A more hopeful time
On August 19, 1991, thousands of people gathered in front of Moscow’s White House to oppose the August Putsch. The protesters set up barricades around the building, distributed political flyers, and tried to convince the soldiers in the area not to follow orders. These actions—combined with Yeltsin’s famous speech from on top of a tank—caused massive defections among the military and eventually led to the unraveling of the coup attempt. By the end of the month, the Russian Federation had declared itself legally independent from the laws of the Soviet Union.
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
The euphoria of such a victory caused a surge of optimism among many Russians. Everyone expected that, with the end of the communist party’s monopoly on power, the country would quickly become a functioning capitalist democracy and a respected member of the international community. It seemed unfathomable that Russia could return to its old authoritarian ways—people who had toppled statues of dictators and stood down tanks would never submit to that type of rule again.
Yet the Yeltsin years demonstrated that the end of autocracy and beginning of democracy are not one in the same. Instead, events like the Chechen war and the 1997 financial crisis disillusioned the population and sent it scurrying back into the arms of dictatorship. Putin’s vertical power system has enjoyed popularity ratings of around 70% ever since.
This realization is something that people in the Middle East should be highly cognizant of in light of recent events. For the Tunisia and Egypt especially, it is vital to have reasonable expectations about both the monumental problems they face and the extreme limitations of democracy as a panacea. The fact that they have (or soon will) rid themselves of long-time autocrats is, in reality, only the first step to regaining control of their states. If they do not steel themselves for the difficult times ahead, they could very well find their countries being ruled by despots eerily similar to Mubarak or Ben Ali in a decade or so.
Click here to read more ------>
Some of the lessons from Russia’s failed transition:
1. Old faces make a comeback
One of the interesting features of the 1990s was the degree of continuity among the elite. Yeltsin, who had been a party apparatchik himself, decided to draw a line under the past and refused to engage in anti-communist purges. This decision maintained Russia’s semi-functioning bureaucracy and prevented a move towards civil war, but it also allowed the nomenklatura to hold onto power. Former KGB officers and party members used old patronage networks and left-over assets to consolidate their position within the system. As early as 1994, the Soviet-era elite controlled eight-four percent of senior posts in the government and another seventy-five percent of big businesses. Although these men traded party cards for crucifixes and Ladas for BMWs, the day-to-day workings of the country changed very little.
Any country that overthrows its government faces a problem of what to do to with those who at one time supported the old regime. If Egyptians and Tunisians try to purge or ban these people from power, it could stoke a violent backlash. But allowing them to maintain their position and privileges also has drawbacks—particularly when the former system was so biased towards those in power. The ideal strategy is to offer an amnesty to those at the lower level, while redistributing the ill-gotten goods of the elite as best as possible. After all, it was angst about the hierarchical nature of Middle Eastern society that spawned these upheavals in the first place.
2. Old habits die hard—especially in a crisis
During his two terms as president, Yeltsin constantly battled against a recalcitrant Duma. Several blocs of MPs wanted to rebuild the communist system or, at least, slow the process of economic reforms. Alexander Rutsoi, the country’s vice president, called Yeltsin’s shock therapy “economic genocide,” pointing out that average incomes had fallen 2.5 times in a year. The climax of this battle came in September 1993, with the beginning of a constitutional crisis. To overcome the Duma’s opposition, Yeltsin illegally dissolved the parliament and adopted an emergency constitution that gave him sweeping executive powers. When the parliament impeached him as president and barricaded itself in the White House, Yeltsin sent the army into shell the building. The resulting fighting led to 187 deaths and over 430 wounded. Such bloodshed not only betrayed Russia’s supposedly democratic principles, but also codified a patrimonial system of rule into law. Like past rulers, Yeltsin had faced down his political foes by force, rather than by elections. “Russia,” as he put it, “[had] adopted a new system but [its leaders] had not learned to govern in a new way.”
Egypt and Tunisia have very few functioning institutions, which makes them highly susceptible to another strongman. Unless these states re-write the rules of the game in a fair and legitimate way, the temptation will remain to use the army to seize power. They should also be very careful about any kind of move towards a strong executive or emergency powers. All dictatorships begin with these simple steps.
