This Did Not Go As Planned 03/30/2011
You know the script.
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And If You Like It With Vinegar... 03/28/2011
The Wonkette folks also weren't particularly impressed with Obama's speech. Some highlights from their liveblog:
7:31 PM — A blood-red tie. Haven’t seen this one. Michelle must have bought him a special new war tie.
7:47 PM — It “would have been a betrayal of who we are” to not go into Libya. He’s right. Invading and getting stuck running other countries is pretty much what we’re known for these days.
7:49 PM — “Blah blah, I don’t feel like looking at mass graves when they’re in this particular bloody country, blah blah.”
7:50 PM — “We will deny the regime arms.” Oooh! That will save all those people from dying Obama seems so concerned about suddenly!
7:51 PM — PRO TIP: Don’t follow up ten minutes about how evil and murderous this dictator is by saying you’re not going to take out the dictator, just going to wait and hope he falls.
There's a lot more where that came from here.
7:31 PM — A blood-red tie. Haven’t seen this one. Michelle must have bought him a special new war tie.
7:47 PM — It “would have been a betrayal of who we are” to not go into Libya. He’s right. Invading and getting stuck running other countries is pretty much what we’re known for these days.
7:49 PM — “Blah blah, I don’t feel like looking at mass graves when they’re in this particular bloody country, blah blah.”
7:50 PM — “We will deny the regime arms.” Oooh! That will save all those people from dying Obama seems so concerned about suddenly!
7:51 PM — PRO TIP: Don’t follow up ten minutes about how evil and murderous this dictator is by saying you’re not going to take out the dictator, just going to wait and hope he falls.
There's a lot more where that came from here.
The Question Remains, What Next? 03/28/2011
President Obama's speech tonight speech left me with a lot more questions than answers. Among them, Has the definition of "interests" changed significantly? If the decision to intervene is based on local pleas for help, UN/international backing, the strong likelihood thousands will be slaughtered, and our unique ability to do something about it, why isn't the U.S. moving more decisively to prevent a massacre in Cote d'Ivoire? What happens if things don't go as planned and Gaddafi doesn't leave in short order? Does the President agree with his general's assessment of the rebels' limited military capabilities? What about their capacity to govern? How would the U.S. deal with a stalemate? Why does the administration keep using the same cliches? (As Dan Drezner put it, "'False choice'!!! Drink!?") And so many more.
Spencer Ackerman was dead on when he tweeted, "This speech seems to be more geared toward arguing that the Libya war is just, rather than arguing that it's wise, or can succeed."
I hope the administration is listening to the recommendations given by CNAS's Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford in their new policy brief. For those with an extremely short attention span, Exum provides this overview on his blog:
Spencer Ackerman was dead on when he tweeted, "This speech seems to be more geared toward arguing that the Libya war is just, rather than arguing that it's wise, or can succeed."
I hope the administration is listening to the recommendations given by CNAS's Andrew Exum and Zachary Hosford in their new policy brief. For those with an extremely short attention span, Exum provides this overview on his blog:
- No matter what anyone else says, the United States and its allies are at war in Libya.
- The United States has very few interests in Libya.
- Unlike with respect to Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration went to war in Libya without a deliberate planning process that forced policy makers to articulate U.S. interests, goals and assumptions. This helps to explain why the administration has had so much difficulty articulating, for the American people, our interests in, goals toward and assumptions about Libya.
- Now that we're in this mess, a policy of regime change in Libya makes the most sense.
- We see two possible outcomes in Libya: either a rapid collapse of the regime, or a stalemate. We assess the latter as more likely.
- In order to avoid the latter and in light of U.S. interests, we believe the United States should establish a structure of incentives to get Moammar Gadhafi to leave. Kinetic military action by U.S. forces is not part of our proposed incentive structure. In fact, we think the United States should halt direct military action and work to broaden the international coalition to include more countries who do have interests in Libya.
- We should be prepared to accept the status quo antebellum, though. Why? See #2.
Yup, That About Sums It Up 03/28/2011
Go support Matt Bors by buying a print. Seriously. I did and chances are you aren't poorer than me.
-Evan
-Evan
A Poem for Libya 03/27/2011
The Dictators
An odor has remained among the sugarcane:
a mixture of blood and body, a penetrating
petal that brings nausea.
