The new agreement is actually a mixed bag. On the one hand, the decision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons should help to defuse tensions between Russia and the US. On the other hand, it does not solve the more pressing issue of disarming Iran’s nuclear program. Unless the two sides find some consensus on the proliferation of weapons technology, this accord will quickly become an after-thought.
Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council presents the biggest impediment to applying sanctions against Tehran. Not only can Moscow scuttle a unified resolution, but it can also continue to supply Iran with equipment and know-how even if other countries proceed. A defection by Russia would also provide nations that have reservations about penalizing Iran with political cover to maintain relations with the Islamic republic. Each of these outcomes would render any sanctions toothless and allow the Ahmadinejad regime to carry on developing its weapons program.
Why does Russia want another nuclear power in its backyard? Most of the Kremlin’s reluctance to act is motivated by domestic considerations. Russians value their country’s independence in international relations and resent its diminished status. Nearly sixty percent of people, for example, "deeply regret" the collapse of the USSR.
To legitimize its rule in this context, the regime engages in great-power politics and tries to set Russia up as a counterweight to American hegemony. This means that an alliance with pariah states such as Venezuela or Iran has value beyond the basic economic subtext. It also means that Russian elites see geopolitics as a zero-sum game based on self-interest and prestige. Their determination to protect Iran, in other words, has more to do with mobilizing domestic support and establishing a prominent role for Russia ‘between the West and the world’ than any worries about the Iranian people’s welfare.
Unfortunately, there is little the US can do to counteract this attitude. Trying to force Russia to take action will feed anti-American sentiments and make the Putin regime more recalcitrant. Yet conceding to Moscow’s demands will only embolden it.
A famous Russian proverb says that if you ‘give a finger, your arm will get bitten off.’ That is probably not what Mr. Obama expected when he talked about extending a hand.
-Joe
Comments
Russia is certainly an impediment to sanctions on Iran, but isn't China at least as big of an impediment, if not bigger?
Most of Iran's nuclear equipment and expertise comes from Russia. Plus, China has traditionally been very reluctant to veto on its own. Without Russia's support, Beijing might abstain. Oil obviously complicates things. But if Russia was on board, it could off-set any loss in supply to China from Iran.
Perhaps China would abstain, it's certainly a plausible outcome. Much less likely is that it would actually stop doing business with Iran. I think China would do the opposite: move to offset reductions in FDI in Iran.
This is pure speculation, but I however do sense that China would be more likely than ever to act alone at this point, there seems to be a qualitative change in its behavior since the Beijing Olympics.
And while from a practical standpoint Russia could certainly supply enough oil to China in the short term, it would be hard for China to resist the opportunity to snatch up oil contacts in Iran for the long term. It would have virtually no foreign competitors for developing Iran's oil fields, something it can never do in Russia.
