For better or worse (you know what this blog thinks) the U.S. and its allies have intervened in Libya. The difficult job now is to make sure the U.S. comes out unscathed and that when the intervention ends Libya isn’t further away from the democratic future we went in to protect.
So who has some ideas?
The Financial Times, which has been leading the intervention charge, writes:
“The job of bringing down Col Gaddafi should be left to the Libyans themselves. It is to be hoped that once his military momentum is decisively punctured, as it surely will be, his hold over his own people will be similarly weakened. His armed forces are not formidable. They have performed poorly in the revolt, taking surprisingly heavy casualties when attacking relatively small rebel-held towns. […] The coalition can help the rebels by protecting those parts of Libya that are free and by putting pressure on those doing Col Gaddafi’s bidding. That means not only attacking his military, but also by making it crystal clear to the regime’s servants that they will be held accountable for their actions when it is finally toppled."
Juan Cole provides a number of suggestions:
“1. It should not be open-ended, but rather should have an expiration date. The no-fly zone is a response to a specific humanitarian crisis (the Qaddafi regime was firing tank and artillery shells at urban crowds protesting it). That crisis must not draw the UN allies into a years-long quagmire. (Such a situation developed in Iraq in the 1990s and contributed to the ultimate destruction of that country).
2. It should be a no-fly zone, not a war on the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi tank columns should be interdicted from moving on Benghazi or Tobruk. But tanks just sitting around in Tripoli should not be targeted.
3. Once the no-fly zone is in place and Benghazi and points east are protected from reprisals, brokers should intervene to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
4. Officers who committed war crimes, as with ordering live fire on civilian crowds, must be prosecuted, but not everyone in the Libyan military should be tarred with that brush.
5. Amnesty might be offered to pro-Qaddafi officers and politicians provided they break with the dictator and send him into exile, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. It is desirable that there be some continuity between the old regime and the new one, and that tribal factionalism and feuds and reprisals be avoided.
6. Countries opposed to or lukewarm toward the no-fly zone, but which are themselves democracies, such as India, Algeria and Russia, could be enlisted to meet with the officer corps in Tripoli and impress on them the need for a transition to parliamentary elections."
And Micah Zenko suggests that a negotiated settlement is the way out:
"Libya’s conflict will likely end as most civil wars end: through a negotiated settlement under which the rebels receive substantial political autonomy. Enforcing such a cease-fire will require tens of thousands of peacekeepers operating under an international mandate. While American officials embraced one Arab League resolution as reflecting the will of the region, they conveniently ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council’s resolution on Libya, which affirmed the union’s 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.'
Just as they are reluctant to fly their combat aircraft over Libya, Arab League member states participate negligibly or not at all in UN peacekeeping, with the exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Given that those states have their hands full with domestic challenges of their own, the onus of peacekeeping will fall on countries from sub-Saharan Africa that regularly contribute troops. The Obama administration should make efforts to get them ready now."
What else is out there, folks?
So who has some ideas?
The Financial Times, which has been leading the intervention charge, writes:
“The job of bringing down Col Gaddafi should be left to the Libyans themselves. It is to be hoped that once his military momentum is decisively punctured, as it surely will be, his hold over his own people will be similarly weakened. His armed forces are not formidable. They have performed poorly in the revolt, taking surprisingly heavy casualties when attacking relatively small rebel-held towns. […] The coalition can help the rebels by protecting those parts of Libya that are free and by putting pressure on those doing Col Gaddafi’s bidding. That means not only attacking his military, but also by making it crystal clear to the regime’s servants that they will be held accountable for their actions when it is finally toppled."
Juan Cole provides a number of suggestions:
“1. It should not be open-ended, but rather should have an expiration date. The no-fly zone is a response to a specific humanitarian crisis (the Qaddafi regime was firing tank and artillery shells at urban crowds protesting it). That crisis must not draw the UN allies into a years-long quagmire. (Such a situation developed in Iraq in the 1990s and contributed to the ultimate destruction of that country).
2. It should be a no-fly zone, not a war on the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi tank columns should be interdicted from moving on Benghazi or Tobruk. But tanks just sitting around in Tripoli should not be targeted.
3. Once the no-fly zone is in place and Benghazi and points east are protected from reprisals, brokers should intervene to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
4. Officers who committed war crimes, as with ordering live fire on civilian crowds, must be prosecuted, but not everyone in the Libyan military should be tarred with that brush.
5. Amnesty might be offered to pro-Qaddafi officers and politicians provided they break with the dictator and send him into exile, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. It is desirable that there be some continuity between the old regime and the new one, and that tribal factionalism and feuds and reprisals be avoided.
6. Countries opposed to or lukewarm toward the no-fly zone, but which are themselves democracies, such as India, Algeria and Russia, could be enlisted to meet with the officer corps in Tripoli and impress on them the need for a transition to parliamentary elections."
And Micah Zenko suggests that a negotiated settlement is the way out:
"Libya’s conflict will likely end as most civil wars end: through a negotiated settlement under which the rebels receive substantial political autonomy. Enforcing such a cease-fire will require tens of thousands of peacekeepers operating under an international mandate. While American officials embraced one Arab League resolution as reflecting the will of the region, they conveniently ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council’s resolution on Libya, which affirmed the union’s 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.'
Just as they are reluctant to fly their combat aircraft over Libya, Arab League member states participate negligibly or not at all in UN peacekeeping, with the exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Given that those states have their hands full with domestic challenges of their own, the onus of peacekeeping will fall on countries from sub-Saharan Africa that regularly contribute troops. The Obama administration should make efforts to get them ready now."
What else is out there, folks?
