The textbook line on Iran's electoral system is that while there are clear limitations on who can run, once the candidates are approved by the Guardian Council Iranian elections are competitive. Dramatic upsets are not completely uncommon and even western electioneers could learn a thing or two from the populist pandering schemes employed by Iranian candidates.
Even with this background, it is clear that this year's Presidential election (polls open Friday, June 12th) has taken on an entirely different tenor. In recent days political rallies have effectively brought Tehran to a standstill as supporters for both the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his main rival former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (who looks curiously like my undergrad thesis adviser Dr. Nozar Alaolmolki) have taken to the streets.
The turning point was the June 3rd televised debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. In a curious move, Ahmadinejad opened by accusing the Mousavi campaign of spreading lies about the ruling government. The discourse devolved from there. Ahmadinejad criticized Mousavi's wife, a well respected academic, Mousavi shot back that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy had disgraced Iran and marginalized it position in global politics.
Since, the two candidates have effectively been at war. Ahmadinejad has impugned the opposition with crimes ranging from corruption to out and out treason while Mousavi has countered by calling Ahmadinejad a megalomaniac.
It goes without saying that for all the recent theatrics, the results of the election will come down to economics, or more precisely individual voter's perceptions of the Iranian economy. Ahmadinejad supporters, who are on the whole poorer and more likely to reside in rural Iran, view their candidate's populist economic policies as overwhelmingly positive. Ahmadinejad reinforces this view by presenting a carefully selected set of figures at campaign rallies and in debates that indicate Iran is weathering the global economic crisis better than its peers. Detractors counter that Ahmadinejad's populism has created massive inflation (over 23% according to a recent report from Iran's Central Bank) and driven unemployment up.
Excluding the very real possibility of election fraud or interference by Iran's clerical elite, Mousavi has a solid shot. If Mousavi is to win, it won't be because he changed the minds of Ahmadinejad supporters but instead because he inspired and mobilized previously marginalized or disinterested sections of the electorate. If recent rallies are any indication he is doing this quite well. Famously shy in front of photographers, Mousavi has become the face of a united front composed of reformists, youth, women, and even conservatives elites who have grown dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad's economic policies.
Regardless of the outcome, the real significance of the current Iranian electoral cycle is the intangible shift in Iranian popular psychology. Latent dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad's policies, both foreign and domestic has poured into the public sphere. Suppressing this sentiment will be a difficult task for Ahmadinejad if he is reelected.
Moreover, it is unclear if he will once again have the full support of the Ayatollah Khamenei in the aftermath of a tumultuous political cycle. Ahmadinejad has become somewhat of a political liability for Iran's spiritual and political leader. In a recent open letter to the Ayatollah published in newspapers across Iran former Iranian President and current member of the Expediency Council called on Khamenei to reign Ahmadinejad in and resolve the "mutiny" he has incurred.
That said, it is hard to be too optimistic even if Mousavi triumphs. Historically, Iranian reformers have only disappointed both the Iranian people and their supporters in the West. Time will tell.
