We haven't covered the Umar Farouk Abdulmutullab story here because it is being covered to death (is that inappropriate?) everywhere else. There simply is no classic profile for a terrorist-- if there was, then preventing terrorism wouldn't be so difficult. 

But the would-be underwear bomber does bring up an issue that I have thought a lot about: airport security. Unfortunately, many of the conspicuous changes to airport security since 9/11 have been farcical. Remember the ban on nail clippers? And now banning people from going to the bathroom during the last hour of flight? Are you serious? What does this mean for short flights? (more yellow stains...)

The cosmetic changes to TSA security are known as "security theater": they serve to make passengers feel safer but do little to make them actually safer. For years after 9/11, you could bring cigarette lighters on board (tobacco lobby). You can still bring unlimited amounts of liquid on board, provided that they are labeled "saline" (contact lens-people). And that swoosh that TSA officials put on your boarding pass before you enter security? It's as worthless as it looks. For a frightening expose of security theater, check Jeffrey Goldberg's piece in the Atlantic from last year. He repeatedly cleared security with terrorist paraphernalia, 24 oz of liquids, and fake tickets.

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Rather, the most significant changes since 9/11 were reinforcing the cockpit doors and the rise in passenger self-defense. In the pre-9/11 world of airplane hijacking, terrorists usually wanted to keep passengers alive to serve as bargaining chips. Thus, it was best to follow their demands and bargain later. But since suicide bombers have no real demands, but simply want to kill as many people as possible, there is no downside into attacking them onboard. This is what saved the passengers on Flight 253. Air marshals might also be helpful, although nobody knows how frequently they fly.

Hopefully, this recent debacle will spur the US gov't to take real actions:

First, take control of checking variants of terrorist lists with flight manifests. This is currently done by the airlines themselves.

Second, check IDs at the gate. Currently, your ID is only checked at security, where they don't scan the barcode. So, if you're on the no-fly list, you have your non-terrorist buddy buy a ticket, which is the point at which the lists are checked. Then, you make a fake boarding pass under your real name-- this is easy in the age of e-tickets. Then when you go to security, you can show your real ID with your fake pass. This gets swooshed. You go and copy that swoosh onto your real pass, which you use to enter the plane.

Third, tell civil libertarians to get a life. We need to use full body scanners that can reveal things hidden under their clothing. If people have a problem with that, there are other ways for them to travel. Your insecurity about your body is worthless if you are blown up in an airplane.

Also, everybody relax. Flying is still going to be much safer than driving to wherever you want to go.

- Jon