Between the coconut palms the graves are full
of ruined bones, of speechless death-rattles.
The delicate dictator is talking
with top hats, gold braid, and collars.
The tiny palace gleams like a watch
and the rapid laughs with gloves on
cross the corridors at times
and join the dead voices
and the blue mouths freshly buried.
The weeping cannot be seen, like a plant
whose seeds fall endlessly on the earth,
whose large blind leaves grow even without light.
Hatred has grown scale on scale,
blow on blow, in the ghastly water of the swamp,
with a snout full of ooze and silence
-Pablo Neruda
An odor has remained among the sugarcane:
a mixture of blood and body, a penetrating
petal that brings nausea.
Between the coconut palms the graves are full
of ruined bones, of speechless death-rattles.
The delicate dictator is talking
with top hats, gold braid, and collars.
The tiny palace gleams like a watch
and the rapid laughs with gloves on
cross the corridors at times
and join the dead voices
and the blue mouths freshly buried.
The weeping cannot be seen, like a plant
whose seeds fall endlessly on the earth,
whose large blind leaves grow even without light.
Hatred has grown scale on scale,
blow on blow, in the ghastly water of the swamp,
with a snout full of ooze and silence
-Pablo Neruda
Things I Miss About Hosni Mubarak 03/26/2011
With the Egyptian public itching for a full investigation of the old regime, it’s certain that we’ll be hearing a lot of negative things about Hosni Mubarak in coming weeks and months. It is true that he condoned the abuse of his citizens, perpetuated a system of endemic corruption, and did everything he could to prevent democratization, but let’s not forget the things that made Hosni so lovable.
1. His Contagious Laugh
1. His Contagious Laugh
Widely considered the funniest of the despots, Hosni knew how to light up a room with laughter—which was often the product of his own jokes. From the Arab League summits to meetings with American presidents, he took every chance he got to earn the nickname, "La Vache qui Rit."
2. That Hair
2. That Hair
Epic dye job or genetic gift, who really cares? Hosni’s hair was the envy of many a dictator and certainly a few democratically-elected leaders as well (I’m looking at you Silvio). Rumor has it Crayola invented the color “Midnight Black” just so Egyptian children could color pictures of the president.
3. Suzanne Mubarak
3. Suzanne Mubarak
Philanthropist, song writer, and bouffant and pearls aficionado, Hosni’s better half was a role model for authoritarian wives everywhere. How can you not love a woman who wrote tacky paeans to peace while her husband ran a regime built on the systematic repression and torture of his opponents?
4. The Suits
4. The Suits
Click for larger image
Hosni nobly resisted the temptation to dress like a lunatic (à la Gaddafi or Kim Jong-il) and instead opted for a simple and understated style characterized by his suits with H-O-S-N-Y-M-U-B-A-R-A-K pinstripes. Despotism never looked so dapper.
-Evan
-Evan
Saif's Art 03/26/2011
Last year we highlighted some of Saif Gaddafi's art here at PBOM. After seeing Foreign Policy's new piece on the subject, I went back to check to the old post. Much to my dismay, most of links are dead and his old site is down for maintenance. After a little hunting, I found a couple pictures to add to the ones FP has. Enjoy.
RSA Animate's Take on Evgeny Morozov 03/26/2011
Lost in Translation 03/25/2011
“The international community had to intervene to stop Gaddafi from massacring the rebels, because not acting would give license to other autocrats to use violence in response to protests.”
Implied in the above statement (which I've heard many times in various forms over the past week) is that by intervening in Libya, the West can achieve the lofty goal of removing violence as an option for autocrats seeking to preserve their rule. This is, of course, is pure fantasy.
The West’s intervention in Libya has not made Assad go soft in Syria, nor will it make the Chinese respond to future protests with flowers instead of bullets. The most likely response of authoritarian states will be to study why Tunisia and Egypt were unable to divide the protesters, and why Gaddafi failed to deter the West from invading Libya.
Indeed, North Korea is already offering survival advice to fellow dictatorships, which differs noticeably from what humanitarian activists are saying:
North Korea’s official news agency carried comments this week…suggesting that Libya had been duped in 2003 when it abandoned its nuclear program in exchange for promises of aid and improved relations with the West.