3. Economics is as important as politics
Neither the collapse of the USSR nor the election of Yeltsin improved Russia’s dire economic situation. In fact, the country experienced one long crisis from 1991 to 2000. Chubais’ attempts to undo Soviet-era subsidies caused massive turmoil within society, leading to sky-rocketing unemployment, hyperinflation, and increasing poverty. This, in turn, created nostalgia for the socialist system and served as a catalyst for the resurgence of the Russian Communist Party under Zyuganov. Yeltsin only managed to win the 1996 election by making a sordid deal to give well-connected businessmen majority stakes in state companies in exchange for their support in the election. The government’s failure to properly administer economic reform thus scuttled any chance to create a just system in Russia; a capitalist oligarchy simply replaced the communist one.
Both Egypt and Tunisia have economies that are burdened with subsidies and full of stagnation and inequality. It will require skill and good sequencing to change the system without provoking a backlash. Above all, it is essential not to rush the process as Yeltsin did based on the (bad) advice of the IMF and World Bank. The rule in economic reform must always be slow and steady change, rather than a one-time shock.
4. The West loses interest quickly
Russia’s moment in the international spotlight did not last long. After some initial jubilation over the collapse of communism, Western countries turned their attention to other issues, including the booming economy, genocide in the Balkans, and President Clinton’s fetish for bimbos. Despite repeated Russian protests that it was “not Estonia,” the US denied Russia’s bid to join NATO and treated it as a peripheral power of little importance. Such marginalization fed Moscow’s imperial nostalgia and created a sense of animosity toward Western arrogance. Under Putin, this would result in a foreign policy that was highly independent and often anti-American. The oil disputes with Ukraine, war with Georgia, and saber-rattling in Munich were all, to some degree, attempts by the Kremlin to get noticed.
Most Westerners today have a superficial awareness of the recent events in the Middle East. Political junkies and bloggers, meanwhile, seem to talk about nothing else. Sadly, however, this degree of interest will not continue for much longer. The 2012 election or some other world event will distract people’s attention and could even spell an end to generous aid packages. Given this possibility, Egyptians and Tunisians must prepare from the beginning to live without much Western largesse or a new ‘Marshall Plan’ (remember when the G8 was going to end poverty in Africa???). Like it or not, their respective fates will be decided locally, not in Washington or Brussels.
There are, of course, several big differences between Russia and either Egypt or Tunisia. These include the two Arab countries relative ethnic homogeneity, better economic infrastructure, and strong armies. Even so, political transformations are always fraught with danger and often disappoint expectations. Few people in the heady early days of the 1990s could have expected that within a decade Putin would be running the Kremlin. Hopefully, Tunisians and Egyptians will not have a similar experience. One good way to avoid it is for the new administrations to think more about Moscow in 1991 than Berlin in 1989.
1. Old faces make a comeback
One of the interesting features of the 1990s was the degree of continuity among the elite. Yeltsin, who had been a party apparatchik himself, decided to draw a line under the past and refused to engage in anti-communist purges. This decision maintained Russia’s semi-functioning bureaucracy and prevented a move towards civil war, but it also allowed the nomenklatura to hold onto power. Former KGB officers and party members used old patronage networks and left-over assets to consolidate their position within the system. As early as 1994, the Soviet-era elite controlled eight-four percent of senior posts in the government and another seventy-five percent of big businesses. Although these men traded party cards for crucifixes and Ladas for BMWs, the day-to-day workings of the country changed very little.
Any country that overthrows its government faces a problem of what to do to with those who at one time supported the old regime. If Egyptians and Tunisians try to purge or ban these people from power, it could stoke a violent backlash. But allowing them to maintain their position and privileges also has drawbacks—particularly when the former system was so biased towards those in power. The ideal strategy is to offer an amnesty to those at the lower level, while redistributing the ill-gotten goods of the elite as best as possible. After all, it was angst about the hierarchical nature of Middle Eastern society that spawned these upheavals in the first place.
