Japan surrenders to American occupation in 1945, aboard the USS Missouri
Is it possible for the U.S. to invade an authoritarian state and install a prosperous democracy? The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq make this one of the most pertinent questions of our time.
Proponents of transformative American power typically cite the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan to show that America’s forays into nation-building do not constitute folly. Rather, if the American missions to install democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan fail, it willl be because of a lack of will, they argue. After all, both Germany and Japan were a complete mess in 1945, and Japanese society was at least as unintelligible to Americans then as Arab culture is today. Yet, the American occupations transformed both former autocracies into prosperous, pro-Western democracies.
Since I recently wrote a very bearish piece on Iraq, I feel the need to refute this (admittedly seductive) argument, which for simplicity I will confine to Iraq. There are three main reasons why the occupations of Germany and Japan were different: total wars made insurgencies unthinkable, they didn't really require "nation-building", and both states feared the Soviet Union far more than they feared America.
The occupations of Japan and Germany, first of all, came after total wars that involved entire societies, exhausting entire populations. As a result, although the wars were far more difficult, the result was unambiguous defeat.
In Iraq, the U.S. fought a regime associated with the Sunni Arab minority. The country did not fight together—if it can be considered to have really fought at all. Thus, large elements or Iraq society retained the will and capacity to fight insurgencies.
This brings us to the second point. The occupations of Germany and Japan did not require nation-building. Corporate German and Japanese identities were already extremely strong, and, as a tragic result of war, consolidated. Indeed, the Allied forces were more concerned that Germany might rebuild centralized power too quickly. Americans made concerted efforts to strengthen German regional identities against Germany national identity, and to hitch West Germany economically to France in what became the European Union.
In Japan, the Americans allowed Emperor Hirohito to stay in power, a longsighted concession that conferred legitimacy onto the post-occupation regime.
The most important difference, however, was the presence of a shared external threat. Nothing turns enemies into friends faster than a common enemy. Germany, Japan, and the US all faced the same existential threat of Soviet communism. So, de-Nazification didn't have to work any better than de-Baathification (and it didn't). The important issue was that the German and Japanese needed the United States more than the United States needed either of them.
For Germany the threat was clear—Soviet troops occupied East Germany, with tanks and nukes facing west.
Japan had historically clashed with Russia over control of northeast Asia, fighting a war in 1905-1906. Japan won the war, sparking a revolution that marked the beginning of the end for the Tsarist regime. After WWII, turning against America again was simply too dangerous, as powerful, Soviet-backed communist movements in Korea, China, and Indochina encircled Japan.
Neither the Iraqi people, nor the Afghanis for that matter, share with America a common and clear existential enemy. US failure in Iraq or Afghanistan will not result in foreign communist domination. Indeed, its not clear that either local population sees a clear stake in American success. That’s the real reason why America's recent occupation regimes are not comparable to those of yesteryear.
- Jon
P.S. If you want a better comparison for Iraq, consider the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, another invasion that was the unlikely result of a surprise attack. (and in the case of the U.S.S. Maine, the conspiracy theorists actually have a good argument)
Proponents of transformative American power typically cite the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan to show that America’s forays into nation-building do not constitute folly. Rather, if the American missions to install democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan fail, it willl be because of a lack of will, they argue. After all, both Germany and Japan were a complete mess in 1945, and Japanese society was at least as unintelligible to Americans then as Arab culture is today. Yet, the American occupations transformed both former autocracies into prosperous, pro-Western democracies.
Since I recently wrote a very bearish piece on Iraq, I feel the need to refute this (admittedly seductive) argument, which for simplicity I will confine to Iraq. There are three main reasons why the occupations of Germany and Japan were different: total wars made insurgencies unthinkable, they didn't really require "nation-building", and both states feared the Soviet Union far more than they feared America.
The occupations of Japan and Germany, first of all, came after total wars that involved entire societies, exhausting entire populations. As a result, although the wars were far more difficult, the result was unambiguous defeat.
In Iraq, the U.S. fought a regime associated with the Sunni Arab minority. The country did not fight together—if it can be considered to have really fought at all. Thus, large elements or Iraq society retained the will and capacity to fight insurgencies.
This brings us to the second point. The occupations of Germany and Japan did not require nation-building. Corporate German and Japanese identities were already extremely strong, and, as a tragic result of war, consolidated. Indeed, the Allied forces were more concerned that Germany might rebuild centralized power too quickly. Americans made concerted efforts to strengthen German regional identities against Germany national identity, and to hitch West Germany economically to France in what became the European Union.
In Japan, the Americans allowed Emperor Hirohito to stay in power, a longsighted concession that conferred legitimacy onto the post-occupation regime.
The most important difference, however, was the presence of a shared external threat. Nothing turns enemies into friends faster than a common enemy. Germany, Japan, and the US all faced the same existential threat of Soviet communism. So, de-Nazification didn't have to work any better than de-Baathification (and it didn't). The important issue was that the German and Japanese needed the United States more than the United States needed either of them.
For Germany the threat was clear—Soviet troops occupied East Germany, with tanks and nukes facing west.
Japan had historically clashed with Russia over control of northeast Asia, fighting a war in 1905-1906. Japan won the war, sparking a revolution that marked the beginning of the end for the Tsarist regime. After WWII, turning against America again was simply too dangerous, as powerful, Soviet-backed communist movements in Korea, China, and Indochina encircled Japan.
Neither the Iraqi people, nor the Afghanis for that matter, share with America a common and clear existential enemy. US failure in Iraq or Afghanistan will not result in foreign communist domination. Indeed, its not clear that either local population sees a clear stake in American success. That’s the real reason why America's recent occupation regimes are not comparable to those of yesteryear.
- Jon
P.S. If you want a better comparison for Iraq, consider the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, another invasion that was the unlikely result of a surprise attack. (and in the case of the U.S.S. Maine, the conspiracy theorists actually have a good argument)
