Given the recent prominence of the missile defense debate, I figured I would drag out something a wrote way back in February of this year on the topic. My views have changed somewhat since then, particularly regarding the utility of missile defense as a deterrent. But I stand by the policy recommendations I made. (Some smart folks seem to agree as well, which is always heartening.) Enjoy and please comment at will.
The Future of Missile Defense: Recommendations for the Incoming Obama Administration
Evan Tachovsky
February 12, 2009
The advent of the Obama presidency comes at a critical moment in the debate on the viability of missile defense. America’s new president must decide how or even if ballistic missile defense (BMD) should be a part of America’s broader defense strategy. There is no shortage of opinions on how the administration should proceed on key issues including America’s controversial missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and the expansion of the Aegis system at sea. During the Bush administration, advocates of BMD warned that North Korea and Iran would soon be able to hold the U.S. hostage, while its critics decried the program as an untenable cash cow only benefiting military industrialists. The purpose of the current investigation is first to delineate why the further development of America’s BMD capabilities should be a priority for the Obama administration and second to suggest a reorganization of priorities to ensure the financial, technical and strategic viability of America’s defenses.
More after the jump --->
The Future of Missile Defense: Recommendations for the Incoming Obama Administration
Evan Tachovsky
February 12, 2009
The advent of the Obama presidency comes at a critical moment in the debate on the viability of missile defense. America’s new president must decide how or even if ballistic missile defense (BMD) should be a part of America’s broader defense strategy. There is no shortage of opinions on how the administration should proceed on key issues including America’s controversial missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and the expansion of the Aegis system at sea. During the Bush administration, advocates of BMD warned that North Korea and Iran would soon be able to hold the U.S. hostage, while its critics decried the program as an untenable cash cow only benefiting military industrialists. The purpose of the current investigation is first to delineate why the further development of America’s BMD capabilities should be a priority for the Obama administration and second to suggest a reorganization of priorities to ensure the financial, technical and strategic viability of America’s defenses.
More after the jump --->
From its origins in the Eisenhower administration, to Regan’s infamous “Star War” scheme, BMD has long been associated with the great power politics of the Cold War. With the break up of the Soviet Union, however, a new conflict paradigm emerged: regional conflicts became the greatest threat to international peace and stability. Concurrent with this change, was the rapid shift of ballistic missile and nuclear technology to regional powers. Pakistan and North Korea both developed and tested nuclear weapons and Iran is on the verge of joining the nuclear club. These two developments in tandem have redefined and revitalized the need for missile defense.
Unlike the Cold War, which pitted two highly centralized and technically equivalent countries against each other, the new conflict paradigm is characterized by uncertainty and uneven technology advancements. The emerging nuclear powers have unstable or remarkably byzantine systems of governance. Pakistan, while currently an ally of the U.S., faces grave instability and there is a significant threat that an Islamist government unfriendly to the West could rise to power. Kim Jung Il’s government in North Korea remains one of the world’s most enigmatic regimes and despite pledges to denuclearize has yet to do so. While Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, analysis indicates that with its uranium enrichment and ballistic missile programs continuing unabated there is a distinct possibility that the Obama administration will face a nuclear Iran. The prospect of an accidental or surprise launch is now more of a threat than ever before. In this context missile defense can provide much needed stability for the international system and security for American interests at home and abroad.
Beyond its functional capabilities, a viable missile defense program would force a significant shift in a hostile nuclear state’s political calculus. North Korea and Iran’s respective decisions to pursue nuclear weapons were as much political as strategic. Neither of these countries would be able to win a war against the United States and its allies even with a nuclear arsenal. Iran is motivated by a desire to reaffirm its position as a regional power and gain significant leverage against the U.S. to counter its increasing presence in the region. Missile defense can invalidate these political objectives, which would in turn help to reduce popular support for nuclear program in Iran, ideally forcing Iran back to the negotiating table. North Korea has moved toward denuclearization but in recent months progress has stalled. Increasing the legitimacy of the U.S. missile defense system in the region would ensure that North Korea does not go back on its commitment to give up its nuclear program and disincentivize Pyongyang’s advanced inter-continental ballistic missile program.
Despite the theoretical utility of enhancing America’s BMD capabilities, there are significant political, technical and financial impediments to complete implementation. Politically, the expansion of missile defense generates grave concern in Russia and China. Both countries see the expansion of U.S. BMD capabilities close to their borders as an offensive move and have responded with diplomatic bluster—in Russia’s case even the threat of attack. Technically there are concerns that America’s missile defense system has only been successful in carefully controlled tests, success that would not be replicated in the real world. Finally, critics argue that the limited success of America’s missile defense systems does not justify their exorbitant cost.
