In 2008, a Georgian-Russian war made the obscure autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into household names. The few people who knew about these provinces beforehand could point to the fact that both resisted inclusion into independent Georgia in 1918, and rebelled again during the fall of the Soviet Union. So was the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia inevitable?
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
Contrarians will point out that the Georgian-speaking Muslims of Ajaria, who enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, and lived under Turkish rule from 1614-1878, submitted to central Georgian authority without an outbreak of violence.
What "separates" the Ajaria case from that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Thomas de Waal isolates an important factor:
…Another reason for the lack of conflict is that Turkey, Ajaria’s old Great Power patron, did not want to play the Ajaria card against Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia could still look to Russia for support. This reveals a lot about how the idea of so-called ancient hatreds in the Caucasus must be taken with a pinch of salt. Over the broad sweep of history, Georgian-Turkish relations were much worse than Georgian-Russian ones.
However,
…When the [old Soviet-Turkish] border reopened, Georgian-Turkish relations actually got off to a very good start. In the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia there were much more real and recent grievances.
Of course, Russia’s policy of supporting separatism in Georgia stopped when it reached a Muslim province—even Putin is not that cynical.
