Joel Klein argues that Obama, rather than sending George Mitchell to try to go straight for an Arab-Israeli peace agreement, should have gone for the more attainable goal of solving the Gaza crisis. He makes a persuasive argument:

Israel has suggested three conditions for lifting the siege to Hamas, which controls Gaza: no more rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, no arms smuggling into Gaza and the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas in June 2006. The rocket attacks have pretty much stopped and the arms smuggling — I am told — is an issue that can be negotiated, but the fate of Shalit has been an insane sticking point.  

It might have been more profitable for Obama to have concentrated on trying to fix Gaza first [instead of trying to go stright for the grand peace agreement]. It was the immediate crisis when he took office, and it remains so. It is difficult to solve, but not impossible. Success would set a predicate: the Administration could be relied upon to work hard, and pragmatically, on vexing issues along the way to an ultimate deal. It could be trusted by all sides. 

That possibility still exists, although senior Administration officials seem unduly pessimistic about the chances of success. And there is a big obstacle here: the best way to resolve Gaza is for the U.S. to quietly convince Hamas that if it gives up Shalit — a huge issue for the Israelis — the U.S. would work to persuade Israel to lift the siege. The trouble is, the U.S. won't talk to Hamas. But if Obama's policy really is about engaging our enemies, he needs to engage Hamas — and Hamas needs to respond. Quickly.