Twelve days after Ben Ali fled Tunisia and two after Egypt's day of rage, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev ordered the head of the Presidential Apparatus Ramiz Mehdiyev to convene the government’s anti-corruption commission for the first time since 2009. That meeting resulted in a series of directives ordering government employees to stop taking bribes and a warning that punishment for anyone who continued would be swift and absolute.
After listening to Azerbaijani officials tell me in one breath that corruption really wasn’t a serious issue and in the next that the government was doing all it could to address the problem for a year, I was extremely skeptical. If there is one thing the Aliyev government has become adept at, it is building facades. But after asking around I found, much to my surprise, that the new anti-corruption campaign is very much real. From ministries in Baku, to local governments in Sheki and Barda, government officials have stopped taking bribes. Even the infamous envelope system that directed money to the upper levels of the country’s bureaucracy has been abolished. Possibly more surprising, bureaucrats that violate the president’s decree have been removed in Saakashvili-style purges.
So why did one of the world’s most corrupt governments decide to go legitimate? I see three overlapping explanations:
After listening to Azerbaijani officials tell me in one breath that corruption really wasn’t a serious issue and in the next that the government was doing all it could to address the problem for a year, I was extremely skeptical. If there is one thing the Aliyev government has become adept at, it is building facades. But after asking around I found, much to my surprise, that the new anti-corruption campaign is very much real. From ministries in Baku, to local governments in Sheki and Barda, government officials have stopped taking bribes. Even the infamous envelope system that directed money to the upper levels of the country’s bureaucracy has been abolished. Possibly more surprising, bureaucrats that violate the president’s decree have been removed in Saakashvili-style purges.
So why did one of the world’s most corrupt governments decide to go legitimate? I see three overlapping explanations:
1. Insulating the Regime from Unrest:
The fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia—more so than unrest in Egypt—forced Aliyev and his toadies to take a hard look at the state of their own kleptocracy. Corruption is truly endemic in Azerbaijan. From their first day in school, Azerbaijanis encounter a system in which money and connections matter far more than merit. The situation is even worse for businessmen who have to pay a huge portion of their profit to a local fixer who in turn distributes the money to government officials. Moreover, rumors of massive graft on the part of the elite are widely known, if not openly discussed. Most everyone you meet in Azerbaijan can tell you a story about the transportation minister’s son who flies around the country eating million dollar bear kebaps or the Aliyev family’s luxury mansions in Dubai. Images of once placid Tunisians raging against symbols of Ben Ali’s excess likely had a deep effect on the ruling family.
2. Improving the Economy and Azerbaijan’s Image Abroad
The Aliyev regime is hugely ambitious and more sensitive to criticism of its economic record than it lets on. Anti-corruption reforms, if successful, will give Azerbaijan access to billions in financing, allow it to compete for marquee events like the 2020 Olympics, and dramatically improve its image in the eyes of potential investors. Additionally, Aliyev has to eliminate corruption if he wants to expand the non-oil sectors of Azerbaijan’s economy. The country’s horribly corrupt State Customs Committee has been a huge impediment for local businessmen interested in selling their products on the international market.
3. Settling Old Scores
While deeply ironic, Aliyev may well be using the new anti-graft movement to consolidate his political position. The crackdown on bribe taking will disproportionately hurt Minister of Emergency Situations and potential rival Kamaladdin Heydarov. His notorious Ministry is responsible for health and safety inspections and regularly uses this power to extract large bribes. Heydarov also likely still benefits from bribes taken by State Customs Committee, which he headed for over nine years. While it’s a matter of speculation, it very well could be that the animosity between Heyadrov and Aliyev has flared up once again.
Despite the veracity of its new anti-corruption campaign, the Aliyev regime isn’t interested in political reform. Public protests and speech remain circumscribed, a fact made very clear by the recent crackdown on opposition youth groups. Reducing corruption is a means to an end, and that end is maintaining control.
Azerbaijan today is in the middle of a political transition. Whereas the late Heydar Aliyev adroitly used corruption to balance rival ministers—giving high-graft taking positions to some and withholding from others—his son Ilham is attempting get rid of those rivalries completely by eliminating the corruption that fuels them. As some countries responded to revolts in Tunisia and Egypt by offering concessions or cracking down on protesters, Azerbaijan is moving toward the Emirates model of stability. The ideal is near monarchical control over resources and political life, a satiated populous, a reputation as a dynamic hub of commerce, and limited criticism from the West. Whether Aliyev will succeed depends heavily on the success or failure of his anti-corruption crusade. The next couple months should be very interesting.
-Evan
