Pakistan Policy 10/30/2009
 Source: CFR.com In the continuing dialogue between PBOM and Garrett, I’ll address Pakistan policy. I prefer the term “policy” to “strategy.” It makes a clear distinction between our strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan vs our efforts to work with Pakistan. Thankfully, America does not occupy Pakistan and does not control its security services. Pakistan is a sovereign nation and it behooves us to remember this. With that in mind, my guiding principles for U.S. policy Pakistan are twofold: humility and a focus on popular opinion. Humility in the sense that Pakistan, like every other country, only takes actions that are in its perceived self-interest. America’s influence and aid dollars only go so far- the rules of state behavior still apply. A focus on Pakistani popular opinion is the second principle. In the long-term, generals and politicians need popular support to wage war. This is even more important when fighting a terrorist counter-insurgency. Terrorists are not fighting the army—they can never defeat an army in war. They are instead fighting against the will of the population to sacrifice their children and their money to the war effort. Click "Read More" to Continue ----> Traditionally, the various fundamentalist groups in Pakistan were not against the Pakistani state. They were focused primarily on India, and secondarily on worldwide jihad. When attacks were carried out in Pakistan, they were aimed at foreign interests—embassies, hotels, etc. As long as the fundamentalists kept focused on other targets, the Pakistanis themselves had no direct incentive to attack the fundamentalists. On the contrary, they had every incentive to maintain good relations with them for insurance against India and against an American failure in Afghanistan (which would presumably lead to a fundamentalist government in Kabul). Thus, for the Pakistani people, operations against the Pakistani fundamentalists felt like a fight for American interests, not their own. Nevertheless, Pakistan did, albeit half-heartedly, begin to attack the Pakistani Taliban. And over the past few years, the fundamentalists began to turn against the Pakistani state and directly attack Pakistani civilians. Now, Pakistanis are beginning to view the fundamentalists as their problem too—which they are—although still as one that was brought on by the Americans. So what more can the U.S. do to eradicate the fundamentalist sanctuary in Pakistan? In fact, the U.S. is probably already doing too much, and needs to be more humble. Drone attacks infuriate the Pakistani people (our second principle) and thus need to be used sparingly. America eventually had to roll back drone attacks in Afghanistan because of civilian outrage, and the same case will happen in Pakistan. Pakistani public opinion is moving swiftly in favor of attacking the fundamentalists, and America should avoid doing anything to compromise this trend. In fact, the best thing for America to do is to work hard on force reductions on the Pakistani/Indian border. India was heroic in its self-restraint after the Mumbai bombings. If India can reduce some of it forces on the shared border, Pakistan will be more able to shift its troops away from India and towards the Afghani border. Any battle for the Pakistani State to extend its writ over the tribal regions and control its border will be long and difficult. But considering the increasingly unbearable levels of terrorism in Pakistan, Islamabad’s calculus is changing. Still, what if Pakistan is unable (or unwilling) to control its tribal areas? Can America defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan without a secure Pakistani border? Perhaps. Turkey defeated the PKK despite a porous, mountainous border with Iraq that is also impassable during the winter. They bribed locals (village guards) and convinced the local population that harboring the PKK wasn’t in their interest. However, the Turkish-Iraqi border is much smaller than the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Turkey also used many tactics, such as clearing border towns, that America can’t use. Ultimately, the best that America can do in terms of Pakistan policy is to help relax tensions on the Indian-Pakistani border while carefully watching Pakistani popular opinion. Pakistan can only commit to fight this war if the Pakistani people are on board, and America can only secure the Afghani-Pakistani border if the Pakistan commits itself. The good news is that the fundamentalists will always discredit themselves in the end. America just needs to allow that to happen. - Jon CommentsGarrett Sat, 31 Oct 2009 12:46:03 Thanks for the insights Jon. Another great read. Correct me if I am wrong, but your conclusion seems to that what America must do is be patient with Pakistan. Jon Sun, 01 Nov 2009 07:12:25 Check out my post "What the Taliban Stand For." There I try to clarify what I mean. Leave a Reply | By Evan Tachovsky and Jon Friedman
|
RSS Feed