An Afghan Solution? 07/12/2010
If only he were still around
The period between the Soviet Union’s withdrawal and the rise of the Taliban is a forgotten section of Afghan history. Most Western scholars and policy makers glaze over it, preferring either to focus on the collapse of the USSR or the emergence of political Islam in Central Asia. According to Nikolas Gvosdev, however, the Najibullah government offers several vital lessons for the US in Afghanistan:
First, it highlights the strategic importance of co-option. When the Soviets pulled out in 1989, the expectation was that their proxy state would quickly collapse. Instead, its leader, Mohammed Najibullah, managed to ward off the mujahedeen and stay in power for another three years. One reason for this was that he exploited tribal and regional connections to his advantage. Militarily, for example, the government allowed regional leaders and ex-mujahadeen members to form their own militias and join the regular army. At the same time, Najibullah reinstated Islam as the state religion and put many prominent mullahs on the state’s payroll. These pragmatic changes helped to legitimize the regime in the eyes of its people while strengthening its hold on power.
Najibullah’s administration also demonstrates the value of patronage. Under his rule, the government in Kabul distributed Soviet largess to a nexus of clients in exchange for loyalty. Along the country's supply routes, for instance, he offered local elders a percentage of the goods if they agreed to prevent mujahedeen attacks. Such a connection allowed the state to use external support without becoming tainted as a puppet regime. Given that Afghanistan is proud of its status as the ‘graveyard of empires,’ the impression that the central government was allocating money on its own was crucial.
Finally, this regime serves as a reminder of the importance of political leadership. Unlike President Karzai, Najibullah was able to gain credibility among all of Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups with his combination of efficacy and flexibility. He also excelled at balancing external and local interests. In short, he was the ideal type of leader for post-conflict Afghanistan—a real irony considering that American and Pakistani pressure was instrumental in his eventual fall. Unless the US can find another dynamic leader like him, both the Afghan state and the coalition’s war effort will deteriorate and eventually fail. If that happens, the state's current leaders will most likely join Najibullah as victims of a make-shift Taliban gallows.
First, it highlights the strategic importance of co-option. When the Soviets pulled out in 1989, the expectation was that their proxy state would quickly collapse. Instead, its leader, Mohammed Najibullah, managed to ward off the mujahedeen and stay in power for another three years. One reason for this was that he exploited tribal and regional connections to his advantage. Militarily, for example, the government allowed regional leaders and ex-mujahadeen members to form their own militias and join the regular army. At the same time, Najibullah reinstated Islam as the state religion and put many prominent mullahs on the state’s payroll. These pragmatic changes helped to legitimize the regime in the eyes of its people while strengthening its hold on power.
Najibullah’s administration also demonstrates the value of patronage. Under his rule, the government in Kabul distributed Soviet largess to a nexus of clients in exchange for loyalty. Along the country's supply routes, for instance, he offered local elders a percentage of the goods if they agreed to prevent mujahedeen attacks. Such a connection allowed the state to use external support without becoming tainted as a puppet regime. Given that Afghanistan is proud of its status as the ‘graveyard of empires,’ the impression that the central government was allocating money on its own was crucial.
Finally, this regime serves as a reminder of the importance of political leadership. Unlike President Karzai, Najibullah was able to gain credibility among all of Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups with his combination of efficacy and flexibility. He also excelled at balancing external and local interests. In short, he was the ideal type of leader for post-conflict Afghanistan—a real irony considering that American and Pakistani pressure was instrumental in his eventual fall. Unless the US can find another dynamic leader like him, both the Afghan state and the coalition’s war effort will deteriorate and eventually fail. If that happens, the state's current leaders will most likely join Najibullah as victims of a make-shift Taliban gallows.
Comments
Evan
07/13/2010 02:30
Good stuff. Two side points:
First, like you mentioned is that Karzai isn't Najibullah. Karzai has shown that he is far more likely to engage in gross nepotism than any sort of strategic patronage. The big problem is, I don't see any potential Najibullah-like replacements on the horizon.
Second, Najibullah's power lasted only as long as the Soviet money did. America's financial support for Afghanistan is likely to last a bit longer than the Soviet's did, but it will end. The implications for Karzai aren't particularly promising.
Jon
07/13/2010 03:49
Yeah this is really interesting. Seems to reinforce the ultimate importance of Pakistani support.
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