Moqtada al-Sadr: Not the guy you want staffing your ministry of the interior
Although nobody is really paying attention, the news from Iraq looks very bleak: Hundreds of members of the Awakening Council—Sunni insurgents paid to renounce al-Qaeda and join the Americans—have defected back to al-Qaeda over the past few months. The Awakening council, started in 2006, combined with “the surge” to bring stability to Iraq over the past couple of years.
Sunnis have been on edge over the past 6 months, as Iraq’s ruling Shia elite has done everything possible to block Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya party from taking power after winning the last elections. News of a supposed Iran-brokered deal for a new government, led by the incumbent al-Maliki and supported by factions loyal to the firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have only made things worse. Lastly, this coalition will also have to include the Kurds in order to move forward, another group with interests inimical to Sunni Arabs.
For those that remember, a Shia-Kurdish coalition headed up Iraq’s first post-Coalition Provisional Authority (i.e. Paul Bremer) government after the Sunni Arabs boycotted elections. In other words, we are back to square one—with the Shia in a marriage of convenience with the Kurds, and the Sunni Arabs, left out of elite politics, taking to arms. Last time, this situation almost led to a civil war.
A Shia-Kurdish coalition will never deliver a stable Iraq. The Shia and the Kurds are two minorities in a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. The only option for the Shia central government is to ally instead with Iran—a nightmare for both Sunni Arabs and America. Meanwhile, Kurds will use an unstable Iraq to agitate for more power/independence for the Kurdistan region, further increasing Iraq’s centrifugal forces.
The addition of Sadr makes things worse. It’s not clear what Sadr’s convictions are, or if he even has any. He became a vehemently opponent of al-Maliki, his apparent new partner, after the Iraqi army quashed Sadr’s paramilitary forces in 2008. He tries to portray himself as an Iraqi nationalist, but he has spent the past few years living in Iran.
What is clear is that Sadr is a populist who deeply despises the United States, and is hated by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. He is poised to claim at least one of the security-related government ministries as part of the deal for joining the coalition, and he wants to incorporate his followers—who aspire to be like Hezbollah—into the national army. The last time he had significant power in Iraq, before the surge, he was a main contributor to the religious thuggery that reigned in parts of Baghdad and southern Iraq.
The United States is set to leave in December 2011. If I were a betting man, I would not be betting on Iraq’s future.
Sunnis have been on edge over the past 6 months, as Iraq’s ruling Shia elite has done everything possible to block Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya party from taking power after winning the last elections. News of a supposed Iran-brokered deal for a new government, led by the incumbent al-Maliki and supported by factions loyal to the firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have only made things worse. Lastly, this coalition will also have to include the Kurds in order to move forward, another group with interests inimical to Sunni Arabs.
For those that remember, a Shia-Kurdish coalition headed up Iraq’s first post-Coalition Provisional Authority (i.e. Paul Bremer) government after the Sunni Arabs boycotted elections. In other words, we are back to square one—with the Shia in a marriage of convenience with the Kurds, and the Sunni Arabs, left out of elite politics, taking to arms. Last time, this situation almost led to a civil war.
A Shia-Kurdish coalition will never deliver a stable Iraq. The Shia and the Kurds are two minorities in a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. The only option for the Shia central government is to ally instead with Iran—a nightmare for both Sunni Arabs and America. Meanwhile, Kurds will use an unstable Iraq to agitate for more power/independence for the Kurdistan region, further increasing Iraq’s centrifugal forces.
The addition of Sadr makes things worse. It’s not clear what Sadr’s convictions are, or if he even has any. He became a vehemently opponent of al-Maliki, his apparent new partner, after the Iraqi army quashed Sadr’s paramilitary forces in 2008. He tries to portray himself as an Iraqi nationalist, but he has spent the past few years living in Iran.
What is clear is that Sadr is a populist who deeply despises the United States, and is hated by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. He is poised to claim at least one of the security-related government ministries as part of the deal for joining the coalition, and he wants to incorporate his followers—who aspire to be like Hezbollah—into the national army. The last time he had significant power in Iraq, before the surge, he was a main contributor to the religious thuggery that reigned in parts of Baghdad and southern Iraq.
The United States is set to leave in December 2011. If I were a betting man, I would not be betting on Iraq’s future.