In fact, looking at recent history from the perspective of North Korea tells a very different story from the ones that the humanitarians are telling. Since 2003, the US invaded the one “axis of evil” member lacking a WMD program, and is now pummelling the one country that “got the right message” from Bush in 2003 and handed over its nukes. Do you think Kim Jong Il, or Iran for that matter, is now more likely to renounce nukes and violence against protesters?
So what is the moral of the story? Be suspicious of any risky foreign policy measure that is justified on the basis that it will convey a specific message, especially one to a wide audience. Different people interpret messages differently, and sometimes in unintended ways.
Again, I can't help but think about Iraq. After capturing Saddam, baffled American interrogators asked him why he had publicly insisted that he had WMD’s, even at the cost of inviting a US invasion, when he had in fact disbanded all such programs years earlier. Saddam explained that “Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran," according to FBI special agent George Piro’s notes. While “Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike,” he perceived an Iranian invasion as a greater threat.
Implied in the above statement (which I've heard many times in various forms over the past week) is that by intervening in Libya, the West can achieve the lofty goal of removing violence as an option for autocrats seeking to preserve their rule. This is, of course, is pure fantasy.
The West’s intervention in Libya has not made Assad go soft in Syria, nor will it make the Chinese respond to future protests with flowers instead of bullets. The most likely response of authoritarian states will be to study why Tunisia and Egypt were unable to divide the protesters, and why Gaddafi failed to deter the West from invading Libya.
Indeed, North Korea is already offering survival advice to fellow dictatorships, which differs noticeably from what humanitarian activists are saying:
North Korea’s official news agency carried comments this week…suggesting that Libya had been duped in 2003 when it abandoned its nuclear program in exchange for promises of aid and improved relations with the West.
In fact, looking at recent history from the perspective of North Korea tells a very different story from the ones that the humanitarians are telling. Since 2003, the US invaded the one “axis of evil” member lacking a WMD program, and is now pummelling the one country that “got the right message” from Bush in 2003 and handed over its nukes. Do you think Kim Jong Il, or Iran for that matter, is now more likely to renounce nukes and violence against protesters?
So what is the moral of the story? Be suspicious of any risky foreign policy measure that is justified on the basis that it will convey a specific message, especially one to a wide audience. Different people interpret messages differently, and sometimes in unintended ways.
Again, I can't help but think about Iraq. After capturing Saddam, baffled American interrogators asked him why he had publicly insisted that he had WMD’s, even at the cost of inviting a US invasion, when he had in fact disbanded all such programs years earlier. Saddam explained that “Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran," according to FBI special agent George Piro’s notes. While “Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike,” he perceived an Iranian invasion as a greater threat.
Let’s All Do the Robert Gates (UPDATED) 03/22/2011
For better or worse (you know what this blog thinks) the U.S. and its allies have intervened in Libya. The difficult job now is to make sure the U.S. comes out unscathed and that when the intervention ends Libya isn’t further away from the democratic future we went in to protect.
So who has some ideas?
The Financial Times, which has been leading the intervention charge, writes:
“The job of bringing down Col Gaddafi should be left to the Libyans themselves. It is to be hoped that once his military momentum is decisively punctured, as it surely will be, his hold over his own people will be similarly weakened. His armed forces are not formidable. They have performed poorly in the revolt, taking surprisingly heavy casualties when attacking relatively small rebel-held towns. […] The coalition can help the rebels by protecting those parts of Libya that are free and by putting pressure on those doing Col Gaddafi’s bidding. That means not only attacking his military, but also by making it crystal clear to the regime’s servants that they will be held accountable for their actions when it is finally toppled."
Juan Cole provides a number of suggestions:
“1. It should not be open-ended, but rather should have an expiration date. The no-fly zone is a response to a specific humanitarian crisis (the Qaddafi regime was firing tank and artillery shells at urban crowds protesting it). That crisis must not draw the UN allies into a years-long quagmire. (Such a situation developed in Iraq in the 1990s and contributed to the ultimate destruction of that country).
2. It should be a no-fly zone, not a war on the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi tank columns should be interdicted from moving on Benghazi or Tobruk. But tanks just sitting around in Tripoli should not be targeted.
