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Ninety-nine times out of a hundred I find Mark Lynch’s work incredibly informative and uniquely insightful. His new article on Libya, however, isn’t one of those times.
The overarching theme of the piece is that Libya’s saga has become central to the narrative of Arab revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and thus deserves special consideration and (possibly) justifies special measures:
“If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics. The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.”
I see three problems here. First, this statements is rather anachronistic. Did Saleh in Yemen, al-Khalifa in Bahrain, or al-Assad in Syria need a green light to start killing protesters? Who is even left to be deterred?
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. would or even could intervene in the same way elsewhere. The Libya no-fly zone was made possible by an exceptional set of factors including Gaddafi’s international pariah status, the eagerness of the French and British to lead the diplomatic and military charge, and the support of the Arab League and the GCC. Consequentially intervention in Libya will do little to limit tyrants or encourage citizens in other countries. If the rebels continue to flounder and the U.S. becomes more deeply involved or pulls out abruptly, the prospects are even worse.
Third, U.S. and European intervention is by nature diametrically opposed to the wave of organic revolutions sweeping across the Middle East. The power of what happened in Egypt and Tunisia was that it had nothing to do with what America said or did and everything to do with the determination and grit of Egyptians and Tunisians. They stood up and did the unthinkable. The tragic reality is that the pro-democracy camp doesn’t always win and in Libya specifically there is little we can do ensure it does without becoming far more involved than we already are.
-Evan
The overarching theme of the piece is that Libya’s saga has become central to the narrative of Arab revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and thus deserves special consideration and (possibly) justifies special measures:
“If Gaddafi succeeded in snuffing out the challenge by force without a meaningful response from the United States, Europe and the international community then that would have been interpreted as a green light for all other leaders to employ similar tactics. The strong international response, first with the tough targeted sanctions package brokered by the United States at the United Nations and now with the military intervention, has the potential to restrain those regimes from unleashing the hounds of war and to encourage the energized citizenry of the region to redouble their efforts to bring about change. This regional context may not be enough to justify the Libya intervention, but I believe it is essential for understanding the logic and stakes of the intervention by the U.S. and its allies.”
I see three problems here. First, this statements is rather anachronistic. Did Saleh in Yemen, al-Khalifa in Bahrain, or al-Assad in Syria need a green light to start killing protesters? Who is even left to be deterred?
Second, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. would or even could intervene in the same way elsewhere. The Libya no-fly zone was made possible by an exceptional set of factors including Gaddafi’s international pariah status, the eagerness of the French and British to lead the diplomatic and military charge, and the support of the Arab League and the GCC. Consequentially intervention in Libya will do little to limit tyrants or encourage citizens in other countries. If the rebels continue to flounder and the U.S. becomes more deeply involved or pulls out abruptly, the prospects are even worse.
Third, U.S. and European intervention is by nature diametrically opposed to the wave of organic revolutions sweeping across the Middle East. The power of what happened in Egypt and Tunisia was that it had nothing to do with what America said or did and everything to do with the determination and grit of Egyptians and Tunisians. They stood up and did the unthinkable. The tragic reality is that the pro-democracy camp doesn’t always win and in Libya specifically there is little we can do ensure it does without becoming far more involved than we already are.
-Evan
Gregory Johnsen has more analysis of the recent defections in Yemen:
What Ali Muhsin is doing is setting himself up for a post-Salih future and further limiting who will have to go. His statement today - and it is important to note that he didn't say he was joining the protesters, only supporting and protecting them - puts him in position to head the military or military council under the next government. This is something a number of prominent Yemenis were waiting for. Not because they liked Ali Muhsin, they don't. But because he commands so much loyalty within the army.
Now, it will only be Salih his sons and nephews that have to go, or at least that is what Ali Muhsin is attempting to insure. The rest of the Sanhan clan in the military and intelligence command structure will, if Ali Muhsin's move is successful, be able to maintain their lucrative positions in a post-Salih Yemen.
What Ali Muhsin is doing is setting himself up for a post-Salih future and further limiting who will have to go. His statement today - and it is important to note that he didn't say he was joining the protesters, only supporting and protecting them - puts him in position to head the military or military council under the next government. This is something a number of prominent Yemenis were waiting for. Not because they liked Ali Muhsin, they don't. But because he commands so much loyalty within the army.
