Discerning what is going on within the opacity of the Kremlin has always involved some rather shaky guesswork. In Soviet times, Western observers attempted to divine the Politburo’s order of succession based on who stood where at military parades or which official was quoted most in the newspaper Pravda. There were several points in time—such as Chernenko’s gerontocratic period—when the West had almost no idea who was actually running the USSR.

Since the fall of communism, the methods available to Kremlinologists have increased dramatically. Yet technology did not allow the experts to correctly predict Putin as Yeltsin’s successor or Medvedev as Putin’s. Even those with good connections to the Russian establishment were baffled by the coronation of these two relative unknowns.

The latest omen circulating Kremlinologist circles is website domain names. Specifically, people have been discussing the fact that someone in the government reserved the site names www.putin2012.rf and www.putin-2012.rf. Whether or not this means that V.V.P. will be hitting the campaign trail again is as speculative as any Pravda quote or Victory Day line-up. But it is certainly interesting that www.medvedev-2012.rf and www.medevedev2012.rf are still available.

The Kremlin’s suppression of dissent is having Freudian effects on Russian society. Artists from a politically minded cooperative, Voina (War), recently took credit for sketching another large phallus on St. Petersburg’s Palace Square. The group’s first installation involved a penis measuring sixty-five meters, which was drawn on one of the city’s iconic drawbridges. When the bridge was raised, it “saluted” the Federal Security Service’s headquarters on the bank. “We have painted a giant phallus to show what the FSB and Interior Ministry are doing [to the country] in terms of security,” Voina said in a statement.

Could this possibly be a sign of some oedipal rage latent within the populace? Probably not. But it is certainly a fitting image.

Since August 2008, the international community has largely forgotten about the five-day war between Russia and Georgia. Other issues—including a potential Iranian bomb, a financial meltdown, and increasing chaos in Afghanistan—have made the dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia seem rather unimportant. While few countries are willing to recognize these enclaves’ claims to sovereignty, most are content to live with the new status quo.

This war, however, did not actually solve anything. Russia failed to achieve its goals of getting rid of the Saakashvili administration and removing the US from its 'near abroad.' Nor has the Kremlin been able to convince even traditional allies like Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine to side with the break-away provinces. The fact that Nauru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are the only countries to open formal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia makes the whole exercise seem like something of a joke.

Georgia, meanwhile, is still reeling from the shock of Russia's invasion. It lost two territories which it considers part of its state and had always hoped to reintegrate. Worse, its complaints to the UN, OSCE, and US have fallen on deaf ears. By continuing to rail against Moscow’s neo-imperialism, President Saakashivili has just confirmed the Russian caricature of him as ‘Crazy Misha.’

Will these two sides ever reach an agreement?

Dmitri Trenin, the head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, thinks that they can. In an article published in the Moscow Times, he argues that Georgia should recognize Abkhazia’s sovereignty in exchange for control of the Gali province (which is almost entirely inhabited by ethnic Georgians). At the same time, he believes that South Ossetia should give up its aspirations for formal independence (which are 'unrealistic') and adopt an ‘Andorran model’ of autonomy with a special security role for Russia. These compromises would allow the Georgian state to engage in nation-building and improve its relations with its northern neighbor, while giving the Ossetians and Abkhazians the recognition that they so desperately crave.  Such a deal would, admittedly, force the Georgian side to make most of the painful concessions. But Trenin maintains that any kind of resolution is better for Georgia than a frozen conflict along the lines of Cyprus.

Ghia Nodia, a professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, rejects this proposal out of hand. First, he points out that no Georgian leader could survive politically if he/she agreed to these terms. Second, he suggests that Trenin is imagining a Russia that is “capable of genuinely recognizing Georgia's right to choose its own government and its own political course,” when such a state does not exist. Nodia’s point is that Putin and Medvedev are just as much of an obstacle to an agreement as Saakashivili is.

Unfortunately, this more pessimistic view is probably correct. Neither Georgia nor Russia has shown any willingness to compromise on the fundamental issues. Having a bogeyman next door is simply too politically useful to lose it by making peace.

