Since August 2008, the international community has largely forgotten about the five-day war between Russia and Georgia. Other issues—including a potential Iranian bomb, a financial meltdown, and increasing chaos in Afghanistan—have made the dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia seem rather unimportant. While few countries are willing to recognize these enclaves’ claims to sovereignty, most are content to live with the new status quo.
This war, however, did not actually solve anything. Russia failed to achieve its goals of getting rid of the Saakashvili administration and removing the US from its 'near abroad.' Nor has the Kremlin been able to convince even traditional allies like Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine to side with the break-away provinces. The fact that Nauru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are the only countries to open formal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia makes the whole exercise seem like something of a joke.
Georgia, meanwhile, is still reeling from the shock of Russia's invasion. It lost two territories which it considers part of its state and had always hoped to reintegrate. Worse, its complaints to the UN, OSCE, and US have fallen on deaf ears. By continuing to rail against Moscow’s neo-imperialism, President Saakashivili has just confirmed the Russian caricature of him as ‘Crazy Misha.’
Will these two sides ever reach an agreement?
Dmitri Trenin, the head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, thinks that they can. In an article published in the Moscow Times, he argues that Georgia should recognize Abkhazia’s sovereignty in exchange for control of the Gali province (which is almost entirely inhabited by ethnic Georgians). At the same time, he believes that South Ossetia should give up its aspirations for formal independence (which are 'unrealistic') and adopt an ‘Andorran model’ of autonomy with a special security role for Russia. These compromises would allow the Georgian state to engage in nation-building and improve its relations with its northern neighbor, while giving the Ossetians and Abkhazians the recognition that they so desperately crave. Such a deal would, admittedly, force the Georgian side to make most of the painful concessions. But Trenin maintains that any kind of resolution is better for Georgia than a frozen conflict along the lines of Cyprus.
Ghia Nodia, a professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, rejects this proposal out of hand. First, he points out that no Georgian leader could survive politically if he/she agreed to these terms. Second, he suggests that Trenin is imagining a Russia that is “capable of genuinely recognizing Georgia's right to choose its own government and its own political course,” when such a state does not exist. Nodia’s point is that Putin and Medvedev are just as much of an obstacle to an agreement as Saakashivili is.
Unfortunately, this more pessimistic view is probably correct. Neither Georgia nor Russia has shown any willingness to compromise on the fundamental issues. Having a bogeyman next door is simply too politically useful to lose it by making peace.
This war, however, did not actually solve anything. Russia failed to achieve its goals of getting rid of the Saakashvili administration and removing the US from its 'near abroad.' Nor has the Kremlin been able to convince even traditional allies like Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine to side with the break-away provinces. The fact that Nauru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua are the only countries to open formal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia makes the whole exercise seem like something of a joke.
Georgia, meanwhile, is still reeling from the shock of Russia's invasion. It lost two territories which it considers part of its state and had always hoped to reintegrate. Worse, its complaints to the UN, OSCE, and US have fallen on deaf ears. By continuing to rail against Moscow’s neo-imperialism, President Saakashivili has just confirmed the Russian caricature of him as ‘Crazy Misha.’
Will these two sides ever reach an agreement?
Dmitri Trenin, the head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, thinks that they can. In an article published in the Moscow Times, he argues that Georgia should recognize Abkhazia’s sovereignty in exchange for control of the Gali province (which is almost entirely inhabited by ethnic Georgians). At the same time, he believes that South Ossetia should give up its aspirations for formal independence (which are 'unrealistic') and adopt an ‘Andorran model’ of autonomy with a special security role for Russia. These compromises would allow the Georgian state to engage in nation-building and improve its relations with its northern neighbor, while giving the Ossetians and Abkhazians the recognition that they so desperately crave. Such a deal would, admittedly, force the Georgian side to make most of the painful concessions. But Trenin maintains that any kind of resolution is better for Georgia than a frozen conflict along the lines of Cyprus.
Ghia Nodia, a professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, rejects this proposal out of hand. First, he points out that no Georgian leader could survive politically if he/she agreed to these terms. Second, he suggests that Trenin is imagining a Russia that is “capable of genuinely recognizing Georgia's right to choose its own government and its own political course,” when such a state does not exist. Nodia’s point is that Putin and Medvedev are just as much of an obstacle to an agreement as Saakashivili is.
Unfortunately, this more pessimistic view is probably correct. Neither Georgia nor Russia has shown any willingness to compromise on the fundamental issues. Having a bogeyman next door is simply too politically useful to lose it by making peace.
