This proposal is essentially a call to revert to the strategy employed by the United States earlier in the war. Basically, the U.S. paid the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban, and early on promoted a war strategy of securing the major cities.
The Northern Alliance undoubtedly used American money to bribe warlords to join them, and then when Hamid Karzai came to power, he also used American money to buy support and create some appearance of stability.
This causes three main problems. First, the Taliban were never eradicated- they just fled to the mountains and rural areas to regroup and launch guerilla attacks.
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Third, the only way to fight the insurgency (rurally based) without a troop infusion is to increase air attacks. This strategy can at best "manage" the insurgency, and at worst strengthens it by infuriating the families of innocent villagers who will inevitably be killed in drone attacks.
One might argue then, as Evan has suggested, that the key is better intelligence- but there is no reason to think that our intelligence will suddenly improve in year 9 of the war in Afghanistan over the past eight. Furthermore, no amount of intelligence will ever make civilian casualties go away.
Thus, the correct military choice is rather clear- a massive influx of troops to secure populated areas and fight the Taliban with minimal civilian casualties. But the politics of this course of action is much more difficult- this strategy would mean more American money and more American casualties.
The real debate here is whether American interests in Afghanistan are commensurate with the effort required to build a stable government in Kabul that can control the entire country. And this is a monstrously difficult question to answer.
- Jon
Comments
Jon,
Thanks for the response. This is obviously a topic that you could write volumes of books on. Obviously, if the solution was simple then this would not be an issue as such.
It seems the real problem with any singularly focused Afghan strategy is that it ignores the source, Pakistan. Without operation in Pakistan or in coordination with Pakistan it seems that we are only putting a band-aid over a bullet hole. If the US is serious about eradicating al-Qai'da from the region, howc an that strategy not involve Pakistan? Pakistan may attack al-Qai'da cells that directly threaten Pakistan, but I remain unconvinced that Pakistan 's army intends to fight against al-Qai'da cells in Pakistan hostile to Afghanistan.
Sorry about the mixup. I didn't proof my last post. What I meant to ask was if the US is serious about eradicating al-Qai'da from the region, how does that strategy not involve Pakistan?