Now, it will only be Salih his sons and nephews that have to go, or at least that is what Ali Muhsin is attempting to insure. The rest of the Sanhan clan in the military and intelligence command structure will, if Ali Muhsin's move is successful, be able to maintain their lucrative positions in a post-Salih Yemen.
According to MEMRI's translation.
Iran sits on several major geological fault lines. A 2003 earthquake, at a magnitude of 6.6, was estimated to have killed between 25,000-30,000 people, mostly due to poor planning.
Iran sits on several major geological fault lines. A 2003 earthquake, at a magnitude of 6.6, was estimated to have killed between 25,000-30,000 people, mostly due to poor planning.
The Guardian’s Brian Whitaker pronounces the end of Saleh’s regime in Yemen, and suggests that General Ali Muhsin, a Salafist [someone who believes in imitating 7th century Islamic practice], might step in to fill the void:
A trickle of high-level resignations over the last few weeks turned to a flood on Monday when the president's kinsman, General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, announced he was switching sides.
Ali Muhsin's defection was the real tipping point. Because of his position in the military, it effectively means the end of the Saleh regime.
Whether that is grounds for celebration is another matter, since almost no one has a good word to say about Ali Muhsin. There were times when President Saleh used to frighten his critics by reminding them that if they didn't like him they could always have Ali Muhsin instead.
In the past, Ali Muhsin has had questionable dealings with Yemeni jihadists, as well as the Houthi rebels in the north of the country. In 1998, for example, when the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (linked to al-Qaida) kidnapped a group of western tourists, one of the first phone calls made by the kidnappers' leader was to Ali Muhsin.
…In Egypt, during the overthrow of President Mubarak, it was possible to view the military as a (comparatively) benign force managing the transition, but it is much more difficult to take a similar view of the military in Yemen.
It is certainly possible that Ali Muhsin will lay claim to the Yemeni revolution and in the process try to establish himself as the country's new strongman. He may be supported in that by those who fear turmoil as a result of ousting Saleh.
I know little about Yemen, but I'm confindent in these three things: that political change in Yemen will not be pretty, whatever happens will likely involve Saudi meddling, and that the US is unprepared.
A trickle of high-level resignations over the last few weeks turned to a flood on Monday when the president's kinsman, General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, announced he was switching sides.
Ali Muhsin's defection was the real tipping point. Because of his position in the military, it effectively means the end of the Saleh regime.
Whether that is grounds for celebration is another matter, since almost no one has a good word to say about Ali Muhsin. There were times when President Saleh used to frighten his critics by reminding them that if they didn't like him they could always have Ali Muhsin instead.
In the past, Ali Muhsin has had questionable dealings with Yemeni jihadists, as well as the Houthi rebels in the north of the country. In 1998, for example, when the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (linked to al-Qaida) kidnapped a group of western tourists, one of the first phone calls made by the kidnappers' leader was to Ali Muhsin.
…In Egypt, during the overthrow of President Mubarak, it was possible to view the military as a (comparatively) benign force managing the transition, but it is much more difficult to take a similar view of the military in Yemen.
It is certainly possible that Ali Muhsin will lay claim to the Yemeni revolution and in the process try to establish himself as the country's new strongman. He may be supported in that by those who fear turmoil as a result of ousting Saleh.
I know little about Yemen, but I'm confindent in these three things: that political change in Yemen will not be pretty, whatever happens will likely involve Saudi meddling, and that the US is unprepared.
$150 million: The democracy and development assistance Hillary Clinton announced will be divided between new programs in Egypt and Tunisia.
$81 million: The cost of the 110 American Tomahawk missiles used during the first day of Operation Odyssey Dawn alone.
$30-100 million per week: The cost of maintaining a partial no-fly zone over Libya. (Be sure to read the rest of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments' backgrounder on the issue.)
$81 million: The cost of the 110 American Tomahawk missiles used during the first day of Operation Odyssey Dawn alone.
$30-100 million per week: The cost of maintaining a partial no-fly zone over Libya. (Be sure to read the rest of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments' backgrounder on the issue.)
So, the US has invaded a third Muslim country, under the pretense that we’ll be greeted as liberators.
