It is right to be skeptical of the abstract slogans of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and the enthusiasms of those in the West who define success in Afghanistan through their own political-science terminology of legitimacy, rights, and development. The Soviet Union defeated itself in Afghanistan by demanding absurdly, that the country conform to its preconceived theories of revolution and state development. As the editors of a review of the Soviet war composed by the Russian general staff put it, "Despite the Soviet Union's penetration and lengthy experience in Afghanistan, their intelligence was poor and hampered by the need to explain events within the Marxist-Leninist framework. Consequently, the Soviets never fully understood the mujahideen opposition nor why many of their policies failed to work in Afghanistan.
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Comments
Do you guys think a duel strategy determined by whether the area is rural or urban would be best? It seems that holding areas where more Afghan citizens are concentrated makes sense strategically . In rural areas the best course seems to be to make deals (bribe) with local tribal chiefs to maintain some type of control structure in rural Afghanistan. In my mind, that would entail less ground troops in the rural areas and more surveillance from above.
Employing the surge throughout all of Afghanistan is unsustainable. Especially, when you factor in a grumpy American public who feels the cost of the war, but does not understand the benefits or consequences of abandoning Afghanistan. What are your thoughts?
From my perspective, our fundamental problem in Afghanistan is intelligence, or more correctly the lack there of.
Regardless of whether we choose to focus on consolidating urban gains or try to push back in the country side, we need to now when and how to adjust the strategy when the reality on the ground shifts.
To ensure we can implement either strategy, we must improve our ability to gather intelligence in Afghanistan.
