The Armored Constitution of Turkey 09/01/2010
Turkish Officers Seize the State in 1960
From the introduction to my master's thesis:
Turkey is a difficult country to handle in the comparative political context. Its modern founders built it to resemble Europe, yet its population is Muslim, and it did not participate in World War II—the event central to shaping modern Europe. It is geographically located in the Middle East, yet it is democratic, resource poor, and lacks a colonial history. It is ethno-linguistically Central Asian, yet it has no experience of communist domination. For these reasons and more, Samuel Huntington labeled Turkey the “prototypical torn country,” unclear of where it belongs in the world order. Ernest Gellner, similarly bewildered, called Turkey’s comparative political development “an exception…profoundly eccentric” in which “the army, the guardian of this new democratic tradition, allows free elections to take place.”
Indeed, Turkey’s Armed Forces are an anomaly both in the historical record and in their geographical region. Its officers have deposed four governments in the past fifty years, yet after every coup the military has returned power to civilians through free elections. In none of these cases was the army forced to concede power because of mismanagement, popular unrest, or military defeat—it returned power because of its commitment to democratic government. Is such a system possible in a democracy?
My paper goes on to suggest a new model of analyzing the Turkish military's role in politics--looking at the Turkish military as an "armored constitution." Basically, the constitution that Atatürk promulgated in 1924--Turkey's first constitution--created a completely unworkable system. At the same time, Turkey never developed new, legitimate, civilian institutions after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
The military stepped in to fill the void, acting as both a constitutional court and a head of state in uniform. It has routinely intervened through coups to change the political system and try to make Turkish politics work, while protecting against a slide into anarchy and/or extremism. I'm not trying to justify military interventionism--a real, legitimate constitution would be much better. But without such a military, it is likely that Turkey would be much worse off--the identity of the state remains contested, as does its contract with its citizens. Thus, military interventionism is not the cause of Turkey's traditional political dysfunction, but is rather a symptom. If you're interested in the argument, feel free to download the whole thesis and let me know what you think.
Jon
Turkey is a difficult country to handle in the comparative political context. Its modern founders built it to resemble Europe, yet its population is Muslim, and it did not participate in World War II—the event central to shaping modern Europe. It is geographically located in the Middle East, yet it is democratic, resource poor, and lacks a colonial history. It is ethno-linguistically Central Asian, yet it has no experience of communist domination. For these reasons and more, Samuel Huntington labeled Turkey the “prototypical torn country,” unclear of where it belongs in the world order. Ernest Gellner, similarly bewildered, called Turkey’s comparative political development “an exception…profoundly eccentric” in which “the army, the guardian of this new democratic tradition, allows free elections to take place.”
Indeed, Turkey’s Armed Forces are an anomaly both in the historical record and in their geographical region. Its officers have deposed four governments in the past fifty years, yet after every coup the military has returned power to civilians through free elections. In none of these cases was the army forced to concede power because of mismanagement, popular unrest, or military defeat—it returned power because of its commitment to democratic government. Is such a system possible in a democracy?
My paper goes on to suggest a new model of analyzing the Turkish military's role in politics--looking at the Turkish military as an "armored constitution." Basically, the constitution that Atatürk promulgated in 1924--Turkey's first constitution--created a completely unworkable system. At the same time, Turkey never developed new, legitimate, civilian institutions after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
The military stepped in to fill the void, acting as both a constitutional court and a head of state in uniform. It has routinely intervened through coups to change the political system and try to make Turkish politics work, while protecting against a slide into anarchy and/or extremism. I'm not trying to justify military interventionism--a real, legitimate constitution would be much better. But without such a military, it is likely that Turkey would be much worse off--the identity of the state remains contested, as does its contract with its citizens. Thus, military interventionism is not the cause of Turkey's traditional political dysfunction, but is rather a symptom. If you're interested in the argument, feel free to download the whole thesis and let me know what you think.
Jon
| the_armored_constitution.pdf |
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