Soviet Lessons 07/21/2010
Don't go that way
Drawing parallels between the Soviet and American occupations of Afghanistan has become a cottage industry in recent years. Yet most policy makers and observers miss the actual convergence between these operations in all the superficial talk of ‘the graveyard of empires.’ If the US expects to avoid a disastrous withdrawal and another civil war, it urgently needs to re-examine the lessons of the USSR’s experience in Afghanistan.
The overlap between the two cases begins with tactics. For one thing, the Soviets repeatedly bombed the borderlands of Pakistan, believing that these attacks would deny their enemies a sanctuary and so weaken the insurgency. For another, they tried to win hearts and minds by installing a ‘progressive’ regime based on Western (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) principles. That both of these attempts failed miserably suggests that neither the coalition’s efforts to construct another alien political system nor its moves to destroy Taliban resistance are likely to succeed. Rather, the US should convince Kabul to declare a general amnesty and form a coalition government.
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The overlap between the two cases begins with tactics. For one thing, the Soviets repeatedly bombed the borderlands of Pakistan, believing that these attacks would deny their enemies a sanctuary and so weaken the insurgency. For another, they tried to win hearts and minds by installing a ‘progressive’ regime based on Western (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) principles. That both of these attempts failed miserably suggests that neither the coalition’s efforts to construct another alien political system nor its moves to destroy Taliban resistance are likely to succeed. Rather, the US should convince Kabul to declare a general amnesty and form a coalition government.
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The USSR’s failure nevertheless offers some hope. Unlike American forces, the Soviets were fighting a proxy war in which outside powers contributed over $48 billion in weaponry to the mujahedeen. They also managed to maintain a loyal regime even after they had deliberately ‘rubbleized’ the Afghan countryside and then fled. For the US, this counter example should provide confidence in its ability to achieve a negotiated settlement.
The big remaining question is whether or not the Obama administration will plot the right course. On Monday, it refused Hamid Karzai’s request to remove a Taliban leader from the UN terrorist blacklist, saying that the US ‘had red lines’ that it would not cross. It also continues to channel only 5% of its aid budget through the central administration. These decisions not only undercut the Karzai government’s already weakened legitimacy, but also give the Taliban even more incentive to wait for US’s eventual withdraw before it ‘deals’ with Kabul. As Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal put it, “if the Afghan government is trusted by the international community but not by its own people, then [it is] in trouble.”
The big remaining question is whether or not the Obama administration will plot the right course. On Monday, it refused Hamid Karzai’s request to remove a Taliban leader from the UN terrorist blacklist, saying that the US ‘had red lines’ that it would not cross. It also continues to channel only 5% of its aid budget through the central administration. These decisions not only undercut the Karzai government’s already weakened legitimacy, but also give the Taliban even more incentive to wait for US’s eventual withdraw before it ‘deals’ with Kabul. As Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal put it, “if the Afghan government is trusted by the international community but not by its own people, then [it is] in trouble.”
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