To address these concerns, the Obama administration must change America’s approach to missile defense. First, the U.S. should shift its focus from ground-based long-range missile defense to the sea-based Aegis system. Since testing began in 2002, this system has proven more successful than its land-based cousin in defeating ballistic missiles. The prospective development of the SM-3 Block IIA missile system would significantly expand its strike capabilities to include long-range ICBMs, lessening the need for land installations. Aegis-based BMD is also more cost-effective than ground-based systems. On the diplomatic front, the shift would address Russian concerns about Western encroachment.
Second, the new administration should pursue a regional approach to missile defense. By working closely with our allies in Asia and Europe, the United States can achieve broader missile defense coverage and significantly defray the associated cost. Even more significantly, by seeking allies to work on the project, the Obama administration can begin to countermand the unilateralism of the Bush administration.Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to develop Japan’s indigenous Aegis missile defense system is an example of successful regionalization. Moving forward, there are indications that friendly governments from the Netherlands to Australia would be interested in partnering on similar programs.
The challenges that face missile defense should not impede further development. America’s scientists, politicians and strategic planners must think smarter and cheaper. Without these changes, the U.S. BMD program under the Obama administration will falter as under the Bush administration. This is a threat that U.S. in the long-run cannot afford.
If you made it through the whole damn thing here is your reward. I actually know the person who wrote # 20 this list.
-Evan
Unlike the Cold War, which pitted two highly centralized and technically equivalent countries against each other, the new conflict paradigm is characterized by uncertainty and uneven technology advancements. The emerging nuclear powers have unstable or remarkably byzantine systems of governance. Pakistan, while currently an ally of the U.S., faces grave instability and there is a significant threat that an Islamist government unfriendly to the West could rise to power. Kim Jung Il’s government in North Korea remains one of the world’s most enigmatic regimes and despite pledges to denuclearize has yet to do so. While Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, analysis indicates that with its uranium enrichment and ballistic missile programs continuing unabated there is a distinct possibility that the Obama administration will face a nuclear Iran. The prospect of an accidental or surprise launch is now more of a threat than ever before. In this context missile defense can provide much needed stability for the international system and security for American interests at home and abroad.
Beyond its functional capabilities, a viable missile defense program would force a significant shift in a hostile nuclear state’s political calculus. North Korea and Iran’s respective decisions to pursue nuclear weapons were as much political as strategic. Neither of these countries would be able to win a war against the United States and its allies even with a nuclear arsenal. Iran is motivated by a desire to reaffirm its position as a regional power and gain significant leverage against the U.S. to counter its increasing presence in the region. Missile defense can invalidate these political objectives, which would in turn help to reduce popular support for nuclear program in Iran, ideally forcing Iran back to the negotiating table. North Korea has moved toward denuclearization but in recent months progress has stalled. Increasing the legitimacy of the U.S. missile defense system in the region would ensure that North Korea does not go back on its commitment to give up its nuclear program and disincentivize Pyongyang’s advanced inter-continental ballistic missile program.
Despite the theoretical utility of enhancing America’s BMD capabilities, there are significant political, technical and financial impediments to complete implementation. Politically, the expansion of missile defense generates grave concern in Russia and China. Both countries see the expansion of U.S. BMD capabilities close to their borders as an offensive move and have responded with diplomatic bluster—in Russia’s case even the threat of attack. Technically there are concerns that America’s missile defense system has only been successful in carefully controlled tests, success that would not be replicated in the real world. Finally, critics argue that the limited success of America’s missile defense systems does not justify their exorbitant cost.
To address these concerns, the Obama administration must change America’s approach to missile defense. First, the U.S. should shift its focus from ground-based long-range missile defense to the sea-based Aegis system. Since testing began in 2002, this system has proven more successful than its land-based cousin in defeating ballistic missiles. The prospective development of the SM-3 Block IIA missile system would significantly expand its strike capabilities to include long-range ICBMs, lessening the need for land installations. Aegis-based BMD is also more cost-effective than ground-based systems. On the diplomatic front, the shift would address Russian concerns about Western encroachment.
Second, the new administration should pursue a regional approach to missile defense. By working closely with our allies in Asia and Europe, the United States can achieve broader missile defense coverage and significantly defray the associated cost. Even more significantly, by seeking allies to work on the project, the Obama administration can begin to countermand the unilateralism of the Bush administration.Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to develop Japan’s indigenous Aegis missile defense system is an example of successful regionalization. Moving forward, there are indications that friendly governments from the Netherlands to Australia would be interested in partnering on similar programs.
The challenges that face missile defense should not impede further development. America’s scientists, politicians and strategic planners must think smarter and cheaper. Without these changes, the U.S. BMD program under the Obama administration will falter as under the Bush administration. This is a threat that U.S. in the long-run cannot afford.
If you made it through the whole damn thing here is your reward. I actually know the person who wrote # 20 this list.
-Evan
Comments
Leave a Reply
Loading