2. Old habits die hard—especially in a crisis
During his two terms as president, Yeltsin constantly battled against a recalcitrant Duma. Several blocs of MPs wanted to rebuild the communist system or, at least, slow the process of economic reforms. Alexander Rutsoi, the country’s vice president, called Yeltsin’s shock therapy “economic genocide,” pointing out that average incomes had fallen 2.5 times in a year. The climax of this battle came in September 1993, with the beginning of a constitutional crisis. To overcome the Duma’s opposition, Yeltsin illegally dissolved the parliament and adopted an emergency constitution that gave him sweeping executive powers. When the parliament impeached him as president and barricaded itself in the White House, Yeltsin sent the army into shell the building. The resulting fighting led to 187 deaths and over 430 wounded. Such bloodshed not only betrayed Russia’s supposedly democratic principles, but also codified a patrimonial system of rule into law. Like past rulers, Yeltsin had faced down his political foes by force, rather than by elections. “Russia,” as he put it, “[had] adopted a new system but [its leaders] had not learned to govern in a new way.”
Egypt and Tunisia have very few functioning institutions, which makes them highly susceptible to another strongman. Unless these states re-write the rules of the game in a fair and legitimate way, the temptation will remain to use the army to seize power. They should also be very careful about any kind of move towards a strong executive or emergency powers. All dictatorships begin with these simple steps.
3. Economics is as important as politics
Neither the collapse of the USSR nor the election of Yeltsin improved Russia’s dire economic situation. In fact, the country experienced one long crisis from 1991 to 2000. Chubais’ attempts to undo Soviet-era subsidies caused massive turmoil within society, leading to sky-rocketing unemployment, hyperinflation, and increasing poverty. This, in turn, created nostalgia for the socialist system and served as a catalyst for the resurgence of the Russian Communist Party under Zyuganov. Yeltsin only managed to win the 1996 election by making a sordid deal to give well-connected businessmen majority stakes in state companies in exchange for their support in the election. The government’s failure to properly administer economic reform thus scuttled any chance to create a just system in Russia; a capitalist oligarchy simply replaced the communist one.
Both Egypt and Tunisia have economies that are burdened with subsidies and full of stagnation and inequality. It will require skill and good sequencing to change the system without provoking a backlash. Above all, it is essential not to rush the process as Yeltsin did based on the (bad) advice of the IMF and World Bank. The rule in economic reform must always be slow and steady change, rather than a one-time shock.
4. The West loses interest quickly
Russia’s moment in the international spotlight did not last long. After some initial jubilation over the collapse of communism, Western countries turned their attention to other issues, including the booming economy, genocide in the Balkans, and President Clinton’s fetish for bimbos. Despite repeated Russian protests that it was “not Estonia,” the US denied Russia’s bid to join NATO and treated it as a peripheral power of little importance. Such marginalization fed Moscow’s imperial nostalgia and created a sense of animosity toward Western arrogance. Under Putin, this would result in a foreign policy that was highly independent and often anti-American. The oil disputes with Ukraine, war with Georgia, and saber-rattling in Munich were all, to some degree, attempts by the Kremlin to get noticed.
Most Westerners today have a superficial awareness of the recent events in the Middle East. Political junkies and bloggers, meanwhile, seem to talk about nothing else. Sadly, however, this degree of interest will not continue for much longer. The 2012 election or some other world event will distract people’s attention and could even spell an end to generous aid packages. Given this possibility, Egyptians and Tunisians must prepare from the beginning to live without much Western largesse or a new ‘Marshall Plan’ (remember when the G8 was going to end poverty in Africa???). Like it or not, their respective fates will be decided locally, not in Washington or Brussels.
There are, of course, several big differences between Russia and either Egypt or Tunisia. These include the two Arab countries relative ethnic homogeneity, better economic infrastructure, and strong armies. Even so, political transformations are always fraught with danger and often disappoint expectations. Few people in the heady early days of the 1990s could have expected that within a decade Putin would be running the Kremlin. Hopefully, Tunisians and Egyptians will not have a similar experience. One good way to avoid it is for the new administrations to think more about Moscow in 1991 than Berlin in 1989.
