaties and conventions (think Abkhazia/South Ossetia). Indeed, this same court has already condemned the Kremlin for its handling of the Khodorkovsky case without having any effect. Unless something changes radically in Moscow, the EU is heading for another embarrassing climb-down, which will only serve to remind people of how ineffectual and inconsequential it really is.
The other issue that this decision brings up is the role of international courts in deciding social matters. Given what happened in Belgrade last week, European judges ought to consider whether it is prudent for them to oblige socially conservative countries like Russia and Serbia to adopt the sexual mores of Western Europe. Such well-intentioned decisions can even hurt the gay-rights movement by associating it with outside interference and threats to local culture and customs. To really uphold the EU’s position on human rights, a judge’s motto should always be: ‘first, do no harm.’
A Hairy Situation 10/19/2010
If only
American voters have a well-earned reputation for not electing bald leaders. With the exceptions of Ford and Eisenhower, every recent US president has had a full head of hair. Even traditionally marginalized groups like Mormons (Mitt Romney), women (Hillary Clinton), and idiots (Sarah Palin/John Kerry) now have a better chance to make it to the White House than the follically challenged.
The same rule of thumb does not hold true in Russia. Unlike the US, the Soviet Union was led by a series of bald men, including Lenin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev. In fact, there is a tradition going back almost two-hundred years of each change of power in the Kremlin involving a switch from a bald man to a man with hair (scroll down to see portraits).
Russia, of course, deserves props for not judging its leaders by their hairlines. But this tradition does not bode well for the country’s immediate future. Unless Dmitri Medvedev’s brown locks start falling out within the next two years, he will be left scratching his hairy head while a certain bald man takes his place. Too bad for Russia there is no such thing as anti-Rogaine.
The same rule of thumb does not hold true in Russia. Unlike the US, the Soviet Union was led by a series of bald men, including Lenin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev. In fact, there is a tradition going back almost two-hundred years of each change of power in the Kremlin involving a switch from a bald man to a man with hair (scroll down to see portraits).
Russia, of course, deserves props for not judging its leaders by their hairlines. But this tradition does not bode well for the country’s immediate future. Unless Dmitri Medvedev’s brown locks start falling out within the next two years, he will be left scratching his hairy head while a certain bald man takes his place. Too bad for Russia there is no such thing as anti-Rogaine.
Loading
