Sunday Afternoon Reads 06/26/2011
Der Spiegl dives into Syria's tortuous revolution-cum-civil war:
“The lurching family business is still keeping itself afloat, partly because no alternatives are in sight yet. The prominent civil rights activists who penned the "Damascus Declaration" in 2005 have a program, but no followers. The protest movement in the streets has followers, but no program that extends beyond deposing the regime.”
Definitely worth a full read.
Ibrahim Saif on the failure of government-backed social programs in the Middle East:
“(S)ocial spending is distinguished by low levels of competency, especially in healthcare and education -- the two sectors that capture the greatest share of social expenditure. These sectors are usually not subject to oversight and lack indicators to measure their operational efficiency. Most of the expenditures go to wages and salaries, rather than to areas such as research and development, which could help improve competency and reduce waste.
These sectors also are resistant to change. They are based on obsolete regulations and bureaucratic measures that are difficult to change. Because of the low average employee salary, they often do not attract the most competent candidates and offer employees too few incentives to increase their work efficiency and motivation.”
And a list of practical and actionable suggestions for U.S. foreign assistance reform in Afghanistan from Desaix Myers:
"•Lower the footprint: Building a team of individuals with field experience and enough time in-country to establish trust is more important than increasing numbers in-country. It’s better to focus on fewer people and fewer activities.
• Streamline coordination and oversight: We need to cut coordinating meetings and duplicative requests for information. More responsibility needs to be delegated to lower levels.
•Rein in expectations: State-building involves often-competing objectives. We want the Afghans to do more but we want less corruption. Building the institutions to contain corruption takes time, but we want the government to get credit for better schools and health now. Finding a balance requires patience. Going slower, with fewer but more knowledgeable people working on fewer projects and spending less money stretched over longer time makes sense — if we can develop strategic patience.
•Develop “expeditionary” civilians willing to be deployed to danger zones critical to national security for years not months. The military has an “AfPak Hands” program to develop a cadre of 750 officers with knowledge and expertise to work on the region’s problems for five to seven years. Civilian agencies could do something similar, creating a team based in Washington, traveling frequently to the field, living in-country for up to 24 months, working the problem for four to five years, and developing the area and language expertise needed to do the job."
“The lurching family business is still keeping itself afloat, partly because no alternatives are in sight yet. The prominent civil rights activists who penned the "Damascus Declaration" in 2005 have a program, but no followers. The protest movement in the streets has followers, but no program that extends beyond deposing the regime.”
Definitely worth a full read.
Ibrahim Saif on the failure of government-backed social programs in the Middle East:
“(S)ocial spending is distinguished by low levels of competency, especially in healthcare and education -- the two sectors that capture the greatest share of social expenditure. These sectors are usually not subject to oversight and lack indicators to measure their operational efficiency. Most of the expenditures go to wages and salaries, rather than to areas such as research and development, which could help improve competency and reduce waste.
These sectors also are resistant to change. They are based on obsolete regulations and bureaucratic measures that are difficult to change. Because of the low average employee salary, they often do not attract the most competent candidates and offer employees too few incentives to increase their work efficiency and motivation.”
And a list of practical and actionable suggestions for U.S. foreign assistance reform in Afghanistan from Desaix Myers:
"•Lower the footprint: Building a team of individuals with field experience and enough time in-country to establish trust is more important than increasing numbers in-country. It’s better to focus on fewer people and fewer activities.
• Streamline coordination and oversight: We need to cut coordinating meetings and duplicative requests for information. More responsibility needs to be delegated to lower levels.
•Rein in expectations: State-building involves often-competing objectives. We want the Afghans to do more but we want less corruption. Building the institutions to contain corruption takes time, but we want the government to get credit for better schools and health now. Finding a balance requires patience. Going slower, with fewer but more knowledgeable people working on fewer projects and spending less money stretched over longer time makes sense — if we can develop strategic patience.
•Develop “expeditionary” civilians willing to be deployed to danger zones critical to national security for years not months. The military has an “AfPak Hands” program to develop a cadre of 750 officers with knowledge and expertise to work on the region’s problems for five to seven years. Civilian agencies could do something similar, creating a team based in Washington, traveling frequently to the field, living in-country for up to 24 months, working the problem for four to five years, and developing the area and language expertise needed to do the job."
Comments
Leave a Reply
Loading