Dmitri Medvedev seems to have found his spine. Speaking at a political forum in Yaroslavl on Friday, he excoriated the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, for his criticism of some of the Kremlin's decisions. "State representatives," the Russian president thundered, "must either take part in the improvement of government institutions or join the opposition."

If Medvedev fires this long-serving Putin ally, the elections in 2012 could take on a whole new life.

Update:

Leaders of Russia's dominant political party, United Russia, have decided to hold discussions about a newly released documentary about Mr. Luzhkov. This film, which is titled “The Cap Affair” after the mayor’s tendency to wear flat caps, accuses him of extreme corruption and incompetence during his eighteen years in office. In particular, it draws attention to his tendency to funnel lucrative construction projects and real estate grants to a company owned by his wife, Yelena Baturina. Forbes magazine recently revealed that Moscow’s first lady is the third richest businesswoman in the world, with assets valued at over $2.9 billion.

The mayor’s fate has become something of a polarizing question between the president and prime minister. Both Medvedev and other officials within the Kremlin have recently attacked Mr. Luzhkov as an impediment to their plans to modernize the country. Putin, by contrast, has chosen to stick by his long-time supporter in terms of aggression abroad and authoritarianism at home.

For his part, Mayor Luzhkov seems fairly confident about the future. Asked about whether he would continue in his post after his current term expires in June, he replied that he “had no reason to think otherwise.” That may well depend on whether the White House or the Kremlin is calling the shots.  

Vladimir Putin and the word subtle do not usually appear in the same sentence. His typical response to Chechen terrorist attacks or criticism of the Russian political system has been to use foul language, threats, and bombastic rhetoric. Even the rather genial Barack Obama did not escape from a meeting with the Russian prime minister without a fairly severe tongue lashing.

This is why Putin’s performance in Sochi yesterday has people talking. At a meeting with fifty foreign reporters and academics, he coyly deflected questions about elections in 2012, claiming that he and President Medvedev had “not discussed it” but that neither of them would “do anything to contradict the constitution.” He then pointedly mentioned Franklin Delano Rooselvelt’s four “consecutive” terms as president of the United States.

The Russian constitution, which the loyalist Duma re-wrote in 2008, allows Putin to return to the presidency for two more six-year terms. That would mean he would surpass his new friend FDR in terms of time in office. Several headlines in Russia declared what to many now seems obvious: “Putin will stay until 2024!”

Where does that leave Medvedev? One option is that, as a Putin loyalist, he will accept the demotion and take the prime minister’s job. He could also find himself elbowed out if Putin’s FSB cronies choose to move against Medvedev’s more liberal camp. It is possible, however, that the current president would refuse to go quietly and instead try to run on his own high name recognition and popularity.

Of the potential situations, this one would be the most interesting—and the most dangerous for Russia.

The English philosopher John Locke believed that the inviolability of private property was a crucial component of the social contract.  A government, he wrote, “can not dispose of the estates of [its] subjects arbitrarily” without ceding its moral authority. This principle served as the bedrock of the American Declaration of Independence and still undergirds republican governments all over the world.

Russia’s leaders have traditionally adopted a different view of property—one in which governmental ownership is the foundation of power.  Whether in the guise of a Tsar or a General Secretary, the ruler of the Russian state has always controlled its land as a form of personal patrimony. No one ever recognized any limitation on his/her absolute authority over the country’s territory or the population who lived on it.

The Putin regime continues several parts of this absolutist tradition. Although it does not make the same claim to be “owner of all Russian land and people” as Nicholas II did in the 1897 imperial census, it uses property as a tool of compulsion and control. Those who voice disagreement or offer a public challenge, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky or Boris Berezovsky, can be stripped of their possessions and forced into exile.

The latest manifestation of this tendency comes in the field of aviation. Members of the government decided last week to deny Moscow’s Domodedovo airport the right to expand its runway capacity to meet growing demand. This decision, which the Western media has largely ignored, may prompt several big carriers to defect to the new runways being built at the city’s two other airports. That, of course, will help the state which controls the other facilities and has long been embarrassed by its privately run competitor’s greater efficiency, innovation, and profitability. Chalk up another victory for Russia, Inc. and another defeat for Lockean property rights in the former communist world.

Strategies range from the mild (above) to the manic (below)

From Popular Science via the Danger Room