I'd answer the question like this: Compared to 10 years ago Turkey is more confident. At the beginning of AKP's rule, Turkish foreign policy amounted basically to acting like a precocious teenager in response to the US decision to invade Iraq. Turkish foreign policy has since matured greatly.
AKP deputy chairman for external affairs Suat Kiniklioglu's recent op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor on the diplomatic spat between Israel and Turkey is a prime example of this confidence. Kiniklioglu argues that it is time for Israel to deal with the fact that Turkish foreign policy has shifted and understand that this doesn't have to be the end of relations between the two countries:
Despite some Israeli and American efforts to paint Turkey’s objections to Israeli policies as “anti-Semitic,” people in the business of statecraft understand very well where Turkey is coming from.
They recognize that disagreements between Turkey and Israel are likely to continue provided there is no recognizable change in issues such as improving the humanitarian situation in Gaza. They also recognize the complete and immediate freezing of settlements and the overall posture of Israel toward the peace process – if one can still talk about such a process.
I remember vividly the days when the United States criticized Turkey for engaging with Syria at a time when Washington and the Europeans were trying to isolate Syria. Today we see a full reversal of US and European policies; both the US and Europe now recognize that engaging with Syria is the right course of action.
Then, Turkey’s views on the Middle East were shunned and disregarded – in my view, primarily due to the inability to make the mental shift about Turkey and its new posture.
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i might argue that turkey as a country is more religious (importantly, this does not mean more spiritual). my point is that when religious movements become more coherent, generating books for people to read, events to attend and networks to engage with, there IS a rise in "religious" people that would self-identify as such (nurcu, fetullahci).
but i think the answer of confidence is spot-on, and often missed, making it all the more important.
I think that religious movements in Turkey were always relatively coherent. The problem is that they were isolated from (or forced out of) the public sphere.
You are correct Evan. The Turkish modernization has touched little and done little to the Turkish countryside. It has just repressed it. Turkey has always been a religious country, we just thought we have become a secular overnight by the wisdom of Ataturk and the rest of the population would follow his wisdom and become secular overnight.
The emergence of Turkish Islamic movements was only possible because of privatization and liberalization after the 1980 coup. Islamic criticism of Turkey's path as set by Ataturk is not new, and neither are Fethullah's ideas (they are mostly Said Nursi's).
The coherence that Char is referring to is perhaps more related to the institutional development of Islamists in Turkey. This was only possible after the privatization of the economy in the 1980s made way for Islamist patterns of consumption, Islamist television and media, and the Fethullahci schools.
Fethullah's organization became a way for socio-economic advancement out of the disadvantaged "periphery" to the "center" (in Serif Mardin's formulation)--through Islamically funded education, exam-prep centers, dormitories, businesses, etc. This was simply not possible prior to 1980.
In a related note, it is interesting to recognize that the difference between successful and unsuccessful Islamist groups in Turkey have been their adherence to liberal economics. The Turkish state seems to have resigned itself to permitting Islamist groups that accept free markets. Ozal helped to fuse together some of these political elements in the late 1980s, although some might argue that this goes back to the Menderes period.
These Islamists are much more moderate because they benefit from the status quo. They also gain Western backing. In this way, the Erdogan has been able to survive politically in ways that would have been impossible Erbakan-types.
Spot on Jon.
Also the funds collected from the Turkish gasterarbeiters in Germany has helped them financially to fix their muscles.