3. Once the no-fly zone is in place and Benghazi and points east are protected from reprisals, brokers should intervene to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
4. Officers who committed war crimes, as with ordering live fire on civilian crowds, must be prosecuted, but not everyone in the Libyan military should be tarred with that brush.
5. Amnesty might be offered to pro-Qaddafi officers and politicians provided they break with the dictator and send him into exile, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. It is desirable that there be some continuity between the old regime and the new one, and that tribal factionalism and feuds and reprisals be avoided.
6. Countries opposed to or lukewarm toward the no-fly zone, but which are themselves democracies, such as India, Algeria and Russia, could be enlisted to meet with the officer corps in Tripoli and impress on them the need for a transition to parliamentary elections."
And Micah Zenko suggests that a negotiated settlement is the way out:
"Libya’s conflict will likely end as most civil wars end: through a negotiated settlement under which the rebels receive substantial political autonomy. Enforcing such a cease-fire will require tens of thousands of peacekeepers operating under an international mandate. While American officials embraced one Arab League resolution as reflecting the will of the region, they conveniently ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council’s resolution on Libya, which affirmed the union’s 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.'
Just as they are reluctant to fly their combat aircraft over Libya, Arab League member states participate negligibly or not at all in UN peacekeeping, with the exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Given that those states have their hands full with domestic challenges of their own, the onus of peacekeeping will fall on countries from sub-Saharan Africa that regularly contribute troops. The Obama administration should make efforts to get them ready now."
What else is out there, folks?
So who has some ideas?
The Financial Times, which has been leading the intervention charge, writes:
“The job of bringing down Col Gaddafi should be left to the Libyans themselves. It is to be hoped that once his military momentum is decisively punctured, as it surely will be, his hold over his own people will be similarly weakened. His armed forces are not formidable. They have performed poorly in the revolt, taking surprisingly heavy casualties when attacking relatively small rebel-held towns. […] The coalition can help the rebels by protecting those parts of Libya that are free and by putting pressure on those doing Col Gaddafi’s bidding. That means not only attacking his military, but also by making it crystal clear to the regime’s servants that they will be held accountable for their actions when it is finally toppled."
Juan Cole provides a number of suggestions:
“1. It should not be open-ended, but rather should have an expiration date. The no-fly zone is a response to a specific humanitarian crisis (the Qaddafi regime was firing tank and artillery shells at urban crowds protesting it). That crisis must not draw the UN allies into a years-long quagmire. (Such a situation developed in Iraq in the 1990s and contributed to the ultimate destruction of that country).
2. It should be a no-fly zone, not a war on the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi tank columns should be interdicted from moving on Benghazi or Tobruk. But tanks just sitting around in Tripoli should not be targeted.
3. Once the no-fly zone is in place and Benghazi and points east are protected from reprisals, brokers should intervene to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
4. Officers who committed war crimes, as with ordering live fire on civilian crowds, must be prosecuted, but not everyone in the Libyan military should be tarred with that brush.
5. Amnesty might be offered to pro-Qaddafi officers and politicians provided they break with the dictator and send him into exile, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. It is desirable that there be some continuity between the old regime and the new one, and that tribal factionalism and feuds and reprisals be avoided.
6. Countries opposed to or lukewarm toward the no-fly zone, but which are themselves democracies, such as India, Algeria and Russia, could be enlisted to meet with the officer corps in Tripoli and impress on them the need for a transition to parliamentary elections."
And Micah Zenko suggests that a negotiated settlement is the way out:
"Libya’s conflict will likely end as most civil wars end: through a negotiated settlement under which the rebels receive substantial political autonomy. Enforcing such a cease-fire will require tens of thousands of peacekeepers operating under an international mandate. While American officials embraced one Arab League resolution as reflecting the will of the region, they conveniently ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council’s resolution on Libya, which affirmed the union’s 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.'
Just as they are reluctant to fly their combat aircraft over Libya, Arab League member states participate negligibly or not at all in UN peacekeeping, with the exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. Given that those states have their hands full with domestic challenges of their own, the onus of peacekeeping will fall on countries from sub-Saharan Africa that regularly contribute troops. The Obama administration should make efforts to get them ready now."
What else is out there, folks?
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