Don’t be blinded by the UN resolution, or the coalition. This is another ill-considered fool's errand without an exit strategy.
1. For those who think that invading Iraq was a bad idea, but support invading Libya:
Was Saddam not evil enough? Would Iraq really have worked differently if the US had “international support”, which apparently means France? You’re a hypocrite.
2. For those who think that the invasion of Iraq was a success, and that Libya will also be one:
a: Are you European?
If Iraq was a success, then I don't want to imagine what failure looks like. Go intervene with your austerity militaries. But don’t grandstand while expecting the US to do all of the hard work.
b: Are you American? Did the idea of your government using your tax dollars to subsidize your fellow American’s health insurance make you go crazy?
Does the idea of your government using your tax dollars to nation-build in Libya make more sense?
Let’s do a quick recap. The US is bombing Libya to protect “civilians”. Who are the civilians? Anyone who is fighting Gaddafi? Residents of Benghazi? Can you think of a more nebulous, arbitrary mission?
The people of Libya won’t be safe until Gaddafi is gone. If the US just pushes him back and then pulls out, it’s Iraq in the 1990s. If the US arms the rebels, pushes Gaddafi out, and then leaves, it’s Afghanistan in 1990s. If the US pushes him out and then sticks around, it’s Iraq 2003.
And I’ll wager my life savings that whatever the US/UK/France does, the Arab Muslim world will not be grateful. After all, we’re just in it for the oil.
I wish I saw a way for the US, with Arab support, to save lives and help Libyans to rule themselves. But I’ve lived through the 2000s. And I’ve learned that bombs are not the seeds of democracy. I wish I could say the same about my representatives in the White House.
Don’t be blinded by the UN resolution, or the coalition. This is another ill-considered fool's errand without an exit strategy.
1. For those who think that invading Iraq was a bad idea, but support invading Libya:
Was Saddam not evil enough? Would Iraq really have worked differently if the US had “international support”, which apparently means France? You’re a hypocrite.
2. For those who think that the invasion of Iraq was a success, and that Libya will also be one:
a: Are you European?
If Iraq was a success, then I don't want to imagine what failure looks like. Go intervene with your austerity militaries. But don’t grandstand while expecting the US to do all of the hard work.
b: Are you American? Did the idea of your government using your tax dollars to subsidize your fellow American’s health insurance make you go crazy?
Does the idea of your government using your tax dollars to nation-build in Libya make more sense?
Let’s do a quick recap. The US is bombing Libya to protect “civilians”. Who are the civilians? Anyone who is fighting Gaddafi? Residents of Benghazi? Can you think of a more nebulous, arbitrary mission?
The people of Libya won’t be safe until Gaddafi is gone. If the US just pushes him back and then pulls out, it’s Iraq in the 1990s. If the US arms the rebels, pushes Gaddafi out, and then leaves, it’s Afghanistan in 1990s. If the US pushes him out and then sticks around, it’s Iraq 2003.
And I’ll wager my life savings that whatever the US/UK/France does, the Arab Muslim world will not be grateful. After all, we’re just in it for the oil.
I wish I saw a way for the US, with Arab support, to save lives and help Libyans to rule themselves. But I’ve lived through the 2000s. And I’ve learned that bombs are not the seeds of democracy. I wish I could say the same about my representatives in the White House.
No matter how you spell it, PBOM wishes our friends in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and across Central Asia a great Nowruz. May the coming year bring peace, prosperity and delicious plov for all.
As we've discussed before, the use of precise timelines to describe Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon is unhelpful and misleading. The reality is that Iran's technical capacity has less to do with if or when it decides to build an actual bomb than its political calculus. To move from its current program, which is predicated on nuclear ambiguity, to a dedicated nuclear weapons program would require a difficult political decision. Considering Iran's multifaceted internal debate and the likely consequences of such a move, it's unlikely that the country's leadership would or even could make that decision.
DNI Clapper did a good job of discussing Iran's nuclear progress without help of an exact timeline during his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2011 NIE:
Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.
[...]
We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Read the full testimony here. Let's hope timelines are gone for good.
DNI Clapper did a good job of discussing Iran's nuclear progress without help of an exact timeline during his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2011 NIE:
Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.
[...]
We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Read the full testimony here. Let's hope timelines are gone for good.
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