Response to "A new START?" 03/31/2010
Guest blogger Joe Pinilla recently published an interesting piece on the new START agreement between Russia and the US and the ongoing crisis in Iran. In my view Joe got some things very right and others very wrong. In the spirit of healthy debate I offer this response:
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
First, Joe overstates the extent of both Russian nuclear and diplomatic assistance to Iran. Let’s start with the nuclear bit. Russia is not a primary supplier of nuclear material and knowledge to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Russian nuclear assistance has largely been limited to the Bushehr project—a light water reactor that is not a part of Iran’s weapons program—and throughout the construction process Russian nuclear officials have cooperated with IAEA inspectors.
The most pernicious element of Russia’s relationship with Iran has actually been the sale of traditional arms and technology (i.e. the sale of the 9K331 Tor surface-to-air missile system in 2005, the possible sale of the S-300 surface-to-air system, and Russia’s continued assistance for Iran’s Shahab-3 program). What has motivates Russia to continue selling arms and technology to Iran? In a word, money. When you track the trajectory of Russian-Iranian arms trade the one constant that emerges irrespective of politics (domestic or otherwise) is the simple reality that when the Iranians have money, Russia sells and when they don’t Russia doesn’t.
As far as the diplomatic relations between the two countries are concerned, Russia’s support for Iran has been far from constant. In March 2007 and March 2008 Russia joined the US in voting for increased sanctions against Iran (UNSCR 1747 and UNSCR 1803 respectively). Why did Russia join the West in 2007 and 2008? The answer is simple: A successful Iranian nuclear program is not in Russia’s interest. Iran is simply a strategic pawn in Russia’s larger game with the West. This means that while Russia certainly isn't leading the charge for punitive measures against Iran, it is not the greatest impediment for new sanctions. That dubious honor is clearly China's.
Overall, there are three factors that dictate whether Russia plays ball on Iran or not:
Read more after the jump --->
1. Russia’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear progress. When Russian decision makers decided to joined the US in voting for increased sanction they did so because they were honestly concerned about Iran’s progress. For example, the month before Russia voted for UNSCR 1747 Russian National Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov presented Iran with an ultimatum: Iran must stop its domestic enrichment activities at the Natanz facility or Russia would vote for the sanctions.
2. Economics. In the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, Iran has been somewhat of a cash cow for Russia. Russia has sold billions of dollars of civilian nuclear technology to the Iranians and is intimately involved in Iran’s oil and natural gas sectors. It’s easy to conflate Russia’s attempts to protect its interests in Iran, something it does regularly, with Russia’s attempts to protect Iran, which it rarely does.
3. The state of Russian-American relations. When things are bad between Moscow and Washington, Russia loves to pull the Iran card both to express discontent and to extract concessions from Washington. As Joe correctly noted, Russia’s leaders also regularly used Iran to reaffirm the vitality and independence of Russia’s foreign policy.
So that brings us to where Joe started: How does the new START agreement factor into the whole diplomatic mess? In my assessment it will help in two key ways: First, by improving relations between the Russia and the US, and second by affirming to the international community that denuclearization is still a priority for two countries that together hold 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
For more background on Russian-Iranian relations, arms trade and the rest, check out a paper I wrote on the subject last year here.
-Evan
2. Economics. In the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, Iran has been somewhat of a cash cow for Russia. Russia has sold billions of dollars of civilian nuclear technology to the Iranians and is intimately involved in Iran’s oil and natural gas sectors. It’s easy to conflate Russia’s attempts to protect its interests in Iran, something it does regularly, with Russia’s attempts to protect Iran, which it rarely does.
3. The state of Russian-American relations. When things are bad between Moscow and Washington, Russia loves to pull the Iran card both to express discontent and to extract concessions from Washington. As Joe correctly noted, Russia’s leaders also regularly used Iran to reaffirm the vitality and independence of Russia’s foreign policy.
So that brings us to where Joe started: How does the new START agreement factor into the whole diplomatic mess? In my assessment it will help in two key ways: First, by improving relations between the Russia and the US, and second by affirming to the international community that denuclearization is still a priority for two countries that together hold 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
For more background on Russian-Iranian relations, arms trade and the rest, check out a paper I wrote on the subject last year here.
-Evan
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