Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason's recent FP article is one of the most persuasive arguments against the AfPak surge I've read thus far. But the duo do make a serious error that I think needs to be addressed.

The authors claim that all members of Taliban are basically the same and their ties to Al-Qaeda cannot be severed: "The strategy's other component for dealing with the Taliban, "negotiating with moderates," is also ludicrous to anyone who is familiar with the insurgents. The Taliban are a virus. There is no one to negotiate with, and from their perspective, nothing to discuss."

If this were true, I would agree with Johnson and Mason's analysis that the road ahead in Afghanistan is one the US would be advised to avoid, but it isn't.

First, the Taliban is not a homogeneous organization; it never has been and never will be. Within the organization, individual leaders and sects differ significantly in regard to their motivations and strategy and power struggles are common.

Second, there are is a significant amount of evidence indicating that the link between the Taliban and Al Qaeda is more tenuous than previously assumed.  Take, for example, Mullah Omar's Eid ul Fitr statement in which he explained that the Taliban was interested in essentially going legit (i.e. withdrawing support for outside extremists, engaging the West and the East, etc.). Al Qaeda's response was particularly harsh. A spokesman called Omar's speech a "dangerous utterance" and demanded he take it back.

The Taliban share little if any of Al Qaeda's zeal for universal Islamic governance. Instead, they seek greater national and local control in Afghanistan. While not ideal, the most realistic prospect for long term stability in Afghanistan is integrating Taliban members into the Afghan government. For details check out Fotini Christia and Michael Semple's recent article in Foreign Affairs here.